Table of Contents:

Key Findings

Approximately a month and a half into the ceasefire with Iran, the Israeli public is divided regarding the campaign's outcomes: only 41% believe that Israel has already won or will likely win, compared to roughly half who believe that Israel will likely not win or has already lost the campaign against Iran. The perception of victory is highly polarized politically: 70% of coalition voters believe that Israel has won or will win against Iran, whereas 74% of opposition voters believe that Israel has lost or will not win against Iran. Public satisfaction with Israel’s military achievements in Iran has declined across the board—currently standing at 37%, compared to 60% in March. Satisfaction with diplomatic achievements is even lower, standing at a mere 22%.

On the northern front, the majority of the public (59%) believes that Israel should intensify the fighting against Hezbollah, and 57% support the establishment of a permanent Israeli security zone within Lebanese territory.

Public trust in the IDF remains high, though it continues to erode compared to the beginning of the campaign—74% express high trust in the IDF, compared to 79% in early March. Trust in the government remains low and continues to decline, with only 26% expressing high trust in it. A majority of 63% of the public believes that solidarity within Israeli society is either absent or exists only to a limited extent.

Methodology

The survey was conducted in May 2026, approximately a month and a half into the ceasefire with Iran and Lebanon, and against the backdrop of ongoing limited fighting against Hezbollah. The survey was led by the Data Analytics Center at the Institute for National Security Studies (INSS). Data collection was carried out online, with 805 respondents completing the survey in Hebrew and 154 in Arabic, assisted by iPanel.

Following sectoral weighting, the sample constitutes a representative sample of the adult Israeli population (ages 18 and above). The maximum sampling error for the entire sample is ±3.16%, at a confidence level of 95%.

Click here to view trends among the Jewish public | Click here to view trends among the Arab public

Full Findings

Trust in Public Figures and Institutions

Trust in the security establishment remains relatively high, though further erosion is evident compared to the beginning of the current campaign against Iran. Concurrently, trust in the government remains low and highly polarized.

• 74% of the public express high trust in the IDF (33% "to a great extent" and 41% "to a fairly great extent"), compared to 24% who report low trust. This represents a continued downward trend in trust compared to the beginning of the campaign—from 79% at the beginning of March to 78% in April, and a current 74%. This marks a return to the levels of trust recorded prior to the campaign against Iran (76% in February and 73% in January).

  • Political breakdown: 86% of coalition voters and 76% of opposition voters express high trust in the IDF.
  • Sectoral breakdown: 85% of the Jewish public express high trust in the IDF, compared to only 29% among the Arab public.

• 26% of the public express high trust in the Israeli government, compared to 72% who report low trust. Compared to the beginning of the campaign, the declining trend in trust in the government continues—from 34% at the beginning of March, to 30% in April, down to a current 26%.

  • Political breakdown: 56% of coalition voters express high trust in the government, compared to only 5% among opposition voters.
  • Sectoral breakdown: 32% of the Jewish public express high trust in the government, compared to only 5% among the Arab public.

• 60% of the public express high trust in the IDF Chief of Staff, Lieutenant General Herzi Halevi, compared to 33% who report low trust. Compared to the beginning of the current campaign, a continuous decline is recorded in the rate of high trust—from 71% at the beginning of March, to 68% in April, down to a current 60%. Here too, trust levels have returned to those measured at the beginning of the year (63% in February and 61% in January).

  • Political breakdown: 63% of coalition voters and 68% of opposition voters express high trust in the Chief of Staff.
  • Sectoral breakdown: 69% of the Jewish public express high trust in the Chief of Staff, compared to only 22% among the Arab public.

• One-third of the public (33%) express high trust in Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, compared to 65% who express low trust in him. This represents a level similar to that measured in April (32%), but lower than the level recorded at the beginning of the campaign (38%).

  • Political breakdown: 72% of coalition voters express high trust in the Prime Minister, compared to only 6% among opposition voters.
  • Sectoral breakdown: 40% of the Jewish public express high trust in the Prime Minister, compared to only 6% among the Arab public.

