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INSS Insight No. 473, October 8, 2013
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Current discourse on Palestinian and Lebanesesocial networks indicates that a surprising trend has emerged over the past sixmonths with potential momentous consequences for Israel’s security concept and thestrategic challenges before it. The violent resistance (muqawama)against Israel by Hizbollah and Hamas has lost much of its legitimacy in Lebanese civilsociety and Palestinian society, respectively. Hizbollah and Hamas were foundedas Islamic resistance movements based on the principle of violent struggle asboth a vision and a means of freeing Arab lands from the “Zionist occupation.” However,since the onset of the “Arab Spring” these two movements have lost much oftheir political power, the support of Arab public opinion, and most important,their domestic support.
Current discourse on Palestinian and Lebanesesocial networks indicates that a surprising trend has emerged over the past sixmonths with potential momentous consequences for Israel’s security concept andthe strategic challenges before it. The violent resistance (muqawama)against Israel by Hizbollah and Hamas has lost much of its legitimacy in Lebanese civilsociety and Palestinian society, respectively.
The two movements were founded, Hizbollah inthe early 1980s and Hamas in the late 1980s, as Islamic resistance movements based on the principle of violent struggle as both a visionand a means of freeing Arab lands from the “Zionist occupation.” The widespreadsupport, sympathy, and admiration they earned over the past 30 years, domesticallyand in the Arab world, have dissipated. Since the onset of the “Arab Spring” thesetwo movements have lost much of their political power, the support of Arab publicopinion, and most important, their domestic support.
“The Enemy Within”
One of the most evident results of the “Arab Spring”has been the shift in focus by Arab civil societies from outside to inside –from foreign policy to domestic affairs. Civil society in the Arab world isdemanding the redressing of injustices. Nationalism and Islamism have beenreplaced by a demand for democratization, rights, and freedom.
The Gazan and Lebanese civil societies, whichhave experienced civil wars and violent struggles against Israel, are not eagerfor revolutions or the collapse of the political and social structures. Moreover,as reflected in the social media discourse, the Palestinians and theLebanese believe far less than they were wont in violent struggle as a successful and legitimatemeans of achieving their political, socioeconomic, and national reforms. Trendanalysis of the social networks among over one million Palestinians (whichrepresents approximately 35 percent of the Palestinian population) and half amillion Lebanese (15 percent of the population) reveals that for the first timein the past 30 years, the “enemy from within” (Hizbollah and Hamas) is regardedas more dangerous than the "from without” (Israel).
Civil society in Lebanon in large, includingparts of the Shiite population), now reflects overwhelming opposition to Hizbollah’spolicy in Syria and Lebanon. The announcement by US President Obama in lateAugust that the US intended to launch a military strike againsrt Syria exposedthe depth of the domestic Lebanese criticism of Hizbollah. Many Lebanesepoliticians attacked the organization’s policy, and Hizbollah ally Michel Aoun,a member of the March 8 Coalition, announced that if Hizbollah intervened inSyria during an American attack, he would withdraw from – and thereby dissolve– the coalition. Many TV channels mobilized to exert massive public pressure onHizbollah not to intervene in the Syrian civil war, and many commentators andinterviewees publicly opposed any Hizbollah military action against Israel. Thepublic “turned its back on Hizbollah,” and some even tweeted that “Hizbollah ismore dangerous to Lebanon than Israel.” Indeed, Israel has become marginal tothe domestic Lebanese discourse, with the three main themes of being the Syriancivil war and its effect on Lebanon; the deteriorating security situation andthe domestic ethnic Lebanese struggle; and the domestic effect of Hizbollah’s politicalweakening.
A similar picture applies to Hamas in theGaza Strip. The wave of revolutions in the Arab world has brought about achange in domestic Palestinian discourse: from a focus on “Israel, the enemywithout” to “Hamas, the enemy from within;” from a discussion of a violentnationalistic struggle to a discussion of rights, freedom, and a betterstandard of living. Internet discourse reveals that for the first time since theestablishment of Hamas, a majority of the Gaza population want to overthrow theHamas regime. This is the first time that Gazan public opinion has indicatedthat the public regards Hamas’ policy as a greater threat than Israel to theirwell being.
