The Gaza Ceasefire: A Political Window of Opportunity?

Both Israel and the Hamas movement hoped the lull in Gaza would temper the domestic criticism in their respective arenas emanating from the ongoing civilian hardships on both sides of the border. For Hamas, the tension between the political process and dialogue with Israel has not been a problem at all – on the contrary. On the other hand, the shift in Israeli policy, reflected by the very fact of dialogue between Israel and Hamas, threatens to harm relations between Israel and Fatah, and therefore hinder progress in the political process.

Israel has now recognized Hamas as a partner for talks even if so far only on the issue of security. In accordance with the understandings put together with Egyptian mediation, the closure of the Gaza Strip will be gradually lifted in return for a cessation of rocket fire by Hamas and all the other militant factions in the Strip. Halting the rocket fire is clearly designed to obviate Israel’s grounds for the closure and military activity in the Strip. Discussions on opening transit points that connect the Strip with the outside world, in particular the Rafah crossing, and conditions for the release of Israeli soldier Gilad Shalit, are to continue in Cairo. For its part, Egypt has undertaken to act against the smuggling of weaponry to Gaza, in order to limit Hamas’ ability to exploit the lull to continue building up its military infrastructure.

The understandings over the lull were formulated against the backdrop of intermittent talks between Israel and the Fatah leadership on issues relating to a final status agreement. The dialogue between them launched at Annapolis is designed to advance principles for compromise as a goal in and of itself, and also as a means to strengthen Fatah’s standing and block the strengthening of Hamas. The hoped for agreement has been defined as a “shelf agreement,” given the awareness that even if Israel and Fatah manage to bridge the fundamental gaps in their basic positions, any understandings reached cannot be implemented under the current circumstances. Israel, the Fatah leadership, and the international parties that supported the talks all understood that the current political, institutional, and geographic split in the Palestinian Authority forestalls any attempt to forge a new reality in the conflict arena.

Fatah’s weakness provided no incentive for Israel to freeze settlement construction and lift roadblocks in the West Bank, measures that could have indicated a determination to reduce tension between the sides. While the Hamas takeover of the Gaza Strip sparked a renewal of talks between Israel and Fatah, this development eventually contributed to delaying the political process, as it embodied the security challenge latent in the split in the PA. Moreover, in Israel's current pre-election atmosphere it is unlikely that leaders will commit themselves to a far-reaching compromise that would constitute an electoral threat. And while a delay in the political process does not exactly signal a missed historic opportunity, the Israeli government, in choosing to negotiate with Hamas, is attempting to rebuff charges of helplessness against the ongoing rocket fire, while taking a calculated risk with regard to its relations with the Fatah leadership.

Indeed, it is possible that Israel's choice will in fact complicate an already difficult and sensitive political process, because the change in Israeli policy may accelerate a rapprochement between Fatah and Hamas – not necessarily based on the intention to advance understandings with Israel. Since the establishment of the Palestinian Authority the focus of Fatah policy has oscillated between two extremes: at times it concentrated on the political process; at other times, in view of the political stagnation, it focused on trying to strengthen its ties with the opposition in order to reinforce its domestic standing, even at the cost of its relations with Israel. Recently, the efforts by Fatah leaders, including President Mahmoud Abbas, to renew the national dialogue have intensified: because of the foot dragging along the political route, the Fatah leadership had no reason to wait for talks between Israel and Hamas to bolster its own drive to reach understandings with Hamas.

The road between contacts and bridging conceptual and institutional differences between the two rival movements is long and winding. However, a major obstacle to agreement between Hamas and Fatah has now been removed: dialogue between Israel and Hamas has freed Fatah from making contacts with Hamas contingent on changing the clauses in the movement’s manifesto that rule out the possibility of Israeli-Palestinian peace. Removing this constraint will make it easier for Fatah to improve its relations with Hamas. The Fatah spokespersons directed their frustration over the lull agreement, put together without Fatah, only against Israel. The Hamas leadership was not a target for criticism. After all, Fatah spokesmen cannot criticize any Palestinian party for maintaining dialogue with Israel. Moreover, in directing claims solely against Israel one can see a sign of the Fatah leadership’s determination to now focus on dialogue with Hamas.

Whether or not the ceasefire between Israel and Hamas holds and whether or not its days are numbered, it will be difficult to resume the pattern of managing the conflict and the political process as was the norm in recent years. Israel must prepare for further talks with Fatah while not finding it easy to ask Fatah to distance itself from Hamas.

One important lesson that emerged during the last few years of the confrontation is that without Hamas there will be no security lull, and without Fatah there can be no political breakthrough. Another round of confrontation between Israel and Hamas will not change the figures in this equation. This means that coordination between Fatah and Hamas – naturally, if it is supported by joint willingness to advance a compromise, or at least to remove Hamas opposition to Fatah attempts to reach a compromise – will be a condition for stabilizing a Palestinian Authority that will advance an agreement and guarantee its implementation. Therefore, Israel's next step ought perhaps to be to agree with the establishment of a Palestinian unity government, or at least refrain from criticism of Fatah if it tries to do this without any change in the Hamas manifesto. With gestures designed to bolster Fatah’s bargaining position with Hamas and block further decline in support of the Palestinian public for an agreement based on two states for two peoples, Israel might try to turn what for years it considered a threat into an opportunity.

The chance of this happening is slim. There are security, political, and conceptual obstacles to such a dramatic change in Israeli policy, and these obstacles, rooted in Israel and the Palestinian arena, have thus far blocked progress towards a treaty. A far more likely possibility is that the lull will be broken before a change of direction can be devised, and Israel and the Palestinians will return to the same impasse that existed in the conflict arena prior to the signing of the ceasefire agreement.