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Memorandum 246, July 2025
The very fact that Israeli–Saudi normalization remains on the agenda, indicates that the fundamental motivations of Israel, Saudi Arabia, and the United States to advance this goal have not fundamentally changed, even after the momentum toward completing the process was halted by Hamas’ attack on Israel on October 7, 2023, and the ensuing war. The three main states involved in the process are still striving—each for their own reasons—to bring the negotiations to fruition, with the overarching goal being the shaping of a new regional architecture in the Middle East.
This volume brings together articles written by researchers at the Institute for National Security Studies, which examine the positions and interests of various states and non-state actors in the Middle East and beyond, regarding Israeli–Saudi normalization. It explores how these stakeholders might influence the process and its chances of success—either positively or negatively, directly or indirectly.
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Table of Contents:
In its attack on October 7, 2023, Hamas aimed, among other goals, to undermine the prospects of a normalization agreement between Israel and Saudi Arabia. Following the outbreak of the Swords of Iron war, then–US President Joe Biden stated that harming the normalization process was one of Hamas’ objectives in launching the war. He further claimed that the parties had reached a breakthrough on the eve of the Hamas assault. Saudi Arabia also indicated that the sides had been close to an agreement prior to the war, and the impression remains that despite the conflict, the door to such an agreement may still be ajar...
The pursuit of formal relations with Saudi Arabia—envisioned as a path toward creating a regional coalition of moderate Arab states with Israeli participation under U.S. leadership—has been a strategic objective for successive Israeli governments over the past two decades. Israeli leaders have consistently expressed interest in a normalization agreement with Saudi Arabia, and some governments have actively pursued this goal, working to enlist American support for the initiative...
Saudi Arabia has so far remained outside the normalization process with Israel, unlike its Gulf neighbors—Oman, Qatar, Bahrain, and the United Arab Emirates—which over the years have made significant progress in establishing diplomatic and economic ties with Israel. However, in recent years, particularly since Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman effectively became the kingdom’s ruler, the Saudis have been advancing slowly yet steadily toward the establishment of diplomatic relations with Israel in a form of “creeping normalization.” Unlike in the past, senior Saudi officials are now openly and frequently speaking about establishing diplomatic relations with Israel, albeit under certain conditions...
Since the signing of the peace treaty between Israel and Egypt, the United States has worked to expand the circle of peace and promote normalization between Israel and Arab states. In the 1990s, significant progress was made with the signing of the peace treaty with Jordan and the establishment of low-level diplomatic relations between Israel and Morocco, Tunisia, and Gulf states. A historic breakthrough occurred with the signing of the Abraham Accords in 2020, which led to diplomatic relations with the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, and Morocco, as well as Israel’s inclusion in the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) a year later. Since then, both the Biden and Trump administrations have worked to continue and expand normalization between Israel and additional Gulf states, most notably Saudi Arabia....
The normalization agreements signed between Israel and the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, and Morocco in 2020, just a few months after the unveiling of then-President Trump’s “Deal of the Century,” dealt a harsh blow to the Palestinians in general and to the Palestinian Authority in particular....
The normalization process rests on two rationales or conventions related to the legitimacy of the very existence of the State of Israel. The first is recognition of Israel’s existence and its acceptance as a state in the region. The second is recognition of the importance of Israel’s integration into the region and its essential role in a new regional architecture, within which—and under American auspices—a camp of stable and moderate states would be formed....
Egypt and Jordan were the first Arab states to establish peace with Israel—in 1979 and 1994, respectively. For this reason, they find it difficult to oppose outright other Arab countries that follow in their footsteps and join the circle of peace and normalization, even when they are not fully comfortable with their actions. It is no coincidence that Egyptian President Abdel Fattah el- Sisi was the first to welcome the Abraham Accords, despite the Palestinian component being more limited than Cairo would have liked. Egypt also joined the Negev Forum (which convened in 2022 and included the foreign ministers of Israel, Egypt, Morocco, the United Arab Emirates, and Bahrain), even though the Palestinian Authority and Jordan were absent...
