Advanced Technologies and National Security

The global race for artificial intelligence is fundamentally reshaping how states perceive technological infrastructure. While competition in recent decades revolved around control over data, digital platforms, and AI models, it has become clear that a nation's strategic advantage will now largely be determined by its control over the physical AI value chain—spanning critical minerals, advanced chip manufacturing, high-performance computing (Compute) infrastructure, data centers, energy, and frontier models. The competition is no longer over a single component of the AI system, but over the ability to hold significant stakes across the entire AI Stack.

Chinese-made drones pose a range of security, technological, and geopolitical challenges for Israel. What measures should Israel take to mitigate the risks involved?

The restrictions recently imposed on Anthropic — including the U.S. administration’s directive to limit access to certain models for users and entities outside the United States on national security grounds[1] — constitute a significant milestone in the evolving relationship between technology, national security, and foreign policy. Whereas over the past decade, the discourse surrounding digital sovereignty has focused on issues such as privacy, data localization, regulation, and cloud infrastructure, recent developments point to a transition to a new phase in which access to advanced artificial intelligence capabilities is becoming a strategic asset in itself. In this reality, not only data or chips are becoming objects of government policy, but also the models themselves. This article argues that the Anthropic case is not an isolated incident but rather a manifestation of a broader trend, in which artificial intelligence is becoming a central component of national power. As a result, access to advanced models may in the future become a policy tool, a mechanism of geopolitical influence, and a means of advancing strategic interests. For Israel, this development necessitates a reassessment of its approach to technological sovereignty and its policies in the fields of artificial intelligence, computing, and infrastructure, as well as a rethinking of its broader security paradigm. [1] The directive conveyed to Anthropic on June 12 by the Trump administration required the company to terminate access to its Fable 5 and Mythos 5 models for all foreign users, including the company’s foreign employees, users outside the United States, and international clients. According to reports, the company was given a very short timeline to implement the directive, under the threat of civil and criminal sanctions in the event of non-compliance. At a later stage, a limited exemption was granted, allowing the use of Mythos 5 for a small number of critical infrastructure organizations within the United States, while Fable 5 remained restricted.  

How has the new US policy—under which AI is positioned as a foundational component in the chain of command, intelligence gathering, and the planning of complex operations—been reflected on the battlefield, and what conclusions should be drawn in Israel?

The Chinese government recently announced that rare minerals are a national asset, and that organizations and individuals are prohibited from taking control of such resources. The announcement was accompanied by the introduction of a program to track and control all the rare mineral resources at China’s disposal, including their production, processing and export. The announcement links to the fact that the Chinese regime, which is striving for political and financial dominance largely because of its internal needs but also due to its global vision, has identified the decisive importance of the market for metals and minerals—including nickel, copper, cobalt, magnesium, rare earths metals and rare ores and as well as others —for both the Chinese and the global economy, and as an engine of growth in the twenty-first century. The importance of minerals, including rare earth elements, lies primarily in their uses for green energy, the electric vehicle industry, electronic products, medicine, lasers, optical fibers, magnets in the motor industry, various aspects of the security industry, and the global microchip industry. These minerals are the building blocks for all branches of modern industry, and therefore control of their chain of supply is essential for the economic development of China itself, as well as a means to position China as an important player in the global economy, with considerable capabilities that can be leveraged for political influence. Over the past thirty years, China has made huge investments in mines and plants that process and refine critical minerals in Africa, and in some markets it has absolute dominance, up to 90 percent in the case of certain products. This fact has economic and political implications, particularly for China’s relations with the United States, and with countries in Africa, Europe, Asia and Southeast Asia. Israel’s knowledge-intensive industries (hi-tech) and its security industry must limit their exposure to the risk of a global shortage or political or economic restrictions on the imports of special critical minerals, by developing confidential contacts and partnerships in countries with the relevant natural resources in Europe and in Africa.