New Winds Blowing from Russia?

The tenth annual conference of the ValdaiDiscussion Club, which took place on September 16-19, 2013, was attended by expertsand media professionals who focus on Russia, as well as senior Russian establishmentfigures and policymakers. The international gathering traditionally serves as anational forum of sorts for discussing a range of topics, both domestic andinternational, that lead Russia’s national agenda. Since its inception, theproject has been under the direct sponsorship of President Putin, who views itas an important channel for Russia’s leadership to relay significant messagesto the international community.

In addition to foreign experts andRussian public representatives, including members of the opposition, the upperechelon of the Kremlin was present, including President Putin himself, ForeignMinister Lavrov, Defense Minister Shoigu, Presidential Administration Chief ofStaff Ivanov, and others. The major issues discussed at the forum related to Russia’sforging its future path domestically (definition of its political system and themain features of this approach) and internationally (a situation assessment ofthe regional and global systems and delineation of foreign policy goals). New approachesas to the essence of the governing structure were formulated, such as apreference for the autocratic trend and a controlled democracy.

Defined after two decades of uncertaintyand ambiguity, the leading foreign policy goals reflect Russia’s overt intentionof reconstructing a Russian empire. Russia sees itself as a separatecivilization seeking parity of status with the West, symbolized first andforemost by the United States, and seeks to undermine the current unipolarmodel. Within this context, Russia is prepared for military, technological, andeconomic competition with the West, i.e., in fields in which it currently lagsbehind. Russia favors turning toward Asia and seeking to establish integrative frameworkswith nations in the region – the Eurasian approach.

It seems that some of Russia’s decisionsstem from its assessment that the international status of the United States hasdeclined, a direct result of the weakness of the Obama administration. This isconsidered a window of opportunity for Russia in its competition with theUnited States.

As for the Middle East – still considereda region critical to Russian interests, in part because it is the focal pointof the threat of radical Islam against Russia itself – the discussion centered primarilyon Syria. Senior Russian officials conveyed the following messages:

• Apart from its role in resolving the chemical weapons issue, Russiais an important actor in the Middle East. Regarding Syria, Russia is interestednot only in resolving the civil war but also in realigning the overall worldorder.
• Russia does not need Assad himself; rather, it is interested in thewelfare of the Syrian people and in international justice.
• The end of the Syrian chemical weapons affair does not spell theend of the civil war. Ending the war is possible only through an internationalsettlement, and the road to such a settlement runs through Geneva-2.
• The Russians continue to insist that the identity of the culprit inthe chemical weapons attack is unclear, though they strongly suspect theopposition. Nonetheless, they continue to support the agreement to dismantleSyria’s chemical weapons arsenal.
• While Russia is not sure whether Syria will fully cooperate in thedismantling of its chemical weapons stockpiles, it does not think Syria shouldbe punished (i.e., Russia does not want the agreement to include a threat ofsanctions), as Syria is not like the West and conducts itself differently.
• The achievement in Syria can be leveraged regarding the Iranianissue.

Among the Middle East issues raised –explicitly and bluntly – by Putin himself was the Israeli nuclear issue.Putin’s claim was that Syria’s chemical weapons were Damascus’ alternative toIsrael’s nuclear arsenal, and that it is reasonable to demand that Israeldivest itself of its nuclear capability, as it doesn’t need it given its military andtechnological superiority in the region. Putin argued that Israel’s atomicweapons, which threaten its neighbors, only hinder Israel on the internationalarena and make Israel a target. He added that there are those in Israel whooppose its possession of nuclear weapons (he referred to the Vanunu affairthough without mentioning the name), and that Israel, which in any case is nota member of the nuclear club, can legitimately be required to relinquish itsnuclear weapons.

President Putin’s statement raises seriousquestions. To be sure, it contained no change in Moscow’s fundamental positions,as Russia consistently votes against Israel at the International Atomic EnergyAgency (as it does on many issues in the United Nations) and supports the Arabresolution on “Israel’s capabilities.” Russia did so as well at the most recentIAEA forum, where it remained – along with its supporters – in the minority,against all the countries of the West that opposed the resolution. One mayassume that the United States will not join the Russians on this issue any timesoon. At Valdai, however, the bluntness and tone of the message coming from sosenior an official imply a different posture than what was in the past, both inthe bilateral and regional contexts.

Bilaterally, Russia has so far made apoint of keeping its relations with Israel friendly and has promotedcooperation in a range of fields. This time, the message from Russia’s toppolitical figure leaves no room for doubt that Russia is prepared to heighten tensionswith Israel and damage the positive relations painstakingly constructed overthe last 20 years. It may be the result of Russia’s frustration with the levelof Israel’s cooperation on political and economic issues. In any case, evidenthere is the victory of those in the Russian establishment who do not supportthe strong relationship built with Israel.

Regionally, this Russian posture reflectsthe desire of the would-be empire to raise its status as a regional player witha say in the rules of the game while lowering the status of the United Statesas the leading power in the arena. Among its motives is Russia’s desire to dragIsrael into negotiations on Syria and Iran, in part as additional Russianleverage in its regional game against the United States. In this context,Russia’s interest would be to promote Iran’s influence while delaying theemerging dialogue between Iran and the United States, by creating an associationbetween the Iranian nuclear program and the atomic arsenal that Israel,according to foreign media, possesses – a move that is consistent with Iran’sinterests. Also, should the process of dismantling Syria’s chemical weapons bederailed, the idea could come into play with the accusatory finger pointed atIsrael.

Russia will likely avoid translating thisapproach from rhetoric into practice. Still, if this approach is pursued on apractical level, it has the potential to change the regional rules of the game.Russia would be shifting its so-called balanced policy on the internationalarena and its status as a fair mediator, and instead choosing a unilateralstance on the Middle East. In turn, Russia’s international and regional conductcould well negatively affect Israel’s strategic interests.