As signatories to the Abraham Accords, the United Arab Emirates and the Kingdom of Bahrain are expected to support an Israeli–Saudi normalization agreement, which does not contradict the Abraham Accords and even complements them. Moreover, these countries have pro-American leaderships that maintain neighborly and friendly relations with Saudi Arabia—especially Bahrain, which relies on Riyadh as its patron. That said, various considerations will guide both states in assessing their positions if and when such an agreement is signed, including their relationships with Israel, Saudi Arabia, the United States, and even Iran—and in Bahrain’s case, its internal political situation...
Qatar’s primary national priority is to consolidate an independent and ostensibly neutral position that protects it from the influence and penetration of external powers—chiefly its larger neighbors, Saudi Arabia and Iran. Qatar addresses this challenge by hosting the largest U.S. military base in the region (the regional headquarters of CENTCOM – U.S. Central Command), which serves as a kind of insurance policy and allows it to hedge between regional powers. In particular, over the years Qatar has distinguished itself from the policies and dictates of the GCC (Gulf Cooperation Council) countries—led by Saudi Arabia and the UAE—partly by maintaining good relations with their rivals, Iran and Turkey...
Unlike its Gulf neighbors, Iraq has not been ruled by a single leader since the fall of Saddam Hussein’s regime in 2003 and the establishment of a democratic system led by a government, parliament, and president. These institutions are chosen through a process that provides proportional representation to the ethnic and sectarian groups comprising Iraqi society (Shi’ites, Kurds, Sunnis, and smaller minorities), based on their relative size within the population...
Turkey, which was in fact the first Muslim country to normalize relations with Israel back in 1949, is likely to view a normalization agreement between Israel and Saudi Arabia with skepticism and even disapproval. Its opposition to the Abraham Accords in 2020—and its threat to recall its ambassador from the UAE following their signing—set a precedent in this regard. While relations between Turkey and the Gulf states have improved significantly since then (after years of tension driven by Ankara’s support for Qatar during the blockade, and the fallout from the murder of Saudi journalist Jamal Khashoggi in the Saudi consulate in Istanbul), Turkey is still unlikely to look favorably on a Saudi–Israeli normalization deal....
The members of the “Axis of Resistance,” led by Iran, perceive a potential normalization between Israel and Saudi Arabia as a strategic threat and seek to thwart it. Iran and its proxies—chief among them Hezbollah—view normalization as a potential boost to the military and economic dominance of the Sunni-Western axis, which would hinder their ability to act against Israel. Hassan Nasrallah, former leader of Hezbollah, frequently voiced his opposition to normalization, often launching sharp criticism at Arab states that recognize Israel, accusing them of betraying the Palestinian cause...
For more than two decades, the State of Israel has been subjected to a global delegitimization campaign aimed at undermining its right to exist as the nation-state of the Jewish people. This campaign operates across both the political and civil arenas, with one particularly prominent aspect being the coordinated activity of non-governmental organizations in liberal-democratic countries. These efforts are carried out within the framework of the “Red- Green Alliance,” which entails extensive collaboration between activists and organizations from streams of political Islam (Islamists) and their counterparts on the left (primarily radical socialists with Marxist-Leninist backgrounds)...
Normalization between Saudi Arabia and Israel would place European leaders in a dilemma between principles and interests—between the traditional desire to make the two-state solution a cornerstone of any political process involving Israel and the understanding that Israeli–Saudi normalization serves Europe’s real strategic interests.
Russia’s approach to potential normalization between Israel and Saudi Arabia— mediated by the United States—is shaped by how such a development would impact the political and security landscape of the Middle East, especially in light of the global confrontation Russia is waging against the West on the Ukrainian front and beyond. Following October 7, 2023, Russia aligned itself with the pro-Palestinian and anti-Western axis, targeting Global South audiences with an anti-colonial narrative that calls for the removal of Western influence from their sociopolitical spheres...
In recent years, China has expanded its involvement in the Middle East. While it may appear that Beijing provides unconditional support for Iran, the Gulf states are far more important to China, and its relations with them overshadow its ties with Tehran. China has deepened its connections with the Gulf states in traditional economic areas—such as oil and infrastructure—as well as in advanced technological sectors, including artificial intelligence and space.
The opinions expressed in INSS publications are the authors’ alone.
Publication Series Memoranda