The collapse of the Muslim Brotherhood inEgypt has accelerated the process, and made it unmistakably clear that theslogan “Islam is the solution” hasn't achieved economic prosperity either inEgypt or the Gaza Strip. On the contrary; the situation in Gaza is deteriorating.The Egyptian military has launched an unprecedented attack on Hamas in Gaza,from its leadership to tunnels to weapons smuggling and to the terroristfactions jockeying between the Gaza Strip and Sinai. A “buffer zone” betweenEgypt and the Gaza Strip was created, and public opinion in Egypt has evenbegun to demand collective punishment of Gaza: no fuel, gas, or food. Theborder crossing between Gaza and Egypt is almost completely closed (except forspecial cases), and Egyptian state media (both social networks and the press)have declared that Hamas is a “terrorist entity” and Gazans are “terrorists.”They have even stated that Hamas and Gaza currently constitute a danger to thenational security of Sinai and Egypt.
“The Enemy Without"
A majority of Lebanese civil society currentlyregards the civil war in Syria, Syria’s political dissolution, and theconsolidation of the radical al-Qaeda-affiliated movements there as the truedangers to Lebanon’s stability and security. For its part, Hizbollah isconcerned about the survival of the Assad regime, the weapons smuggling routes fromSyria to Lebanon, and the effect of a future settlement in Syria. While Israelis not considered a threat to Hizbollah’s survival at present, a collapse ofthe current system in Syria and the emergence of a new order that includes Sunnijihadist movements on the Lebanese border jeopardizes the security of Lebanonin general, and that of Hizbollah and the Shiite population in particular. Inaddition, among Shiites and Hizbollah supporters, muqawama has beendemoted to third place on the list of priorities, following Hizbollah’sintervention in Syria and efforts to ensure the survival of the Assad regime, andinternal Lebanese politics and issues related to the Shiite population and theSunni jihad movements. When the Lebanese public speaks about the externalenemy, it therefore does not refer to Israel. Some Lebanese regard the Assadregime as a threat, while others fear the radical Sunni jihad movements currentlyoperating in Syria.
The vast majority of social discourse in theGaza Strip currently concerns Egypt and its policy towards Gaza. Many on thenetworks assert that the policy of the Egyptian military toward Gaza is tougherthan that of Israel. The Gazan public objects to “Egyptian abuse” and the harshsanctions imposed on the Gaza Strip, which are turning it into a prison with lengthypower outages and at times no clean water. Sentences like “Egypt has become Gaza’sjailer” and “They are starving and punishing us” are seen frequently on the socialnetworks. Most of the demonstrations today in the Gaza Strip are staged on the Rafahborder, whether they were initiated by Hamas or by Gazans demanding change. Andas with Lebanon, Israel has been relegated to fourth place in the publicdiscourse behind a) Egyptian policy toward Gaza; b) the deteriorating economicsituation; c) the civilian protest against Hamas; d) Israel. If the “enemy fromwithin” is Hamas, the “external enemy” is now Egypt, not Israel.
Reform vs. Collapse
Current domestic discourse on the two muqawamamovements on Palestinian and Lebanese social media suggests only two optionsfor the future of these movements: reform and transformation or collapse. Social media users are united in their demand forchange, but they have not explained the nature of the necessary changes nor howthese changes will be implemented. Hizbollahis the element with the most military power in Lebanon; the same is true forHamas in Gaza, and therefore no local movement or militia is capable ofchallenging or overthrowing either resistance movement. Nevertheless, withoutinternational, Arab, or domestic political legitimacy, these two movements lacksocioeconomic power, and thus lose their ability to exert political influencein the areas under their control. According to domestic social media discourse,if elections were held today in Lebanon and the Gaza Strip, Hizbollah and Hamaswould not win. This is the first time that this widespread public sentiment hasbeen sounded, along with the sense that an attempt by these organizations todivert public attention from their weakness through another round of violenceagainst Israel would only hasten their collapse.
Is this the End of the Muqawama?
The discourse on the social networks thuspoints to three conclusions. The first: Ideology is no longer the same driving force as inthe past. The Lebanese and Gazan publics nolonger believe that the violent struggle is an effective means of realizing theirsocial, economic, and national aspirations. In the dialogue on the socialnetworks, a public demand for a violent struggle against Israel no longerexists. Two, both movements are losing political power. The slogans usedby Hamas and Hizbollah, “Islam is the solution” and “ideology built on violentstruggle,” are rapidly losing their legitimacy. Finally, the two movements willhave to reform their internal and external policies. Otherwise, they are likelyto collapse.