Since the outbreak of the war in Gaza, the Institute for National Security Studies has been regularly conducting public opinion surveys to assess attitudes toward key national security issues, national resilience, and public trust.[1]
A noticeable rise in public trust across both defense and political institutions has been observed since the launch of the campaign against Iran.
Most of the public supports the attack on Iran and believes the decision was primarily based on security considerations.
Nonetheless, around 70% of respondents are concerned about how the campaign may evolve, and nearly half believe the government lacks a plan to conclude it.
A large majority expects the war to last up to a month, and most believe the civilian home front is prepared to endure its consequences for up to three months.
The majority of the public is satisfied with the performance of the Home Front Command and feels that its instructions are clear.
The number of those who believe the Gaza war objectives will largely or fully be achieved has increased, accompanied by a growing sentiment that the time has come to end the war.
A significant number of people now believe that the US President is strongly committed to protecting Israel’s interests.
There has been an increase in public perception that social solidarity has strengthened during this period.
Trust in People and Institutions
Key Findings:
Trust in the IDF has now increased to approximately 82%, up from 75.5% in May 2025.
Government trust has climbed to 30%, compared to 21% in May.
Trust in the Air Force has surged to 83%, from 71% in April.
Trust in Military Intelligence has risen to 74%, up from 61% in December 2024.
Trust in the Mossad remains high at 81%.
Trust in the chief of staff has increased significantly to 69% among the general public, up from 56% in May, and to 81% specifically among the Jewish public, up from 67.5%.
Trust in the prime minister has climbed to 35%, compared to 26% in May.
Trust in the minister of defense has increased to 32%, up from 25% in March.
Trust in the IDF spokesperson’s reports is now 63% among the general public and specifically 71.5% among the Jewish public, up from 55% and 64% respectively in May.
Home Front Command Performance
Key Findings:
A large majority of respondents—74.5%—expressed high satisfaction with the Home Front Command’s performance on the night of the Iran strike, compared to 72% during the October 2024 Iranian attack.
The percentage of the public who are generally satisfied with the Home Front Command stands at 78.5%.
A large majority of the public at 74% found the instructions during the first night of Iran’s strike clear, compared to 77% during the October 2024 strike.
Currently, 89% feels the instructions are clear to a large or very large extent.
The most common source of updates is the Home Front Command app, used by 53.5% of the public, followed by officials on various channels (23%), social media (16.5%), and IDF spokesperson’s announcements (4.5%).
The Iranian Front—Operation “Rising Lion”
Key Findings:
A majority of the public at 73% supports the Israeli attack on Iran, while 18% opposes it.
Some 76% of the public believes the decision was based on security considerations to a large or very large extent.
A majority of 73% of the public is satisfied with the defense system’s actions in Iran to a large or very large extent.
Only 9% believes the Iranian nuclear threat will be fully removed; 49.5% thinks it will be mostly removed; 27.5% believes it will only be slightly reduced; and 6% thinks it won’t be removed at all.
Around 70% of the public is very or somewhat concerned about how the campaign against Iran will unfold.
Only 6% of the public believes the campaign will last a few days; 61.5% thinks it will last a week to a month; 19.5% believes it will continue one to three months; 3% thinks three months to a year; and 1% expects it to last over a year.
Some 60% of the public believes the Israeli home front is well or very well prepared for the Iran conflict; 35% thinks it is poorly or very poorly prepared.
About 49% believes the public will be able to endure the war and its consequences (casualties, evacuations, economic impact, and so forth) for up to one month; 27% believes for up to 2–3 months; 8.5% up to 4–6 months; 3% up to a year; and 3.5% more than a year.
Approximately 61% of the public thinks Israel should aim not only to neutralize the nuclear threat but also to topple the Iranian regime, while 28% thinks the focus should remain on the nuclear threat alone.
Some 47% of the public believes the Israeli government lacks an exit strategy for the Iran campaign; 41% believes it has one.
The Gazan Front
Key Findings:
Approximately 63% of the public and 70% of the Jewish respondents believe the IDF will win the Gaza war, similar to 61% and 69.5% in May.
About 55% of the public and 62% of the Jewish public believe the war goals in Gaza will be fully or largely achieved, up from 46% and 54% in May.
Support for ending the Gaza war has risen sharply, with 60.5% of the general public and 53% of Jewish respondents now holding this view, compared to 49% and 41%, respectively, in January 2025.
Reserve Duty
Key Findings:
A majority of Jewish respondents—65.5%—would encourage a family member who already served in combat reserves to respond to another call-up, up from 55.5% in May 2025.
US–Israel Relations
Key Findings:
A growing portion of the public—29%—believe President Trump is strongly committed to defending Israel’s interests, compared to 20% in May.
Half of the respondents think Trump supports Israel only when it serves his own interests, down from 51.5%.
A smaller segment—18%—considers Trump unpredictable and therefore unreliable on security matters, down from 23%.
Israeli Society’s Resilience
Key Findings:
Some 27.5% of the public reports high or very high personal security (compared to 28.5% in May); 32.5% report low or very low security (up from 25.5%).
Nearly half of the public—48%—believes the sense of solidarity in Israeli society has strengthened or greatly strengthened, up from 30% in March 2025.
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[1] The survey was conducted between June 15–16, 2025, by the Data Analytics Center at the Institute for National Security Studies. The fieldwork was carried out by iPanel through online interviews with 800 Jewish and 151 Arab respondents, forming a representative sample of the adult population in Israel aged 18 and over. The data are weighted by sector. The maximum sampling error for the entire sample is ±3.2% at a 95% confidence level.
The opinions expressed in INSS publications are the authors’ alone.
This survey is the second one conducted in June 2025, focusing on the Israeli campaign against Iran. The survey was carried out before the ceasefire was announced
03/07/25
IDF Spokesperson's Unit (INSS modifications)
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