Israel, the United States, and the Faltering Peace Process

On November 8, 2009, Tom Friedman published an op-ed piece in The New York Times entitled, “Call White House, Ask for Barack” in which he surveys the sorry state of the Israeli-Palestinian peace process. In his opinion, currently neither side is really interested in advancing the process towards a permanent settlement. Rather, the Palestinians seemingly want a settlement without talks whereas Israel wants talks without a settlement. The impression is that the American administration is more interested than the parties in promoting the dialogue. With unveiled anger, Friedman asserts that this unacceptable situation requires the present administration to make the radical decisionand withdraw the United States from the process. In such a scenario, the leaders of both sides would be forced to face their peoples and tell them the truth: nothing is happening. When both sides show serious inclination to reach a settlement, says Friedman, the administration will have to present them with a thoughtful program to realize the two-state solution.

Friedman is a well-known columnist with many ties to leading figures in the American administration and is reportedly especially close with Secretary of State Clinton. Thus his column presumably reflects the current administration's prevalent mood, since after a year on the job the administration has yet to find a formula that would enable a Israeli-Palestinian political process, let alone progress.

As a veteran columnist well versed in the intricacies of Middle Eastern and American arenas, Friedman knows full well that an American withdrawal from the Israeli-Palestinian peace process is not realistic. American internal considerations, pressures from the Arab world, the European states, international organizations, and various peace movements obligate American involvement. The administration does not have a real option to withdraw, even if it wanted to. Friedman’s call to the administration to withdraw from the process, therefore, bespeaks rage and frustration among administration members in light of the present situation rather than a genuine proposal.

One can understand Friedman's frustration. Under “normal” circumstances, the parties to the conflict would be expected to demonstrate eagerness to end the conflict, whereas the United States would merely be a party facilitating a settlement. Yet under the present circumstances, it is easy to sense that Israel and the Palestinians are not keen on working towards a settlement, or at any rate, do not seem to be willing to pay the required price for advancing a settlement.

This article focuses on the Israeli dimension.

Like all Israeli governments, the Netanyahu government assumes that any Israeli-Palestinian arrangement will require territorial and other concessions on Israel’s part. A right wing government, the present coalition comprises many factions that view the West Bank as part of Israel and therefore ideologically oppose such concessions. This does not mean that the government has completely ruled out a withdrawal as part of a settlement. Yet it does mean that unlike the views of the peace camp, the withdrawal is not seen as a move that serves Israel’s best interests. According to the government’s understanding, should circumstances require a withdrawal, it will be necessary to give it serious consideration, but only on the basis of the assumption that there will be a genuine return from the Palestinian side and the Arab world in exchange for a withdrawal.

The apparent prevailing opinion among the current government is that the events of recent years have eroded the relevance of territorial withdrawal as an agreement-promoting move. The“land for peace” formula, a mantra in the State of Israel since the Oslo accords, lost its appeal and practicability among many, especially those identified with the “nationalist camp.” Government spokespeople repeatedly refer to the fact that Israel’s withdrawal from Lebanon in May 2000 and the Gaza Strip in September 2005 not only did not advance the peace process, but led to escalations and military confrontations: the Second Lebanon War (July-August 2006) and Operation Cast Lead (December 2008-January 2009). Both conflicts cost Israel in loss of life, heavy damages, and harm to Israel’s position on the political level and in world public opinion.

Beyond this, the present reality is not inducing Israeli public opinion to work towards a settlement. Palestinian suicide bombings and other forms of terrorism, which were a central impetus for Israel's interest in the peace process, has all but disappeared. To many, the current picture is evidence that it is possible to suppress terrorist organizations without a political settlement.

On the northern border vis-à-vis Hizbollah, and on the southern border vis-à-vis Hamas, Israel has succeeded in creating a balance of deterrence, manifested in the extendedperiod of calm. The West Bank economy has improved, and it seems unlikely that the Palestinian masses will risk this prosperity by embarking on another military confrontation with Israel whose outcome, from their point of view, is liable to be disastrous.

In Israel’s internal arena, there is likewise no real pressure on the government to work towards a settlement with the Palestinians. The most recent elections dealt a severe blow to the Israeli left and the various peace groups, and they are not capable of applying significant pressure on the current government to advance a settlement with the Palestinians. The Labor Party is virtually paralyzed: even its leaders do not appear to believe in the likelihood of an Israeli-Palestinian agreement in the foreseeable future. In any case, Defense Minister Barak, who is directly responsible for affairs in the territories, is not displaying genuine willingness to fulfill Palestinian and American demands towards a settlement, i.e., dismantling the illegal outposts and completely freezing construction in Jewish settlements.

Finally, even the American administration, the primary lever capable of advancing a settlement, is currently not genuinely applying pressure on Israel to work towards an agreement. It has become clear to the administration that President Obama’s demand that Israel stop construction completely in the Jewish settlements was unrealistic and almost impossible to implement.

The Obama administration went even further, as Secretary Clinton publicly complimented Prime Minister Netanyahu on his willingness to limit construction in the settlements in an unprecedented manner. For now, the American administration is preoccupied with severe internal problems and with urgent international issues. In the coming year, there are Congressional elections and before long we will see the curtain rise on the next race for the White House. These circumstances will likely further diminish the administration’s motivation to make a massive push for an Israeli-Palestinian agreement

At the same time, the prevalent assumption is that Abu Mazen cannot deliver what is demanded of the Palestinians. Even if Abu Mazen genuinely wants peace, he lacks the tools and the authority to ensure the realization of agreements in a way that would guarantee a massive war against terrorism to ensure Israel's security.

In general, Netanyahu’s government seems to be operating with the mindset that time is not necessarily working against Israel. The absence of a settlement, and therefore also the absence of a massive evacuations Judea and Samaria settlements, will ensure the unity of the coalition for the statutory term. If the acceptable economic status quo also continues, the prime minister will be able to look forward to the next elections with equanimity.