Hamas currently faces difficult challenges. First, it must advance the faltering, slow reconstruction of the Gaza Strip and raise the local standard of living. Second, it must improve its status vis-à-vis the leadership of the Fatah-led Palestinian Authority and narrow the divisive split between them. Third, it endeavors to maintain its military infrastructure, for use in a next round of conflict with Israel. At the same time, Hamas must contend with Salafi jihad groups in an escalating struggle. Finally, it must maneuver politically...
Despite the heavy price paid by Hamas in Operation Protective Edge, it is not wasting any time preparing for the next war. For the organization, war against Israel is a tool for strategic change to entrench its rule in the Gaza Strip and establish itself as a key player in the Israeli-Palestinian arena and surpass the power base of the PA, headed by Fatah and Mahmoud Abbas. In order for Israel to postpone the next conflict with Hamas for as long as possible, two main efforts are necessary. One is to prevent the organization’s arming...
Recent weeks have seen an escalation in the conflict in the Gaza Strip between Hamas and the Salafi jihad groups that support the Islamic State organization. Israel clearly has much interest in the conflict, especially given the possibility that an Islamic State infrastructure or a satellite of the group backed by al-Baghdadi could be established in Gaza. Any development in this direction is liable to translate into activity against Israel. It is possible that in the framework of the effort to halt the expansion of the Islamic...
It may well be the case that convergent threat assessments do facilitate some covert contact between the security echelons of Israel and some of the Arab states concerned about the shadow of Iranian hegemony, and the potential may exist for expanded ties. But the added value of more intense and/or overt ties is not self-evident, and it could reasonably be argued that the potential benefits to Israel of a real regional approach are too modest to justify the soul-searching and domestic political tensions that would inevitably ensue....
On April 27, 2015, the UN Secretary-General released a summary of the report by the Board of Inquiry appointed to investigate damage to UN facilities during Operation Protective Edge in July-August 2014. While the report states that in seven of ten incidents UN schools were damaged by IDF fire, it refrained from blaming Israel. In addition, for the first time, the report speaks of the illegitimate use of UN facilities by Palestinian militant groups. The balanced and factual nature of the report, particularly as compared with the...
Israel would do well to announce that it regards the Arab Peace Initiative as a basis for negotiations, in which principles for a regional agreement resting on a regional security regime are formulated, with the Palestinian issue being a layer or element in the broad regional system – not an issue by itself. Israel should seek to make the Arab initiative, after negotiations between the parties and necessary adjustments, into a kind of new systemic logic, which inter alia will require the Arab world to accept significant...
For the first time in over 15 years, Israel may soon form a coalition government that is composed solely of right-wing factions. This could have major implications for settlement expansion. After all, both of Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s previous governments (2009–2013 and 2013–2015) included center-left parties that opposed settlement expansion outside areas that—according to past negotiations and in any realistic future peace accord—would end up as part of Israel. That is, his governments allowed population growth to expand...
The significance of this week’s visit to Moscow by PA President Mahmoud Abbas should be assessed in the context of Russia’s increasing effort to influence the Israeli-Palestinian political process and advance a settlement of the conflict. This particular effort appears well-suited to Russia’s new Middle East policy, reflected in the decision, announced on April 13, 2015, to supply the S-300 missile system to Iran. Over the years, it has appeared that Russia was willing to accept participation in the Israeli-Palestinian political...
A new Israeli government has yet to be formed and sworn in, but the Israeli and international media have already predicted a collision between Israel and the international community, including the United States. Given the political ideology shared by the potential coalition partners and their approach to the Israeli- Palestinian conflict, that prediction is not hard to make. Prime Minister Netanyahu will have to juxtapose the stability of his future government against the risks involved in pursuing the pre-election political promises...
At the start of 2015, Israel’s two major fronts – home to the two hostile players with which Israel has had military encounters in recent months – were calm. The war against Hamas in the Gaza Strip in the summer of 2014 and the mutual attacks between Israel and Hizbollah in January 2015 seem to be at a standstill and have not been renewed. Nevertheless, a clash between Israel and Hamas in Gaza and one between Israel and Hizbollah in southern Syria seem possible in the foreseeable future. Only a change in the strategic reality in Gaza...
Operation Protective Edge ended in August 2014, leaving the Gaza Strip entrenched in a complex humanitarian reality. The international community committed itself to the reconstruction of the Gaza Strip, and at a conference in Cairo close to the end of the military operation some $5.4 billion was promised. However, for several reasons the project has not yet commenced and the Gaza Strip is now a powder keg: hence the need for a creative solution that would bridge the respective gaps, positions, and demands, and improve the likelihood...
Three rounds of violence between Israel and Hamas since 2008 have not resulted in any change to the fundamental essence of the conflict. Israel is trapped in an asymmetrical conflict with increasingly intense violence, a reality in which Hamas manages to prove the “Paradox of Power”: Israel’s military strength becomes its weakness while Hamas’ military weakness becomes its strength. Seeing Gaza as a state-like entity and declaring war on it may help alter public opinion, allowing for definition of clear goals and less engagement in...