Publications

This publication presents the executive summary of the memorandum. The full memorandum will be published soon.

The recent visit of Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi to Tunisia adds to the mutual decision to abolish visa requirements between the two countries, underscoring Iran’s strong interest in expanding its influence in North Africa in general, and in Tunisia in particular. For the leadership in Tehran, North Africa represents a highly significant geo-strategic region that allows Iran to advance a variety of political, economic, and security interests. Therefore, without a diplomatic move to prevent Iran from pursuing this goal,...

Recent reports from the United Kingdom and Italy about the involvement of Iran’s PressTV television channel in sophisticated influence operations in those countries attest to the ongoing efforts of Iran’s state propaganda network—operated under the supervision of the Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting—to weaken Western nations and amplify the Iranian narrative within them. The ability to curb Iran’s global influence depends, among other things, on the international community’s capacity to disrupt this elaborate system that Iran...

Even after the conclusion of the war between Israel and Iran, the Islamic Republic continues to grapple with significant domestic challenges, namely a deepening economic crisis, ecological problems, shortages of water and electricity, and a widening gap between the regime and the public, especially the younger generation. About three months after the 12-day war, it does not appear that the conflict undermined the foundations of the Iranian regime. On the contrary, Israel’s strikes had, to some extent, the opposite effect, provoking...

__________________ Overview The Middle East is undergoing an unprecedented transition sparked by Hamas’ October 7, 2023, attack and the subsequent regional war. The war in the Gaza Strip provided Iran with its first real opportunity to implement its “unity of the fronts” concept through the simultaneous, coordinated activation of several fronts against Israel and the United States. Iran hoped to avoid direct involvement and the consequences thereof. Ultimately, however, it failed to employ its network of proxies to force Israel to...

The policy of Moscow and Beijing, which consisted of fairly mild condemnations of the Israeli and US strikes in Iran, sparked criticism and disappointment in Tehran. It also reinforced the Iranian assessment that its reliance on Russia and China remains limited, particularly in the event of a military confrontation with Israel and the United States. Nevertheless, it is clear that for now, Iran has no viable alternative to continuing its political, economic, and security partnership (as limited as it may be) with Russia and China,...

In early August, Iran’s Supreme National Security Council (SNSC) announced the establishment of the “Defense Council,” which will operate under Iran’s president and will be composed of the heads of the three branches of government, representatives of the supreme leader, and senior military officials. Just as this was announced, Iran’s Supreme Leader Khamenei appointed Ali Larijani as secretary of the SNSC and as his representative to this  Council. These organizational changes underscore Tehran’s ongoing effort to draw lessons and...

Two central pillars of Iran’s security perception have been undermined since its war with Israel: First, its nuclear program has suffered a severe blow, and second, the “resistance camp” of its regional proxies has been weakened to the point that, for now, it cannot stand by Iran’s side. Tehran must now formulate its nuclear policy under intense time pressure—caught between President Trump’s ultimatum and the threat from the European countries (the E3) to renew the UN Security Council sanctions by activating the “snapback” clause....

The confrontation between Israel and Iran has seemingly strengthened the Gulf States by weakening Iran, their primary security concern. However, from the perspective of the Gulf States, Iran still has the capability of inflicting significant harm and may even accelerate its nuclear program. Therefore, the Gulf States are unlikely to shift their policy toward Iran and will stick with the détente. At the same time, Israel’s relative strengthening is also viewed with concern. As a result, the Gulf States seek to restore the regional...

Israel did not make regime change a declared objective in its recent war with Iran; however, certain Israeli actions were clearly aimed at weakening the foundations of the Islamic Republic and encouraging the Iranian public to reignite their popular protest movement. As the dust settles, not only is there no evidence that Israel’s actions advanced this goal, but it seems that they may even have had the opposite effect (at least for the time being). Currently, several main scenarios could unfold in Iran’s domestic arena: the...

In recent years, and even more so since October 7, Iran has been conducting influence and interference campaigns targeting the Israeli public. These efforts aim to deepen societal divisions and weaken the country from within. Recently, an aggressive Iranian operation was uncovered, designed to recruit Israelis for espionage, terrorism, and to assist Iran in the event of war. The latest revelations about Iran’s long-standing influence and interference operations in the United Kingdom highlight a common ground between Israel and other...

The war between Israel and Iran, known as Operation Rising Lion, significantly set back Iran’s nuclear program. Iran is no longer a nuclear threshold state as  its status was prior to its war with Israel. It would take Iran at least one to two years to regain threshold status, assuming a decision by Supreme Leader Khamenei to pursue nuclear weapons. However, the war did not eliminate Iran’s nuclear capabilities entirely. Iran maintains residual capabilities that could eventually enable the rebuilding of its nuclear program and the...