By Executive Director of INSS Maj. Gen. (res.) Tamir Hayman
In the six months since October 7, despite the considerable operational achievements on the battlefield in the Gaza Strip, none of the war's objectives have yet been fully achieved. A total of 133 hostages are still being held in Gaza, and Hamas has not yet been decisively defeated. The war against Hamas is waning, as was expected at this stage, and even an operation in Rafah will not significantly change this trend. This decline in the war can lead to weariness, accompanied by discouragement, disappointment, and frustration. At the same time, however, this situation may present a series of opportunities—detailed and nuanced in this document—that will improve Israel’s security situation over time.
The document, written by researchers at the Institute for National Security Studies (INSS), recommends a series of strategic decisions that the political echelon should adopt to improve Israel’s strategic situation and prevent significant potential damage. INSS recommends exploiting the tactical-operational fatigue in the war to achieve strategic gains, with an extensive and long-term view of Israel’s status in the world and in the Middle East in particular. This should be done while demanding substantial concessions in exchange for the price Israel has been paying since the beginning of the war—currently without any reciprocity.
Admittedly, these are not the recommendations we would have made had the State of Israel not been in the complex situation it finds itself in. The recommendations in this document were formulated in the absence of other good alternatives. They are not perfect, and we recognize their shortcomings.
The challenge for Israel’s leaders at this time is to do the right thing for Israel’s history, not to achieve immediate short-term tactical gains. At this point in time, we must do everything in our power to improve the country’s strategic situation, seize the opportunities at hand, and act according to the priorities of Israel’s national security and its citizens.
Table of Contents:
This part includes the main policy recommendations of the Institute for National Security Studies.
The Strategic Problem: Slipping into a prolonged and static war of attrition, which reduces the chances of returning Israeli hostages held by Hamas and replacing Hamas’s rule in the Gaza Strip, also jeopardizes the special relationship with the United States, undermines the security of the country’s borders, and leads to Israel’s isolation in the regional and international arena....
It is recommended that the Palestinian Authority, renewed following comprehensive reforms, be the civilian alternative to Hamas. Security responsibility will remain in the hands of Israel...
We must strive for a deal that will lead to the release of the hostages, and quickly, even at the price of declaring an end to the war....
A humanitarian catastrophe in the Gaza Strip must be avoided, and the regulation of humanitarian aid should be integrated into the process of establishing an alternative civilian entity to Hamas while preventing the aid from falling into the hands of the organization.....
The recommendation to cease the current campaign and transition to a different operational mode does not prevent action in Rafah but requires adopting a different course of action and timing that serves the guiding strategic concept...
The strengthening of Israel’s national resilience will enable the continued functional continuity and rapid recovery from the collective trauma toward prosperity and growth...
The formation and cohesion of the resistance front composed of the Iranian Shiite axis and the Palestinian resistance organizations eroded Israeli deterrence and increased the sense of dangerous self-confidence among Israel’s enemies...
The American stance alongside Israel in the “Swords of Iron” war is unprecedented, except perhaps for the support the United States provided to Israel during the Yom Kippur War...
The State of Israel is facing one of its most challenging periods, both in terms of its international standing and domestic situation. It is difficult to envision an improvement in this reality without taking decisions for action, in response to the array of challenges it faces...
The opinions expressed in INSS publications are the authors’ alone.
Hamas Disarmament Agreement: Motives, Core Elements, and Obstacles
What does the agreement dubbed "historic" by the U.S. President include, what are the main obstacles to its implementation – and how should Israel act?
03/08/26
REUTERS / Mohammed Salem
The Gaza Strip: Possible Directions for Breaking the Stalemate
How should Israel implement the necessary effort to disarm Hamas?
14/06/26
REUTERS
Alternatives for the Gaza Strip Following the Campaign Against Iran
As the campaign against Iran winds down, attention is expected to return to the Gaza Strip. In the meantime, Hamas is exploiting the strategic vacuum to rehabilitate its governance and military capabilities. Simultaneously, the Trump framework remains stalled, and the “Board of Peace” faces professional, operational, and budgetary difficulties in advancing its declared objectives. The issue of demilitarization remains trapped between Israel’s demand for the complete and immediate disarmament of Hamas and the organization’s stalling tactics.
Israel faces three main alternatives: (1) Renewal of efforts to fully implement the Trump framework across the Strip, a course that carries the risk of “mock demilitarization” and depends on Hamas’s consent; (2) Gradual stabilization and reconstruction of areas cleared of Hamas while continuing to erode its control in areas still under its rule. This option is vulnerable to violent disruption and could entrench the Strip’s division; (3) A return to war and the reoccupation of the Gaza Strip, which would entail extremely heavy military, economic, and diplomatic costs for Israel.
The key recommendation is to avoid perpetuating the status quo, which establishes Hamas’s rule, and instead adopt a proactive approach. Israel should allow the implementation of the Mladenov framework for gradual demilitarization, beginning with heavy weapons, while coordinating with the Trump administration regarding scenarios that would justify use of force. If Hamas obstructs the process, Israel should implement a differential alternative: the entry of a civilian committee and Palestinian police into “green zones” cleared of Hamas (alongside increasing Israeli security responsibility modeled on Judea and Samaria). Simultaneously, Hamas’s capabilities and governance in the “red zone” should be systematically degraded, including the gradual erosion of its territorial control. The alternative of returning to war and military occupation should remain a last-resort alternative, contingent on the formulation of an exit strategy and a designated body to assume civilian responsibility.
