Currently, amid the growing debate over the fighting in the Gaza Strip within the context of the Swords of Iron war—what the worthy and attainable goals are and how to achieve them, as well as whether to escalate the campaign in Lebanon, including possibly occupying territory in southern Lebanon—it is worth returning to the IDF’s presence in Lebanon, particularly from September 1982 to one year later when the IDF unilaterally withdrew south of the Awali River. By comparing the decision-making processes, the public atmosphere, and the...
The bill to amend the conscription law in its current form is unfathomable, especially after October 7.
Its legislation endangers the model of the people’s army, is inconsistent with the needs of the army, and exacerbates the inequality.
This legislation is a danger to the national security of the State of Israel.
There are important fundamental principles that should be integrated into any legislation. The law should be adapted to Israel’s security needs, it should preserve the people’s army model and be based on a wide scope of...
In spite of the severe damage it has sustained, Hamas is expected to recruit more terrorists to replenish its ranks. The Israeli leadership is still debating whether to make a decision—the decision that will effectively determine the fate of the war, after some eight months. But against this background, critical questions are already emerging: What are the advantages and disadvantages of an Israeli military administration in Gaza? What are the implications of this scenario for the capabilities of the IDF? And what is the significance...
Since Hamas’s attack and the outbreak of the war in the Gaza Strip, the public discourse has been impressed by the view, which Major General (res.) Itzhak Brik in particular voiced even before the war, that the IDF is too small given the threats; that reliance on technology has led to dangerous neglect and reduction of the ground forces; that the air force is disproportionately funded at the expense of the ground forces; and that there is a need to increase the defense budget significantly and permanently, beyond covering the...
Senior Israeli officials continue to emphasize that Israel will keep fighting in the Gaza Strip “until victory,” but the question of what the public perceives as victory in this military campaign remains open. Using surveys conducted by the Institute for National Security Studies and analysis of media and public discourse in Israel, we claim that there is a disparity between the expectation of a clear image of victory and the actual possible end point. This disparity is also the product of vaguely defined aims, which have also...
This article proposes that the declared aims of the war in the Gaza Strip and the strategy chosen to promote them are fundamentally essential, appropriate for the situation, and achievable, even if they do not lead to a “solution” in the foreseeable future. It reviews the alternatives proposed with respect to the aims and conduct of the war and argues that they lack internal coherence and do not meet the test of reality.
Even during the war in the Gaza Strip, Israel uses public disclosure of intelligence as a tool for shaping the behavior of both sympathetic and hostile actors and audiences. These intelligence disclosures are usually reactive, intended to defend Israel and the legitimacy of its military actions and to protect sensitive sources. Given the centrality of intelligence-driven military operations for conveying messages and shaping reality in wartime, as well as the fact that this war began with Israel being in a disadvantageous position in...
The United States administration wants to grant Israel special aid of more than $14.2 billion for the war in the Gaza Strip. An analysis of the items in the proposal, which has not yet earned final approval in Congress, shows that it will enable Israel to renew its inventory of essential munitions – above all, interceptors for air defense. A quarter of the amount will be earmarked for implementing lessons from the war, and the Israeli establishment must formulate appropriate approaches for proper use of this package.
Israel’s reserve forces have now been mobilized for three months. Their ability to continue to serve is based on the spirit of the people, the atmosphere in the country following the events of October 7, and the moral and economic support of the home front. However, these elements may diminish over time – not as the result of a specific event, but rather as the outcome of a process that is difficult to identify. Many reserve soldiers have sacrificed their lives, and others are willing to continue to risk their lives in this just war....
Since the Hamas terror attack in the Negev on October 7 and the start of the war in Gaza, there have been escalating attacks by the Houthi terror organization, disrupting navigation in the Bab el-Mandeb Strait. The stated aim of the organization, one of the most prominent Iranian proxies, is to harass and damage ships linked directly or indirectly to Israel, in response to Israel’s operations against Hamas in the Gaza Strip. However, most of the Houthi attacks so far have damaged ships that have no link to Israel. In view of the...
The Campaign Between Wars (CBW) is the term given to the IDF’s significant offensive activity over the past decade. What began in 2013 as specific, targeted actions with limited objectives, developed into an extensive campaign in physical and geographical terms and was anchored in the IDF operations approach, with far-reaching strategic ramifications.
CBW did indeed demonstrate advanced capabilities in intelligence and aerial action. But at the end of a decade and in view of significant changes in the region, there is a need to...