Perception of Threats and Challenges

The public’s assessment of Israel's national security remains relatively low. Although the sense of personal security is higher than that measured at the outset of the current campaign against Iran, it is still not particularly high. Looking at the various fronts in comparison to the period prior to October 7, the public believes that the situation has worsened in Lebanon, Iran, and Judea and Samaria, while perceptions regarding the Gaza Strip and Syria are more positive.

• 26% of the public rate the current national security situation as good or very good, 34% rate it as poor or very poor, and 38% rate it as moderate. Compared to the beginning of the current campaign against Iran, the situation is now perceived more negatively: at the beginning of March, 38% rated the national security situation as good or very good, and only 27% as poor or very poor.

• • Political breakdown: 49% of coalition voters rate the national security situation as good or very good, compared to only 10% among opposition voters. Conversely, 48% of opposition voters rate the situation as poor or very poor, compared to only 14% among coalition voters.
  • Sectoral breakdown: 31% of the Jewish public rate the national security situation as good or very good, compared to only 6% among the Arab public. Conversely, 51% of the Arab public rate the situation as poor or very poor, compared to 30% among the Jewish public.

• 32% of the public report a high or very high sense of personal security, 41% report a moderate sense of security, and 26% report a low or very low sense of security. Compared to the beginning of the campaign, this reflects a moderate improvement: at the beginning of March, only 26% reported a high sense of security, and 32% reported a low sense of security.

  • Political breakdown: 54% of coalition voters report a high sense of personal security, compared to only 16% among opposition voters.
  • Sectoral breakdown: 38% of the Jewish public report a high sense of personal security, compared to only 8% among the Arab public. Conversely, 47% of the Arab public report a low or very low sense of personal security, compared to 21% among the Jewish public.

Security-Diplomatic Threats and Challenges

The Various Fronts

• Compared to the period prior to October 7, the majority of the public believes that Israel's situation has worsened on the Lebanon, Iran, and Judea and Samaria fronts, while improving on the Gaza and Syria fronts.

  • Lebanon: 48% believe that Israel's security situation has worsened, compared to only 28% who believe it has improved.
  • Iran: 45% believe that the situation has worsened, compared to 31% who believe it has improved.
  • Judea and Samaria: 42% believe that the situation has worsened, compared to only 25% who believe it has improved.
  • Yemen: 35% believe that the situation has worsened, compared to only 22% who believe it has improved.
  • Gaza: 43% believe that Israel's security situation has improved, compared to 33% who believe it has worsened.
  • Syria: 40% believe that the situation has improved, compared to only 22% who believe it has worsened.
  • Political breakdown: On nearly all fronts, a more positive outlook is evident among coalition voters than among opposition voters. For example, regarding Iran, 54% of coalition voters believe that Israel's situation has improved, compared to only 13% among opposition voters; regarding Gaza, 63% of coalition voters believe the situation has improved, compared to 29% among opposition voters; and regarding Lebanon, 44% of coalition voters believe the situation has improved, compared to only 16% among opposition voters.
  • Sectoral breakdown: Notable gaps are evident here as well. Regarding Iran, 36% of the Jewish public believe that Israel's situation has improved, compared to only 14% among the Arab public. Regarding Lebanon, 32% of the Jewish public believe the situation has improved, compared to only 12% among the Arab public. Conversely, 67% of the Arab public believe that the situation in Lebanon has worsened, compared to 43% among the Jewish public. 

The Iran Front

Approximately a month and a half into the ceasefire with Iran, the public is divided on whether Israel has won or is expected to win the campaign, and expresses only limited satisfaction with the military and diplomatic achievements. The gaps between coalition and opposition voters remain particularly sharp.

• 41% of the public believe that Israel has already won or will likely win the campaign against Iran, compared to 49% who believe that Israel will likely not win or has already lost. 10% responded "don't know."

