The Elections in Turkey: A Vote for Continuity

In Turkey’s recent elections, almost half the voters opted for continuity and the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) won an impressive parliamentary majority (340 out of 550 seats in parliament) that will enable it to govern without coalition partners. With close to 47% of the popular vote, AK even surpassed its performance (34%) in the previous elections, although its parliamentary representation will actually drop somewhat because of the electoral system and the entry of an additional party into parliament. The other party represented in the outgoing parliament, the veteran Republican People’s Party (CHP) founded by Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, remains the second-largest party; it maintained its levels of support and received about 21% of the popular vote.

Still, the election results also foretell some changes. One potentially significant development stems from the ability of the right-wing Nationalist Action Party (MHP) to garner 14% of the vote (more than the 10% threshold) and therefore to return to parliament after a one-term absence. MHP’s growing popularity can be traced to stepped-up Kurdish terrorism in recent years and the resulting demand for aggressive Turkish action in northern Iraq. At the same time, however, the Democratic People’s Party (DTP), which represents Kurdish interests and which failed in previous elections to pass the electoral threshold, this time ran independent candidates who managed to secure more than 20 seats. These members of parliament will work to promote Kurdish cultural rights and can be expected to clash constantly with the MHP.

Another ramification of the elections is a further decline in the political status of the Turkish Army. Despite the Army’s warnings that the AK was undermining the secular principles of Turkey, the public gave AK another vote of confidence. The Army remains a potent force in defense of Turkish secularism and the precedents it has established – it has overthrown four governments since the establishment of the Turkish Republic – constitute a warning to the AK not to deviate too sharply from the Kemalist tradition of separating state and religion. That may help explain why Recep Tayyib Erdogan, the popular leader of AK, declared in his victory speech that the Party would not compromise the basic principles of the Turkish Republic. Nevertheless, the Army has actually emerged in a weaker position. Early parliamentary elections had been prompted by an earlier crisis over the election by Parliament of a new president, during which the Army had published a memorandum on its Internet site warning against the choice of a pro-Islamist candidate (Erdogan’s deputy, Foreign Minister Abdullah Gul) with a headscarf-wearing wife. The virtual ultimatum of the Army was widely interpreted as an attempted coup against AK and actually strengthened support for the Party which, was seen as victim both of Army intervention and of the controversial ruling by the Constitutional Court to annul the results of the first round of the presidential election.

However, while AK may have emerged from the elections in a stronger position, the new government will still face formidable challenges. One could be a new crisis over the rescheduled presidential election. At first glance, cooperation only with the pro-Kurdish independents would be enough to give AK the two-thirds majority needed to elect a president in the first round. However, if the Party again proposes Gul or some other AK member as its candidate, it will be reluctant to base his election on support from a Kurdish party; that would only intensify the opposition of the secularists and hard-line nationalists. Parliament has 30 days in which to choose a new president, and if it ends up in another impasse, there will have to be another round in October. But in October there will also be a referendum on several constitutional reforms, including a proposed change in the system for choosing a president, according to which the president will be elected by popular vote rather than by Parliament. The best way for AK to avoid another crisis on this issue would be to work with the opposition to find a consensus candidate.

On the economic front, the main test for the government will be to preserve the gains of the previous term, including high growth rates, reduction of inflation to single digits, and the lowering of the external debt; these gains helped produce a new Islamic middle class that strongly supported AK. But the government will also have to deal with high unemployment rates and huge gaps between different regions of the country. Finally, it will want to make further progress in negotiations for accession to the European Union, whatever the doubts about the prospects of that ever actually happening.

At the regional level, the greatest challenge for Erdogan will be to decide on policy regarding Iraq. Since 2005, there has been an upsurge in terrorist incidents and casualties from actions attributed to the Kurdish Workers’ Party (PKK-Kadek). The Turkish Army claims that several thousand PKK fighters have found refuge in northern Iraq and benefited from the benign indifference of the Americans and the Iraqi Kurds. The Turkish electoral campaign was marked by strong demands for extensive military intervention in northern Iraq and large forces have been concentrated on the Iraqi border. Truly large-scale incursions have thus far not taken place, perhaps because of American warnings, but the government may eventually find it very difficult to resist domestic pressure to act more forcefully, especially if/when American forces begin to withdraw.

To sum up, AK’s electoral success and the popularity of its leaders – Erdogan and Gul – may create the conditions for political continuity and stability in Turkey. Nevertheless, the new government will confront some very difficult challenges – primarily the presidential election and the question of intervention in Iraq – and AK’s second term of office could be very stormy, indeed.