CV
Brigadier General (res.) Udi Dekel joined the Institute for National Security Studies (INSS) in 2012. He served as Managing Director of INSS for ten years and is currently the Director of the research program "Conflict to Agreements".
Dekel was the head of the negotiating team with the Palestinians under Prime Minister Ehud Olmert during the 2007-8 Annapolis process.
Brig. Gen. (res.) Dekel filled many senior IDF positions in intelligence, international military cooperation, and strategic planning, His last post in the IDF was head of the Strategic Planning Division in the General Staff. Previously he served as head of the Foreign Relations Division in the General Staff and head of the Research and Production Department in the Israeli Air Force Intelligence. Brig. Gen. (res.) Dekel served as head of the Israel-UN-Lebanon committee following the Second Lebanon War and head of military committees with Egypt and Jordan. In addition, he headed a working group on strategic-operative cooperation with the United States. He served on the 2006 commission to update Israel's security concept and coordinated the formulation of IDF strategy.

Udi Dekel
Director of the research program "Conflict to Agreements"
udid@inss.org.il
03-640-0400
Publications
All PublicationsE1 – Construction Today, Undermining an Arrangement Tomorrow
The publication of a tender to build 1,234 housing units in E1 crosses a threshold that Israeli governments have avoided for years, due to American and European opposition. What are the implications of this controversial move?
9 September, 2026Towards Expanding the “Abraham Accords” and Normalization Between Israel and Saudi Arabia
Saudi Arabia is in the midst of an unprecedented economic revolution, through which it seeks to position itself as a regional technological and economic power. At the same time, the entire Middle East is undergoing a process of transformation in terms of the balance of power and regional arrangements, a process involving states seeking to establish a regional order characterized by cooperation and stability, including the United States and the pragmatic Sunni states: Jordan, Egypt, the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, and Saudi Arabia.
10 August, 2026Hamas Disarmament Agreement: Motives, Core Elements, and Obstacles
What does the agreement dubbed "historic" by the U.S. President include, what are the main obstacles to its implementation – and how should Israel act?
3 August, 2026Alternatives for the Gaza Strip Following the Campaign Against Iran
As the campaign against Iran winds down, attention is expected to return to the Gaza Strip. In the meantime, Hamas is exploiting the strategic vacuum to rehabilitate its governance and military capabilities. Simultaneously, the Trump framework remains stalled, and the “Board of Peace” faces professional, operational, and budgetary difficulties in advancing its declared objectives. The issue of demilitarization remains trapped between Israel’s demand for the complete and immediate disarmament of Hamas and the organization’s stalling tactics.
Israel faces three main alternatives: (1) Renewal of efforts to fully implement the Trump framework across the Strip, a course that carries the risk of “mock demilitarization” and depends on Hamas’s consent; (2) Gradual stabilization and reconstruction of areas cleared of Hamas while continuing to erode its control in areas still under its rule. This option is vulnerable to violent disruption and could entrench the Strip’s division; (3) A return to war and the reoccupation of the Gaza Strip, which would entail extremely heavy military, economic, and diplomatic costs for Israel.
The key recommendation is to avoid perpetuating the status quo, which establishes Hamas’s rule, and instead adopt a proactive approach. Israel should allow the implementation of the Mladenov framework for gradual demilitarization, beginning with heavy weapons, while coordinating with the Trump administration regarding scenarios that would justify use of force. If Hamas obstructs the process, Israel should implement a differential alternative: the entry of a civilian committee and Palestinian police into “green zones” cleared of Hamas (alongside increasing Israeli security responsibility modeled on Judea and Samaria). Simultaneously, Hamas’s capabilities and governance in the “red zone” should be systematically degraded, including the gradual erosion of its territorial control. The alternative of returning to war and military occupation should remain a last-resort alternative, contingent on the formulation of an exit strategy and a designated body to assume civilian responsibility.
10 June, 2026The Israeli-Palestinian Conflict: Moving Away from the Ability to Find and Promote Solutions
Did Israel miss the (last) chance for a two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict? With the growing debate among the Israeli public about the viability of a two-state solution, and the lack of public knowledge about the Annapolis process and how close Israel may have been to “two states for two peoples,” INSS recently published a memorandum on the Annapolis process (2007-2008). The Annapolis process saw the convergence of optimum conditions for negotiations, with a golden opportunity to reach a settlement: calm after the years of the second intifada; trust between Prime Minister Olmert and President Mahmoud Abbas; an outline for negotiations drawn up in advance with the Palestinians and the United States; the involvement of professional elements on the specific issues; a supportive international system; and more. Nonetheless, the professional and practical talks did not bring about the sought agreement. The Biden administration, which hopes to promote the two-state option, could learn from the lessons of Annapolis, if it seeks to restart the political process.
2021-07-01 All magazine articles
Media
All media How to secure Israel’s future amid escalating threats
23 August, 2024