  • Political breakdown: 70% of coalition voters believe that Israel has already won or will likely win, compared to only 16% among opposition voters. Conversely, 74% of opposition voters believe that Israel will likely not win or has already lost, compared to 22% among coalition voters.
  • Sectoral breakdown: 45.5% of the Jewish public believe that Israel has already won or will likely win, compared to 24% among the Arab public. Conversely, 62% of the Arab public believe that Israel will likely not win or has already lost, compared to 45.5% among the Jewish public.

• 37% of the public express high satisfaction with the military achievements in Iran, compared to 25% who are dissatisfied. One-third of the public expressed a moderate level of satisfaction. Compared to the survey conducted during the campaign there has been a sharp decline in satisfaction with the military achievements—from 60% to 37%.

  • Political breakdown: 56% of coalition voters are satisfied with the military achievements, compared to only 24% among opposition voters.
  • Sectoral breakdown: 42% of the Jewish public are satisfied with the military achievements, compared to only 19% among the Arab public.

• Only 22% express high satisfaction with Israel's diplomatic achievements in the campaign against Iran, compared to 48% who are dissatisfied. 25% expressed a moderate level of satisfaction.

  • Political breakdown: 42% of coalition voters are satisfied with the diplomatic achievements, compared to only 8.5% among opposition voters.
  • Sectoral breakdown: 26% of the Jewish public are satisfied with the diplomatic achievements, compared to only 9% among the Arab public.

The Lebanon Front

Against the backdrop of the ongoing fighting in Lebanon, the majority of the public supports intensifying the fighting against Hezbollah and establishing a permanent Israeli security zone within Lebanese territory. However, on this front as well, the public is divided on whether Israel has already won or is expected to win the campaign against Hezbollah.

• 59% of the public believe that Israel should intensify the fighting against Hezbollah, compared to 30% who believe it should avoid a broad escalation. 11% responded "don't know."

  • Political breakdown: 84% of coalition voters support intensifying the fighting, compared to 50% among opposition voters.
  • Sectoral breakdown: 69.5% of the Jewish public support deepening the fighting, compared to only 15% among the Arab public. Conversely, 74% of the Arab public believe that Israel should avoid a broad escalation.

• 57% support establishing a permanent Israeli security zone within Lebanese territory (30% "somewhat support" and 27% "strongly support"), compared to 29% who oppose it. 14% responded "don't know."

  • Political breakdown: 82% of coalition voters support a permanent security zone, compared to 43% among opposition voters.
  • Sectoral breakdown: 63.5% of the Jewish public support this, compared to only 27% among the Arab public.

• 45% of the public believe that Israel has already won or will likely win the campaign against Hezbollah, compared to an identical percentage who believe that Israel will likely not win or has already lost. 10% responded "don't know."

  • Political breakdown: 67% of coalition voters believe that Israel has already won or will likely win, compared to only 27% among opposition voters.
  • Sectoral breakdown: 48.5% of the Jewish public believe that Israel has already won or will likely win, compared to 32.5% among the Arab public.

The Gaza Front

The public continues to express relative pessimism regarding the state of the campaign against Hamas, alongside dissatisfaction with how the Gaza ceasefire agreement has been enforced.

• 42% of the public believe that Israel has already won or will likely win the campaign against Hamas, compared to 49% who believe that Israel will likely not win or has already lost. 9% responded "don't know."

  • Political breakdown: 66.5% of coalition voters believe that Israel has already won or will likely win, compared to only 21% among opposition voters.
  • Sectoral breakdown: 45% of the Jewish public believe that Israel has already won or will likely win, compared to 31% among the Arab public.

• 59% of the public are dissatisfied with how the ceasefire agreement in Gaza has been enforced so far, compared to 31% who report satisfaction. 10% responded "don't know." This rate is nearly identical to the one measured in January (58.5%).

  • Political breakdown: 70.5% of opposition voters are dissatisfied with how it is enforced, compared to 56% among coalition voters.
  • Sectoral breakdown: 62% of the Jewish public are dissatisfied, compared to 49% among the Arab public.

