The agreement that has been reached is a tremendous achievement for Israel. It includes what Hamas had refused until now: the immediate release of all the hostages, thereby relinquishing its principal bargaining chip before the IDF withdraws from the Gaza Strip, and a demilitarization clause that appears in the agreement—even if Hamas avoided formally accepting it. For Hamas, this clause is a double-edged sword: If it complies, it loses; if it does not, it will face political and military attacks for violating the agreement, without...
With the major turning point in the war in the Gaza Strip, the release of all the remaining living hostages, and the apparent end of the intense phase of fighting, it is time to return to and reexamine several fundamental assumptions of the Arab–Israeli conflict. Segments of the Israeli elite are deeply—and rightly—concerned about the growing messianic and annexationist tendencies in Israel, which have reached their peak in the current governing coalition. They also sense—again understandably—that the absence of an adequate response...
The failure to secure the release of the hostages through military pressure or a binding agreement raises the question of what Israel should do now, given the likelihood that Hamas will refuse the deal currently on the table—or, alternatively, impose conditions that Israel cannot accept. The purpose of this policy paper is to analyze this evolving situation and offer a recommendation for a new and adapted policy.
The war between Israel and Iran, known as Operation Rising Lion, significantly set back Iran’s nuclear program. Iran is no longer a nuclear threshold state as its status was prior to its war with Israel. It would take Iran at least one to two years to regain threshold status, assuming a decision by Supreme Leader Khamenei to pursue nuclear weapons. However, the war did not eliminate Iran’s nuclear capabilities entirely. Iran maintains residual capabilities that could eventually enable the rebuilding of its nuclear program and the...
Operation Rising Lion, carried out on Iranian soil was a highly significant campaign, showcasing operational artistry, excellence, and a sophisticated, complementary international diplomatic effort. Whereas gratification is in order, the campaign must be analyzed objectively and professionally. Were its goals truly achieved? Has an existential threat to the State of Israel been removed? Has Israel’s security situation improved meaningfully or is it caught in a vicious circle of tactical excellence and strategic failure?
Although it...
This article reframes the current global landscape: the United States faces not a regional conflict but a decisive struggle for its established world order. Five states—Russia, China, North Korea, Iran, and Qatar—are coordinately challenging American hegemony, using economic, cyber, and cognitive warfare, a dynamic the United States often struggles to fully grasp. Iran, the most vulnerable yet dangerous link, looms as a nuclear threat that would irreversibly shift global power and constrain US influence. With Europe largely...
This policy paper outlines the recommended strategy for ending the war in the Gaza Strip while fully achieving its objectives and improving Israel’s long-term strategic posture. The majority of the principles and proposed course of action presented in this document align with the Egyptian–Arab proposal for ending the war, which was presented in April 2025 and has not been discussed by the Israeli government. It is proposed that the principles of this plan serve as a basis for negotiations As part of these negotiations, the following...
In his book The Hi-Tech Army and the Cavalry Army: How Israel Abandoned the Ground Forces (Hebrew, 2024), written mostly before the war in Gaza, Brig. Gen. (res.) Guy Hazut sharply criticizes the steadily declining importance and chronic neglect of the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) ground forces over recent decades. He critiques the division of the IDF into an elite “hi-tech army,” relying on the air force, precision-guided munitions, and special forces, on the one hand, and, on the other, the supposedly outdated “cavalry army”—the...
We invite you to look and learn about the fallen through this annual memorial project—to once again recognize how, in the microcosm of the people’s army, the character of its fallen reflects the society itself.
Israel faces three possible strategic paths to achieving the objectives of the war: the occupation of the Gaza Strip and the imposition of a military administration; a siege on the Strip, in which Hamas is weakened and deterred; or an agreement to discuss the Arab proposal for the reconstruction and stabilization of the Strip and the establishment of an alternative governing authority. Of these three, the diplomatic path—discussing the Arab proposal—is the only option that could advance the war’s objectives at a relatively low cost....
An empirical examination and historical review of appointments to key positions in the IDF’s General Staff over the past five decades reveal a marked tendency toward similarity bias, particularly evident in the frequent promotion of individuals from the Paratroopers and Sayeret Matkal units. This bias reflects a form of “human duplication,” stemming from a preference to appoint people who resemble oneself. As similar individuals tend to think alike, it reduces critical, challenging, and skeptical thinking, thereby affecting the...
This article discusses the Nagel Commission report on the security budget and force buildup, which was recently submitted to the prime minister, and compares it to reports issued by previous commissions that have addressed this issue (the Brodet Commission and the Locker Commission). The analysis highlights flaws in the broad mandate given to the commission, its timeframe, the validity of some of its conclusions—both in terms of concept and force building—as well as its omission of critical fundamental issues. While adopting the...
