Publications

The current U.S. administration is advancing a major deal, valued at over $700 million, to sell F110 engines to Turkey for its KAAN aircraft project. Despite the administration’s attempts to bypass congressional barriers, this move is not an isolated event; rather, it is a strategic accelerator intended to pave the way for Ankara’s full return to the F-35 program. While Washington’s rationale seeks to preserve Turkey as an anchor within NATO, in practice, it creates a serious dilemma and presents a weighty, threefold strategic risk: Undermining NATO from within: Empowering an actor that is engaged in aggressive competition against Western allies (such as Greece) and is entrenching a defiant military presence in Cyprus. Fueling Regional Friction: Granting legitimacy to a competitive power that provides a safe haven for Hamas and supports the al-Sharaa regime in Syria. Creating a Systemic Risk to the Global F-35 Network: Deploying 5th-generation capabilities in proximity to Russian S-400 systems risks compromising and cracking the information security of the platform as a whole. This threat is not limited to the erosion of Israel’s qualitative edge or the exposure of its defense industries; it constitutes a direct threat to every country in the world equipped with the F-35, alongside concerns over the possible proliferation of KAAN aircraft to additional militaries across the Sunni sphere.

Israel finds itself in a continuous stagnation, wherein impressive tactical military achievements are not translating into political and strategic victory. How can this 'limbo' be resolved across the various fronts?

As the campaign against Iran winds down, attention is expected to return to the Gaza Strip. In the meantime, Hamas is exploiting the strategic vacuum to rehabilitate its governance and military capabilities. Simultaneously, the Trump framework remains stalled, and the “Board of Peace” faces professional, operational, and budgetary difficulties in advancing its declared objectives. The issue of demilitarization remains trapped between Israel’s demand for the complete and immediate disarmament of Hamas and the organization’s stalling tactics. Israel faces three main alternatives: (1) Renewal of efforts to fully implement the Trump framework across the Strip, a course that carries the risk of “mock demilitarization” and depends on Hamas’s consent; (2) Gradual stabilization and reconstruction of areas cleared of Hamas while continuing to erode its control in areas still under its rule. This option is vulnerable to violent disruption and could entrench the Strip’s division; (3) A return to war and the reoccupation of the Gaza Strip, which would entail extremely heavy military, economic, and diplomatic costs for Israel. The key recommendation is to avoid perpetuating the status quo, which establishes Hamas’s rule, and instead adopt a proactive approach. Israel should allow the implementation of the Mladenov framework for gradual demilitarization, beginning with heavy weapons, while coordinating with the Trump administration regarding scenarios that would justify use of force. If Hamas obstructs the process, Israel should implement a differential alternative: the entry of a civilian committee and Palestinian police into “green zones” cleared of Hamas (alongside increasing Israeli security responsibility modeled on Judea and Samaria). Simultaneously, Hamas’s capabilities and governance in the “red zone” should be systematically degraded, including the gradual erosion of its territorial control. The alternative of returning to war and military occupation should remain a last-resort alternative, contingent on the formulation of an exit strategy and a designated body to assume civilian responsibility.