Publications on Lebanon War II

Recent weeks have witnessed a change in the public position on the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) among senior IDF officers, reflecting sharp criticism of UNIFIL (in)action vis-à-vis Hezbollah. UNIFIL forces have successfully performed their mission of reducing friction between the IDF and Lebanon by means of the coordination and liaison mechanism, thereby contributing to the preservation of calm and preventing unintended escalation. At the same time, UNIFIL has consistently refrained from dealing with the most...

The IDF does not hide the fact that it is preparing for war in Lebanon. These preparations take the form of learning and applying the lessons of the Second Lebanon War while incorporating the modifications required in light of changes in the region’s strategic reality, especially in Israel’s northern theater. The IDF Strategy, published in 2015, which serves as the compass for military force buildup and operation, notes that a war in Lebanon is one of the reference scenarios in IDF preparations. As defined, the IDF required...

This essay deals with Hezbollah’s concept of deterrence against Israel as it developed over the ten years since the Second Lebanon War. The essay looks at the most important speeches by Hezbollah Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah during this period to examine the evolution and development of the concept of deterrence at four points in time that reflect Hezbollah’s internal and regional milieu (2000, 2006, 2008, and 2011). Over the years, Nasrallah has frequently utilized the media to deliver his messages and promote the...

Lebanon is no stranger to conflict. Due to a unique mixture of weak political institutions, internal sectarian political divisions, and deep and often aggressive foreign intervention, the small Mediterranean country has time and time again oscillated between war and peace, stability and chaos. The past decade (or more precisely, decade plus) has been especially complex. It began with the shocking and highly disruptive political assassination in February 2005 of twice-Prime Minister, industrial magnate, and all-around post-war...

In the summer of 2006, Hassan Nasrallah predicted that the Second Lebanon War would become a historic landmark and the countdown to the end of the State of Israel. With the same breath, Nasrallah sought to make the war into a milestone on Hezbollah’s road to hegemony in Lebanon. In practice, he failed. The Second Lebanon War did not break apart the camp of Hezbollah opponents in Lebanon, and it also turned the spotlight on the organization’s Shiite identity, its connections to Iran, its dependence on Tehran, and its obeisance to...

The 2006 Second Lebanon War represents a turning point in the use of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs).1 This was the first war in history that recorded more unmanned flight hours than manned fighter aircraft flight hours, and that featured sustained UAV use without breaks in situational awareness. Since that war, Israel has continued to develop and absorb additional UAVs, and has used them extensively in operations over the last decade. At the same time, Hezbollah too – which failed in its few attempts to attack Israel with...

The Second Lebanon War is anchored in Israel’s collective memory as a military failure. The media played a significant role in this war, and there were those who claimed that the media had a large part in painting the war as a failure. Over time, political-security discourse has come to understand that the ten years of quiet on the northern border indicate more favorable outcomes of the war than the impressions formed in August 2006. Accordingly, it is important to assess the role of the media in shaping the discourse on the war over...

Many have called the Second Lebanon War a turning point for the Israel’s emergency management system in general and missile and rocket defense in particular. In 2006, Israel was not adequately prepared for the attacks by Hezbollah rockets. It appears that more than a failure of command, the event revealed a conceptual and strategic failure, reflecting the insufficient weight given by the security and civilian leadership in Israel’s national security doctrine to the missile and rocket threat against the population. Since 2006, the...

The nature of IDF combat in the security zone in southern Lebanon imposed many restraints on the regular army’s ground forces and their ability to operate in a way reflecting the IDF’s traditional doctrine of combined ground warfare. The reasons for these limitations are beyond the scope of this article; suffice it to mention the anachronistic activity in the security zone and the trouble the IDF encountered in executing attacks on short notice and with rushed battle procedures. The retreat from southern Lebanon and the war on...

The outbreak of war in July 2006 was as surprising for the United States as it was for Israel. In addition to the significance for Israel, the results were important for the Bush administration, as they changed the American view of the Israeli-Palestinian situation and destroyed the relationship between Prime Minister Olmert and Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice.

Despite Israel’s problematic decisions and flaws in preparedness and use of force in the Second Lebanon War, the realization of the gaps in force between Israel and Hezbollah left the Lebanese organization badly bruised and forced it to change its modus operandi and strategic conduct vis-à-vis Israel. In the years after the war, Hezbollah was drawn into the Syrian civil war, leaving Israel’s northern border calm for the decade that followed. The most important lesson is not to embark on a military campaign to fix the outcomes and...

Israel did not intend to start a war in the Lebanese theater, nor did Hezbollah plan one. Essentially, the Second Lebanon War was a result of the ongoing erosion in Israel’s deterrence, which motivated Hezbollah to carry out a provocative kidnapping operation, under the erroneous assumption that it would not necessarily lead to escalation. The Second Lebanon War lasted 34 days, and its results were far reaching. Even though the way it was conducted drew strong criticism from the Israeli public and the Winograd Commission Report, it...