The war called by Israel “Swords of Iron” began with an unprecedented surprise attack by Hamas that led to the death of hundreds of Israelis and the abduction of dozens more. The Institute for National Security Studies (INSS) is following the events carefully, providing situation updates and policy recommendations for decision makers and the general public.
Achieving the War’s Objectives and Improving Israel’s Long-Term Security: Recommended Policy for Ending the War with a Victory
This policy paper outlines the recommended strategy for ending the war in the Gaza Strip while fully achieving its objectives and improving Israel’s long-term strategic posture. The majority of the principles and proposed course of action presented in this document align with the Egyptian–Arab proposal for ending the war, which was presented in April 2025 and has not been discussed by the Israeli government. It is proposed that the principles of this plan serve as a basis for negotiations As part of these negotiations, the following demands should be added: the disarmament of Hamas and the assurance that it will not be able to rebuild its military capabilities. Most importantly, steps must be taken to prevent the integration of Hamas into any future Palestinian governing framework.
The Debate That Isn’t Happening: “Gideon’s Chariots” vs. the Egyptian Plan
A comprehensive comparison between the plan to conquer Gaza and the Egyptian proposal for a ceasefire, the release of hostages, and the establishment of an alternative administration in the Strip
Israeli policymakers have relied on cumulative deterrence strategies to combat terrorism. However, Israel has consistently failed to deter Hamas’ attacks, not only on October 7 but also in 2008-09, 2012, 2014, and 2021. A critical yet often overlooked observation is that cumulative deterrence strategies coupled with robust denial capabilities can lead to an attrition trap, which serves as a victory strategy for weaker actors, ultimately resulting in deterrence failure rather than success. This article employs lessons from cases of both successful and failed deterrence in a longitudinal study of the Arab-Israeli conflict. It argues, firstly, that in challenging contests of resolve, actors can escape the attrition trap when they move beyond cumulative deterrence strategies and employ land maneuvers that systematically target the strategies of terrorist organizations, thus addressing the credibility problem. Secondly, such wars can potentially lead to overextension and further wars of attrition, which means defenders must know when to stop and disengage, ensuring the balance of legitimacy and resolve remains favorable to them. This paper asserts that Hamas remained undeterred throughout the conflict because Israel viewed reliance on cumulative deterrence strategies and its robust denial capability, the Iron Dome, as less costly than engaging in a war of maneuver, which was essential to resolving Israel’s credibility issue regarding its willingness to act.