Israel's Foreign Relations

The Israeli public currently tends to view US President Donald Trump as a leader whose support for Israel is conditional, rather than as a leader deeply committed to its security interests. At the same time, the majority of the public perceives China as an unfriendly or hostile country toward Israel.

• More than half (54%) of the public believe that Trump supports Israel only when doing so serves his own interests, while an additional 21% believe that Trump is unpredictable and therefore difficult to rely on regarding security matters. Only 21% view President Trump as a leader committed to protecting Israel's security interests.

  • Compared to the beginning of the campaign against Iran in March, a significant decline is evident in the percentage of those who view Trump as a leader committed to protecting Israel (dropping from 34.5% to 21%), alongside an increase in the percentage of those who believe his support for Israel is conditional on his own interests (rising from 45% to 54%).
  • Political breakdown: 33% of coalition voters view Trump as a leader committed to protecting Israel, compared to only 10% among opposition voters. Conversely, 64% of opposition voters believe that his support for Israel is conditional on his own interests, compared to 49.5% among coalition voters.
  • Sectoral breakdown: 59.5% of the Jewish public believe that Trump supports Israel only when doing so serves his own interests, compared to only 34% among the Arab public. Conversely, 35% of the Arab public view him as an unpredictable president, compared to 17.5% among the Jewish public.

• 53.5% of the public believe that China is an unfriendly or hostile country toward Israel, compared to only 25% who view it as an ally or a friendly country. 21.5% responded "don't know."

  • Political breakdown: 59% of opposition voters believe that China is unfriendly or hostile to Israel, compared to 56% among coalition voters.
  • Sectoral breakdown: 58% of the Jewish public view China as an unfriendly or hostile country, compared to 34% among the Arab public. Conversely, among the Arab public, 43% view China as an ally or a friendly country to Israel, compared to only 21% among the Jewish public.

Internal-Societal Threats and Challenges

Civil-Military Relations

The public tends to view the IDF as an institution that enables service without compromising the identity of soldiers from diverse groups or sectors; at the same time, there are concerns regarding the erosion of discipline and values. The perception of solidarity within Israeli society remains low.

• 56% believe that the IDF enables soldiers from diverse groups or sectors to serve in a manner that does not compromise their personal identity, compared to 33% who believe it does so only to a limited extent or not at all. 11% responded "don't know."

  • Political breakdown: 67% of opposition voters believe that the IDF enables service without compromising personal identity, compared to 50.5% among coalition voters.
  • Sectoral breakdown: 61% of the Jewish public hold this view, compared to only 36% among the Arab public.
  • Religious breakdown: As the level of religiosity increases, the perception that the IDF enables service without compromising personal identity decreases. This view is held by 72% of the secular public, 64% of the traditional public, 49.5% of the religious public, and only 15% of the ultra-Orthodox (Haredi) public.

• Among the Jewish public, 59% are concerned about erosion of discipline and values of the IDF, compared to 36% who are not concerned.

  • Political breakdown: 85% of Jewish opposition voters are concerned about such erosion, compared to only 39.5% among Jewish coalition voters. Conversely, 55.5% of Jewish coalition voters are not concerned, compared to only 14% among Jewish opposition voters.

The Resilience of Israeli Society

• 63% believe that solidarity within Israeli society does not exist at all or exists only to a limited extent, compared to 31% who believe it exists to a great or very great extent. This represents stability relative to previous months: 66% in February and 65% in January.

  • Political breakdown: 79% of opposition voters believe that solidarity does not exist or exists only to a limited extent, compared to only 50% among coalition voters.
  • Sectoral breakdown: 62% of the Jewish public believe that solidarity does not exist or exists only to a limited extent, compared to 67% among the Arab public.
  • Religious breakdown: 72.5% of the secular public believe that solidarity does not exist or exists only to a limited extent, compared to 62% of the traditional public, 31.5% of the religious public, and 54% of the ultra-Orthodox (Haredi) public.