Publications

In a special policy paper, the Institute for National Security Studies determines:

1. The intention of the IDF to be content with the recruitment of an additional 3,000 Ultra-Orthodox Jews to the security services does not satisfy the current needs and fails to see the importance of this matter and to understand its implications.
2. The security needs arising from the Swords of Iron war and to meet future challenges are estimated at about 20,000 fighters, support personnel, and other occupations. There is no way of meeting this need except by mobilizing the Ultra-Orthodox—in far larger numbers than those mentioned by the security services.
3. Extending mandatory service and increasing the reserve burden without a significant increase in Haredi recruitment will erode the people’s army and gravely harm the motivation to serve, whether in the regular, permanent, or reserve forces.
4. Ultra-Orthodox enlistment is particularly necessary and possible in the short term for protecting communities, securing essential facilities, serving in the Home Front Command, and for releasing combat troops from administrative tasks so they can do their proper tasks.
5. The expected monetary savings from these required actions amount to billions of shekels annually, in direct costs to the security budget.
6. There is a need to establish a mandatory civilian-security service, while maintaining the enlistment and placement in the IDF, that is operated by the internal security system for those who are not called for military service—including a large number of Ultra-Orthodox.

Recommendations for immediate action:

1. It is vital to reach the target of 7,000 Ultra-Orthodox who are drafted into IDF service and employed in internal security tasks under the command of the Border Police and the Israel Prison Service, within the next recruitment year.
2. In addition, it is possible and necessary to reach 18,000 Ultra-Orthodox volunteer reservists over the age of exemption (24) who will be trained for guard duties and who will be on call and will serve for at least a month each year in these positions.
3. Call up orders must be sent immediately to all graduates of Ultra-Orthodox education over the past two years (about 28,000 people).
4. The security system must set up systems for screening, placement, and training that are adapted to the Ultra-Orthodox public. However, it is important to avoid creating an “Ultra-Orthodox bubble” in the IDF, while the army’s values and spirit must be carefully maintained in terms of gender equality and statehood.
5. A civilian-security service must be set up for internal security tasks, protecting communities on the border and the seam line, strengthening the Police and engaging in emergency tasks within the country, based on recruiting a large number of Ultra-Orthodox in mandatory and reserve duty.
6. The target for Ultra-Orthodox recruitment in all frameworks in the 2025 recruitment year must be more than 7,000 new recruits, with a plan for considerable increase in the future.
7. If the Ultra-Orthodox respond fully to the call to report for screening and for actual enlistment, it will be possible to consider a uniform postponement of service for all sectors (such as a year of service or preparatory courses) and thus grant a one-off exemption from service for those who have passed the age of serving. Anyone who fails to report will be declared a deserter, with all that entails.
8. The definition of “Ultra-Orthodox” in the Security Service Law must be amended to include the entire Ultra-Orthodox public.
9. The IDF, the security services, and the government must see Ultra-Orthodox recruitment not only as an obligation according to Supreme Court rulings but also as an essential step for the survival of the people’s army, the Israeli economy, and society, as well as to meet the country’s security needs.
10. The Recruitment Law currently being discussed in the Knesset must respond to all these needs and must not allow any possibility of evasion.