China’s relations with Iran were recently tested during the twelve-day Israel–Iran war and the US strike on Iran’s nuclear sites. While China’s diplomatic statements supported Iran verbally, they did little else. Chinese media reports covered the Iranian minister of defense’s visit to Beijing in June and mentioned the possible supply of air defense systems and fighter jets to Tehran, although China denied the former. As Beijing is typically cautious in its security, defense, and military cooperation with Iran, most public attention in the West and the Middle East tends to focus on Chinese–Iranian relations in energy, trade, economy, infrastructure, and diplomacy. Publications addressing their security relations usually emphasize surveillance systems supplied to Iran, joint military and naval exercises, and the ongoing transfer of technological components and materials to Iran’s defense industry. In the aftermath of the war, one may also expect to see sharing of techno-operational learning between China and Iran, possibly involving their other network partners, Russia and North Korea. This study examines a lesser-known aspect of security-technological cooperation between Beijing and Tehran: joint and expanding academic-technological research linked to the defense establishments of both countries, in fields such as nuclear energy, aerospace, missiles, UAVs, underwater vehicles, and cyber. Drawing on recent academic articles co-authored by Chinese and Iranian experts, it reveals joint research efforts and some convergence between the two countries’ defense innovation ecosystems. This cooperation between China and Iran—respectively the main national security threats to the United States and Israel—poses a potential risk not only to these two allied states but also to their partners in Europe, the Asia-Pacific, and the Middle East. This risk should be recognized, monitored, analyzed, and addressed, both separately and collectively.

The growing involvement of the Gulf states in Africa: interests, opportunities, and implications for the region and for Israel

Donald J. Trump is a unique president. So far, he has proven himself to be an enthusiastic supporter of the State of Israel, and who leads a transformative foreign policy in the Middle East and the global arena. Multiple reasons suggest Israel cannot simply assume such strong US alignment with its interests and policies will persist.  Thus, and in light of current shifts in the global, regional, and Israeli-Palestinian contexts, it is necessary to consider which policy goals Israel should set for its relations with Washington for the remainder of President Trump’s second term. This policy paper outlines changes occurring in the American system and its effects on Israel-United States relations, and concludes with policy recommendations to improve Israel’s strategic posture for years to come.

A review of Israel’s security, diplomatic, and economic interests in the northernmost part of the globe

Israel must present a coherent, multi-stage, and detailed plan for the demilitarization of the Gaza Strip, including the establishment of an international stabilization force, before American and international decisions are made without its involvement