In Augus 2022, Türkiye and Israel decided to return high-level diplomatic representation to the respective country and normalize ties between the states. The current attempt at normalization comes at a time when Israel is developing a new set of relationships, most notably with some of the Arab Gulf states. At the same time Ankara is also emphasizing improving relations with these same actors. How do these processes relate to one another? Which aspects are contradictory and which are complementary? Can these processes be combined?...
The decision by Azerbaijan to open an embassy in Israel corrects an existing asymmetry in the bilateral relations – while Israel has had an embassy in Baku since 1993, Baku had no embassy in Israel, despite the close relations between the two countries. The opening of the embassy can be understood against the background of the outcome of the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War in 2020, the Abraham Accords, and the growing tension between Iran and Azerbaijan. Relations between Israel and Azerbaijan have withstood numerous challenges,...
Recent increased attacks on Kurdish targets in northern Syria by Turkey and the Syrian rebel groups its supports raise the question whether Turkey’s President Recep Tayyip Erdogan intends to carry out his threat of May 2022 to begin another major ground operation against the Kurds. On the other hand, conciliatory statements regarding the Assad regime have been sounded recently in Turkey, and there has been discussion of the possibility of normalizing relations between the two countries after over a decade of hostility and...
The decision by Turkey and Israel to normalize their relations stems from several processes that brought the Turkish side to push for normalization and the Israeli side to respond affirmatively. Yet alongside the serious motivations of the two sides to continue this process, there are issues that could become obstacles. Among them are the developments between Israel and the Palestinians, Turkey-US relations, the dynamics of Turkey’s integration in processes related to the Abraham Accords, and the nature of future Israeli plans...
The meeting in Sochi on August 5, 2022 between Russian President Vladimir Putin and Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, not long after their meeting in Tehran at the Astana Forum, reflects deepening cooperation between Moscow and Ankara. Moscow needs Ankara, partly in order to limit the negative economic ramifications of the war in Ukraine, but also to further weaken NATO from within. For its part, Ankara needs Moscow because of Russian influence in what it sees as main conflict zones– Syria, the Caucasus, and Libya, and given...
The visit by Russian President Vladimir Putin and Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan in Tehran – the first such visit since the outbreak of the war in Ukraine in February 2022 – offered the three leaders an opportunity to demonstrate their partnership against the West and discuss the challenges they face domestically, regionally, and internationally. Iran viewed the summit as a chance to tighten its strategic relations with the Kremlin, in part in response to the idea of a regional defense alliance led by Washington. Russia...
The declaration by Turkey’s President, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, on May 23, 2022 that Greek Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis “no longer exists for him” constitutes a new low in the tense relationship between Turkey and Greece. This is in sharp contrast not only to Ankara’s previous attempt to lower the tensions between the two states but also to Turkey’s “charm offensive” toward several Middle East states. Beyond economic and domestic considerations is the Turkey-Greece-US triangle and the sense in Ankara that the record warmth in...
Following a decade of tension, relations between Turkey and leading Arab countries have seen significant positive developments over the past year, led by the détente with the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia. While Turkey’s reversal regarding Abu Dhabi and Riyadh stemmed mainly from economic considerations, it also has geostrategic implications. The thaw between Ankara, Abu Dhabi, and Riyadh bolsters the chance that the recent rapprochement between Israel and Turkey will last, because it encourages Ankara to assume a more...
Russia and Ukraine have clearly been willing to give Ankara a significant role to play in talks on how to end the war and to participate in Turkish mediation efforts. The position of mediator has eased Turkey’s situation not only in relation to some of the dilemmas posed by the war, but also in providing an opening for improving its relations with NATO. As tensions escalate, the Turkish dilemma will worsen, as the pressure on Ankara to adopt a consistent line in favor of one side increases. The war in Ukraine is underway in parallel...
The strategic assessment for Israel for 2021 is shaped by significant uncertainty in three principal areas: the level of success in coping with COVID-19; the modus operandi and policies of the new administration in the United States; and the political developments in Israel. The current assessment is based on a broader conception of national security, which places greater weight than in the past on the domestic arena and on threats to internal stability, social cohesion, values, and fabric of life. This of course does not detract...
Paradoxically, the arrest of an Israeli couple vacationing in Turkey and their release nine days later presents a new opportunity in relations between Jerusalem and Ankara. During and following the incident, conversations were held between Israeli and Turkish leaders in a fashion unprecedented in recent years. Over the past year, Turkey has tried to break out of its regional isolation, and Israel is one of the countries marked by Ankara as a target for improving relations. Despite the booming trade between the two countries, however,...
The threat by Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan to declare ambassadors from ten Western countries, including seven NATO members, as “personae non gratae” had the potential to become a severe diplomatic crisis between Ankara and the said countries. The diplomatic way out came in a tweet from the United States Embassy, which was retweeted or similarly worded on the Twitter accounts of the other embassies, whereby the United States operates under Article 41 of the Vienna Convention (1961) regarding non-interference of...
