Hadas Lorber

The restrictions recently imposed on Anthropic — including the U.S. administration’s directive to limit access to certain models for users and entities outside the United States on national security grounds[1] — constitute a significant milestone in the evolving relationship between technology, national security, and foreign policy. Whereas over the past decade, the discourse surrounding digital sovereignty has focused on issues such as privacy, data localization, regulation, and cloud infrastructure, recent developments point to a transition to a new phase in which access to advanced artificial intelligence capabilities is becoming a strategic asset in itself. In this reality, not only data or chips are becoming objects of government policy, but also the models themselves. This article argues that the Anthropic case is not an isolated incident but rather a manifestation of a broader trend, in which artificial intelligence is becoming a central component of national power. As a result, access to advanced models may in the future become a policy tool, a mechanism of geopolitical influence, and a means of advancing strategic interests. For Israel, this development necessitates a reassessment of its approach to technological sovereignty and its policies in the fields of artificial intelligence, computing, and infrastructure, as well as a rethinking of its broader security paradigm. [1] The directive conveyed to Anthropic on June 12 by the Trump administration required the company to terminate access to its Fable 5 and Mythos 5 models for all foreign users, including the company’s foreign employees, users outside the United States, and international clients. According to reports, the company was given a very short timeline to implement the directive, under the threat of civil and criminal sanctions in the event of non-compliance. At a later stage, a limited exemption was granted, allowing the use of Mythos 5 for a small number of critical infrastructure organizations within the United States, while Fable 5 remained restricted.  

How has the new US policy—under which AI is positioned as a foundational component in the chain of command, intelligence gathering, and the planning of complex operations—been reflected on the battlefield, and what conclusions should be drawn in Israel?

Digital sovereignty has, in recent years, become one of the central components of national power, economic resilience, and security. Artificial intelligence, cloud computing, data, and capital-intensive computing infrastructure constitute foundational elements for governmental, military, and economic activity. Accordingly, control over digital infrastructure is not merely a technological or economic issue but a strategic concern of the highest order. Israel, as a powerhouse of technological innovation, currently finds itself in a paradox. It is a leader in the development of advanced technologies and benefits from a highly developed technological ecosystem. At the same time, it is increasingly dependent on digital infrastructures controlled by foreign actors, including global cloud providers, semiconductor supply chains, and a regulatory framework that is not always aligned with the scale of investment, the risks involved, and the unique characteristics of strategic digital infrastructure. This situation presents Israel with a strategic challenge: how to preserve openness and innovation while ensuring control, resilience, and sovereignty over critical digital assets. This paper aims to present a conceptual framework for digital sovereignty, to identify principal policy challenges, and to propose an infrastructural and regulatory agenda for integrated implementation that balances public, economic, and security interests.