Tamir Hayman

Donald J. Trump is a unique president. So far, he has proven himself to be an enthusiastic supporter of the State of Israel, and who leads a transformative foreign policy in the Middle East and the global arena. Multiple reasons suggest Israel cannot simply assume such strong US alignment with its interests and policies will persist.  Thus, and in light of current shifts in the global, regional, and Israeli-Palestinian contexts, it is necessary to consider which policy goals Israel should set for its relations with Washington for the remainder of President Trump’s second term. This policy paper outlines changes occurring in the American system and its effects on Israel-United States relations, and concludes with policy recommendations to improve Israel’s strategic posture for years to come.

Analysis of the major events of the war, the changes they brought about, and their impact on Israel, the region, and the international system

How does Trump’s initiative for the Gaza Strip create new opportunities for Israel to change the security and political reality, and what challenges might stand in its way?

The failure to secure the release of the hostages through military pressure or a binding agreement raises the question of what Israel should do now, given the likelihood that Hamas will refuse the deal currently on the table—or, alternatively, impose conditions that Israel cannot accept. The purpose of this policy paper is to analyze this evolving situation and offer a recommendation for a new and adapted policy.

The war between Israel and Iran, known as Operation Rising Lion, significantly set back Iran’s nuclear program. Iran is no longer a nuclear threshold state as  its status was prior to its war with Israel. It would take Iran at least one to two years to regain threshold status, assuming a decision by Supreme Leader Khamenei to pursue nuclear weapons. However, the war did not eliminate Iran’s nuclear capabilities entirely. Iran maintains residual capabilities that could eventually enable the rebuilding of its nuclear program and the development of nuclear weapons. Although Iran’s motivation to obtain nuclear weapons may have increased after the war, its future course of action will ultimately depend on its remaining capabilities and its evolving risk calculus. Iran faces several options: complete abandonment of the nuclear program (highly unlikely); agreement to a new nuclear deal (either to ease sanctions and buy time, or to covertly continue its nuclear progress); gradual restoration of its threshold status without a formal agreement or weaponization; or covert break out toward a nuclear weapon. From Israel’s perspective, preventing Iran from obtaining nuclear weapons remains a central national security objective. As a result of the war, Israeli policy must  push for a restrictive agreement—including intrusive and strict International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspections—while maintaining the ability to actively enforce and disrupt to counter any Iranian nuclear breakout. Additionally, to effectively deter an Iranian nuclear breakout, Israel must make it clear that such a move would pose a direct threat to the regime’s survival.

In the reality of the zero-sum game between Hamas and the Palestinian Authority (PA), a strong Hamas and a strong PA cannot coexist. The weakness of the PA alongside a strengthened Hamas, compounded by the erosion of deterrence against Hezbollah and Iran and the increased likelihood of a multi-front conflict, poses a strategic dilemma for Israel. Israel must define its strategic goal vis-à-vis the Palestinian arena, and consider whether there is any value to a formative military move against Hamas that is not part of a broader political plan. Weakened military capabilities would significantly reduce the challenge Hamas poses to the PA that accelerates its weakening, and remove an obstacle to effective moves to strengthen the PA. A weakened Hamas would also loosen the Gordian knot between the various arenas that Hamas seeks to tighten, and presumably also strengthen Israeli deterrence in the region. Under the existing political conditions, the current Israeli government is unlikely to agree on the need to strengthen the PA, or at least stop weakening it. Therefore, the government does not face a strategic dilemma on taking proactive steps to strengthen the PA, even though the PA’s weakness harms Israeli interests: a move of this magnitude can only be led by a national unity government with broad public backing. At the same time, the status of the Palestinian Authority is so shaky and problematic that it is doubtful it can be restored under the existing conditions.