Udi Dekel

As the campaign against Iran winds down, attention is expected to return to the Gaza Strip. In the meantime, Hamas is exploiting the strategic vacuum to rehabilitate its governance and military capabilities. Simultaneously, the Trump framework remains stalled, and the “Board of Peace” faces professional, operational, and budgetary difficulties in advancing its declared objectives. The issue of demilitarization remains trapped between Israel’s demand for the complete and immediate disarmament of Hamas and the organization’s stalling tactics. Israel faces three main alternatives: (1) Renewal of efforts to fully implement the Trump framework across the Strip, a course that carries the risk of “mock demilitarization” and depends on Hamas’s consent; (2) Gradual stabilization and reconstruction of areas cleared of Hamas while continuing to erode its control in areas still under its rule. This option is vulnerable to violent disruption and could entrench the Strip’s division; (3) A return to war and the reoccupation of the Gaza Strip, which would entail extremely heavy military, economic, and diplomatic costs for Israel. The key recommendation is to avoid perpetuating the status quo, which establishes Hamas’s rule, and instead adopt a proactive approach. Israel should allow the implementation of the Mladenov framework for gradual demilitarization, beginning with heavy weapons, while coordinating with the Trump administration regarding scenarios that would justify use of force. If Hamas obstructs the process, Israel should implement a differential alternative: the entry of a civilian committee and Palestinian police into “green zones” cleared of Hamas (alongside increasing Israeli security responsibility modeled on Judea and Samaria). Simultaneously, Hamas’s capabilities and governance in the “red zone” should be systematically degraded, including the gradual erosion of its territorial control. The alternative of returning to war and military occupation should remain a last-resort alternative, contingent on the formulation of an exit strategy and a designated body to assume civilian responsibility.

The integrated map offers a broad, clear, and accessible visual overview of the current state and plans for transportation, communication, and energy infrastructure in the Middle East. At a time when regional infrastructure is becoming a central factor in shaping economic, political, and security relations, the map enables a rapid understanding of the complex network of connections spanning across the region. By integrating multiple layers of information, users can focus on each domain separately or explore interactions among them, including land and maritime transport routes, communication lines, and digital infrastructure, as well as energy transmission networks for oil, gas, and renewable energy. The map highlights not only what currently exists in practice, but also initiatives in planning, projects under development, and future opportunities for regional cooperation. This interactive presentation allows users to identify key trends, understand how infrastructure influences the flow of goods, information, and energy, and pinpoint strategic nodes. In this way, the map serves as a decision-support tool for policymakers, researchers, professionals, and the broader public alike. Beyond presenting data, the integrated map provides a wider geographical, economic, and strategic context, helping to interpret the evolving dynamics of the Middle East, where infrastructure is not only a means of connection but also a central driver in shaping a shared regional future.

The Israeli government’s policy in Judea and Samaria is in the middle of a broad political-ideological transformation. How is this reflected in practice, and why does it pose a significant security and diplomatic risk for Israel?

Assuming that Operation Roaring Lion does not end in the complete defeat of Hezbollah, the issue of disarming Hezbollah will remain on the agenda at its conclusion—an interest shared by both Israel and the Lebanese state. This article proposes adopting the DDR model—Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration—and advancing an L(ebanon)DDR process as an orderly framework for disarming Hezbollah and integrating it into Lebanon, alongside repairing, rebuilding, and strengthening the Lebanese state. This framework offers an alternative to disarming Hezbollah through military force, which would require Israel to occupy all of Lebanon. Although it is clear that Hezbollah will not relinquish its weapons easily, the current circumstances present an opportunity to force this outcome through combined Lebanese–Israeli, regional, and international efforts. These circumstances include the willingness of Israel and Lebanon to enter into direct political negotiations; the military weakening of Hezbollah (and Iran) following the war; the IDF’s presence in southern Lebanon; and the growing support within Lebanon for disarming Hezbollah. On April 9, Israel agreed to President Aoun’s proposal to open direct negotiations with Lebanon to promote a peace arrangement and disarm Hezbollah. This objective is the central challenge on the path to an agreement between the two states, which would establish the Lebanese government’s monopoly over the use of military force. Experience from DDR processes suggests that this model can help, as it offers a long-term, supervised, and gradual process that combines disarmament with civil, social, and economic rehabilitation, alongside international support and reciprocal incentives for all parties involved.

To leverage the military success against Iran into a strategic achievement, a mechanism for cooperation with the United States and the moderate Arab states is required

Did Israel miss the (last) chance for a two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict? With the growing debate among the Israeli public about the viability of a two-state solution, and the lack of public knowledge about the Annapolis process and how close Israel may have been to “two states for two peoples,” INSS recently published a memorandum on the Annapolis process (2007-2008). The Annapolis process saw the convergence of optimum conditions for negotiations, with a golden opportunity to reach a settlement: calm after the years of the second intifada; trust between Prime Minister Olmert and President Mahmoud Abbas; an outline for negotiations drawn up in advance with the Palestinians and the United States; the involvement of professional elements on the specific issues; a supportive international system; and more. Nonetheless, the professional and practical talks did not bring about the sought agreement. The Biden administration, which hopes to promote the two-state option, could learn from the lessons of Annapolis, if it seeks to restart the political process.