Udi Dekel

The Israeli government’s policy in Judea and Samaria is in the middle of a broad political-ideological transformation. How is this reflected in practice, and why does it pose a significant security and diplomatic risk for Israel?

Assuming that Operation Roaring Lion does not end in the complete defeat of Hezbollah, the issue of disarming Hezbollah will remain on the agenda at its conclusion—an interest shared by both Israel and the Lebanese state. This article proposes adopting the DDR model—Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration—and advancing an L(ebanon)DDR process as an orderly framework for disarming Hezbollah and integrating it into Lebanon, alongside repairing, rebuilding, and strengthening the Lebanese state. This framework offers an alternative to disarming Hezbollah through military force, which would require Israel to occupy all of Lebanon. Although it is clear that Hezbollah will not relinquish its weapons easily, the current circumstances present an opportunity to force this outcome through combined Lebanese–Israeli, regional, and international efforts. These circumstances include the willingness of Israel and Lebanon to enter into direct political negotiations; the military weakening of Hezbollah (and Iran) following the war; the IDF’s presence in southern Lebanon; and the growing support within Lebanon for disarming Hezbollah. On April 9, Israel agreed to President Aoun’s proposal to open direct negotiations with Lebanon to promote a peace arrangement and disarm Hezbollah. This objective is the central challenge on the path to an agreement between the two states, which would establish the Lebanese government’s monopoly over the use of military force. Experience from DDR processes suggests that this model can help, as it offers a long-term, supervised, and gradual process that combines disarmament with civil, social, and economic rehabilitation, alongside international support and reciprocal incentives for all parties involved.

To leverage the military success against Iran into a strategic achievement, a mechanism for cooperation with the United States and the moderate Arab states is required

The memorandum proposes a research framework for analyzing and understanding a major strategic challenge facing the State of Israel: an accelerating slide toward a “one-state” reality between the Jordan River and the Mediterranean Sea. Such an outcome is expected to severely undermine the Zionist vision of a Jewish, democratic, secure, and prosperous state. The memorandum examines the main drivers pushing Israel toward a one-state model. These include the erosion of the two-state paradigm; the weakening of the Palestinian Authority; settlement, outposts and farms expansion in Judea and Samaria; and the growing intermingling of Israeli and Palestinian populations. The memorandum outlines several plausible scenarios for a one-state reality, concluding that such a development would likely trigger violent escalation, severely damage Israel’s international standing, and lead to a breakdown of Israeli social cohesion and economic stability. To prevent this trajectory, the authors recommend advancing political, geographic, and demographic separation steps from the Palestinians; strengthening the Palestinian Authority as the only viable partner for cooperation; maintaining Israel’s overriding security responsibility; and mobilizing moderate Arab states to promote normalization, support and improve the Palestinian economy.

What options are available to Israel with regard to its conduct in the Gaza Strip in 2026—and how should it act?

Did Israel miss the (last) chance for a two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict? With the growing debate among the Israeli public about the viability of a two-state solution, and the lack of public knowledge about the Annapolis process and how close Israel may have been to “two states for two peoples,” INSS recently published a memorandum on the Annapolis process (2007-2008). The Annapolis process saw the convergence of optimum conditions for negotiations, with a golden opportunity to reach a settlement: calm after the years of the second intifada; trust between Prime Minister Olmert and President Mahmoud Abbas; an outline for negotiations drawn up in advance with the Palestinians and the United States; the involvement of professional elements on the specific issues; a supportive international system; and more. Nonetheless, the professional and practical talks did not bring about the sought agreement. The Biden administration, which hopes to promote the two-state option, could learn from the lessons of Annapolis, if it seeks to restart the political process.