In an interview with Haaretz on December 15, Palestinian Authority president Mahmoud Abbas repeated his longstanding position that Israeli-Palestinian negotiations can only resume after Israel implements a complete freeze on settlement construction throughout the West Bank, including East Jerusalem. But in a new wrinkle that might have been intended as a sign of flexibility, he added that negotiations could begin immediately, even if the freeze is not publicly declared.
The declaration by EU heads of state on December 8, 2009 about the political process in the Middle East is no cause for anxiety. However, neither should it be dismissed lightly, and we would do well to examine its long term implications.
On November 8, 2009, Tom Friedman published an op-ed piece in The New York Times entitled, “Call White House, Ask for Barack,” in which he surveys the sorry state of the Israeli-Palestinian peace process. In his opinion, currently neither side is really interested in advancing the process towards a permanent settlement. Rather, the Palestinians seemingly want a settlement without talks whereas Israel wants talks without a settlement. The impression is that the American administration is more interested than the parties...
The failure of the American effort to restart the negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians over the final settlement has created a political crisis in the Palestinian Authority. On November 5, PA president Mahmoud Abbas announced that he does not intend to run in the general presidential and Legislative Council elections scheduled for January 2010. Abbas’ announcement may reflect a real political crisis liable to lead to the collapse of the PA, or a tactic designed to put pressure on the United States and Israel.
The violent clash in Gaza in mid-August at the Ibn Tamiyya mosque in Rafah between Hamas members and a group of al-Qaeda supporters from the Jund Ansar Allah organization, which led to the deaths of more than 20 Palestinians and the wounding of several dozen, has again demonstrated the violence, domination, and mercilessness Hamas exhibits towards its political rivals. At the same time, a volatile power struggle in the Gaza Strip was on full display, first and foremost, a struggle over Hamas’ control of the Gaza Strip...
Fatah’s sixth convention, held in Bethlehem on August 4-13, 2009, took place 20 years after the previous convention in Tunisia, which antedated the Madrid conference and the beginning of the Oslo process. For many years Yasir Arafat refrained from convening the forum, even though Fatah’s protocol calls for a convention every five years. The very fact of the recent event is a victory for Fatah’s current leader, Mahmoud Abbas, who succeeded in holding the convention after many postponements and in the face of severe...
In a Newsweek interview on June 22, 2009, former prime minister Ehud Olmert stated that in his talks with Mahmoud Abbas, he had made fairly detailed offers towards an Israeli-Palestinian settlement, including: wllingness by Israel to give the Palestinians 93.5-93.7 percent of the territories. The Palestinians would receive an additional 5.8 percent as part of a land swap; a safe passage between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. Olmert did not state who would have sovereignty and control over this passage; Israel is not willing to...
Adopting the current fashion inaugurated by President Obama with his June 4 Cairo address, Hamas political bureau chief Khaled Mashal joined the list of political leaders delivering major policy speeches in the Middle East. On June 25, Mashal delivered a response to the speeches of Obama and Prime Minister Netanyahu. His address presents Hamas’ comprehensive, updated political approach, thus also deciding the internal debate within Hamas between the so-called moderates and the so-called radicals – in favor of the moderates.
Two central dynamics fueled the two Palestinian popular uprisings in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank: the struggle against Israel and rivalry within the internal Palestinian arena. Anat Kurz studies the intertwined Israel-Palestinian and intra-Palestinian dynamics that evolved since the eruption of the first uprising in late 1987. The study charts how in the years between the two uprisings the balance between these arenas shifted, such that the internal Palestinian dynamic intensified and assumed a more central role.
Hizbollah and Hamas are guerilla and terrorist organizations that in less than 20 years have developed into quasi-governmental entities. They have done so in a relatively smaller area than is usually the case in guerilla warfare, and in the case of the Gaza Strip, primarily in urban areas suited to this type of fighting. Militarily, Hizbollah is a big brother of Hamas: Hizbollah is more experienced, knowledgeable, and selfassured. Nonetheless, Hizbollah is learning from Hamas’ conduct during Operation Cast Lead and is...
Operation Cast Lead against Hamas in the Gaza Strip filled both the IDF and the Israeli public with a sense of success, and justifiably so – at least militarily speaking. In the course of the fighting, Israel managed to greatly reduce the rocket fire at the Israeli home front, with relatively little loss of life and property; the air force managed to render severe blows to the Hamas infrastructure in the Gaza Strip and eliminate senior operatives in the military and political wing of the organization; and the ground forces...
This essay seeks to view Operation Cast Lead as a piece in a developing sequence, beginning with the second intifada and continuing through the Second Lebanon War, in terms of two major components: the military response to the threat and the public understanding of the effectiveness of the military response. There is a close symbiotic relationship between the two components because Israel’s response to the threat involves military combat elements alongside civilian stamina and defense capabilities. The two components are...
