What are the implications of the Saudi crown prince’s historic visit to Washington, both for Saudi Arabia and for the United States, and what risks and opportunities does it create for Israel?

Should Israel recognize the pro-Western state located in the Horn of Africa—an area whose security importance for Israel has become even more pronounced over the past two years?

How can victory and decisive defeat be defined – and has Israel achieved them after two years of war in Gaza?

The main foreign policy issue that has preoccupied Egypt recently has been the war in the Gaza Strip. Egypt’s policy toward the war in particular, and toward Israel in general, should be assessed in light of two central factors: first, the prolonged war and its severe consequences in the Gaza Strip—an area that directly borders Egypt; and second, the war’s contribution to the growing prominence of the Palestinian issue on Egypt’s national agenda, which resonates deeply within Egyptian public opinion. In this sense, this current situation is unprecedented in the 45 years of peace between Egypt and Israel. The war has posed a significant test for Egyptian–Israeli relations. At the same time, Egypt’s leadership has had to consider its domestic political and economic agenda—already burdened with challenges—as it formulated its policy toward both the war and Israel. Understanding these two dimensions—Egypt’s position on the Palestinian issue and its internal challenges—helps explain Egypt’s policy toward Israel and the likely implications for relations between the two countries. The analysis and insights presented in this article are based on official statements, as well as commentary and reporting by Egyptian analysts and journalists during the period under review.

The statements and actions of Erdoğan toward Israel raise concerns that “Turkey is the new Iran”—but is this the correct analogy for the Turkish threat?

China’s relations with Iran were recently tested during the twelve-day Israel–Iran war and the US strike on Iran’s nuclear sites. While China’s diplomatic statements supported Iran verbally, they did little else. Chinese media reports covered the Iranian minister of defense’s visit to Beijing in June and mentioned the possible supply of air defense systems and fighter jets to Tehran, although China denied the former. As Beijing is typically cautious in its security, defense, and military cooperation with Iran, most public attention in the West and the Middle East tends to focus on Chinese–Iranian relations in energy, trade, economy, infrastructure, and diplomacy. Publications addressing their security relations usually emphasize surveillance systems supplied to Iran, joint military and naval exercises, and the ongoing transfer of technological components and materials to Iran’s defense industry. In the aftermath of the war, one may also expect to see sharing of techno-operational learning between China and Iran, possibly involving their other network partners, Russia and North Korea. This study examines a lesser-known aspect of security-technological cooperation between Beijing and Tehran: joint and expanding academic-technological research linked to the defense establishments of both countries, in fields such as nuclear energy, aerospace, missiles, UAVs, underwater vehicles, and cyber. Drawing on recent academic articles co-authored by Chinese and Iranian experts, it reveals joint research efforts and some convergence between the two countries’ defense innovation ecosystems. This cooperation between China and Iran—respectively the main national security threats to the United States and Israel—poses a potential risk not only to these two allied states but also to their partners in Europe, the Asia-Pacific, and the Middle East. This risk should be recognized, monitored, analyzed, and addressed, both separately and collectively.