Still No Outlet: Israel–Turkey Relations and the Turkish Referendum

The results of the September 12, 2010 referendum in Turkey on constitutional reforms signal a continued stagnation in relations between Ankara and Israel. Although the referendum dealt with internal issues, the results reflect a general endorsement of the government’s policies in other areas, including foreign policy. Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu has spearheaded a global and regional policy based on his book Strategic Depth and aims to strengthen Turkey’s geo-political status in the region, primarily by tightening relations with the Arab and Muslim states. This trend and Turkey's search for a central role in the Middle Eastern arena help explain the serious crisis in current Israel-Turkey relations. While Turkey has not tried to solve the crisis with Israel, it has emphasized that the tightening of ties with Muslim states, and especially with Iran, do not contravene its desire to strengthen its relations with Western states and continue the process of joining the European Union.

            The reforms ratified by the referendum concern changes in the constitution originating from the 1980 military revolution in Turkey. These changes are ostensibly necessary as part of the process of internal liberalization required by the European Union in order for Turkey to join the EU. In practice, however, the Justice and Development Party party, led by Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan, can see the results of the referendum as a mandate, as widespread approval, and even as a temporary victory over the secular camp that is concerned with preserving Ataturk’s legacy. The success of the referendum also has ramifications for the government’s relationship with the military, since the results constitute a further erosion of the military’s ability to intervene in political processes, both internal and foreign, and compete with the ruling party. The military and defense establishment in Turkey were a leading force in cultivating and strengthening the relations with Israel. The weakening of the military’s status and ability to influence internal and foreign policy will impede the rehabilitation of these relations.

            The Turkish flotilla to Gaza, with Israel's interception of the Mavi Marmara, was not the cause, rather simply the catalyst for the deterioration of the relations. Against the background of the “strategic depth” approach in Turkish foreign policy, Operation Cast Lead in Gaza – which was launched a few days after Prime Minister Ehud Olmert’s visit to Ankara – and the cessation of the Turkish-mediated negotiations between Israel and Syria after the rise to power of Israel's Likud party were interpreted as insults to the Turkish government. The flotilla affair only exacerbated the crisis in the relations.

Various statements by Turkey have reiterated its conditions for restoring the relations to their former level. In an interview to Dar-al-Hayat (September 28, 2010), Foreign Minister Davutoglu presented Turkey’s demands regarding the flotilla as a matter of principle and demanded an Israeli apology and compensation for the families of those killed. Turkey will likely not accept the conclusions of the Turkel Committee, regardless what they may be. Rather, Turkey is presumably waiting for the findings of the United Nations Secretary General inquiry committee, which will not be published until February 2011. In addition, Israel will probably not agree to Turkey's conditions for returning the Turkish ambassador to Israel and resuming normal relations. Israel must thus take into account that at least in the area of security-military cooperation, the relations will not return to the format and intensity that characterized them before the crises of the last three years. And even though in the Dar-al-Hayat interview and other statements the Turkish foreign minister did not present the mediation between Israel and Syria as a prerequisite, one may assume that this issue also constitutes some sort of undeclared condition for resuming regular relations. In this regard, Syrian president Bashar Asad made the situation easier for Israel and Turkey when in an October 6, 2010 interview to Turkish television TRT he said that the United States and France are also trying to jumpstart the negotiations between Israel and Syria, suggesting, in contrast to past comments, that he has not assigned exclusive mediation rights to the Turkish brokers.

            The mediation between Israel and Syria during 2007-8 afforded Turkey one of the most outstanding achievements of the “strategic depth” and “zero problems” policy. Yet despite both the foreign minister’s repeated statements on Turkey's willingness to resume the mediation between Israel and Syria and Israel's desire to repair the relations, it is hard to believe that Israel will agree. This is particularly the case in light of the processes underway in Turkey expressed in part by the weakening of the Turkish military and imprisonment of some of its past officers (representing the human link between the two countries), as well as the results of the referendum. No less worrying for Israel is the tightening of ties between Ankara and Tehran over the last few years. Despite Turkey’s statements that it will abide by the Security Council’s decisions regarding sanctions on Iran, the interpretation given by Turkey regarding the sanctions decision is lenient (for example, in an interview to CNN on September 24, 2010 the Turkish foreign minister claimed that Resolution 1929 does not impose monetary or banking sanctions on Iran).

            At the same time, it is possible to find bridging elements that bypass Turkey’s flotilla-related demands. The establishment of a free trade zone between Turkey, Jordan, Syria, and Lebanon, and Turkish assistance for erecting industrial parks in the Palestinian Authority point to potential Turkish involvement in the regional economy. The need for the involvement of third parties in the framework of a solution for the conflicts between Israel and Syria and between Israel and the Palestinians could give Turkey a constructive role that fits its political aspirations in the region. The discovery of natural gas off the shores of Gaza, Israel, and perhaps in the future off the shores of Lebanon and Syria can afford Turkey an important position, especially in the area of transportation networks.

            The results of the referendum thus imply that Israel will have to accept that Erdogan and his party will continue to rule in Turkey and will have to fashion its approach accordingly. The political and security conditions set by Turkey to resume normal relations under Erdogan are demanding, but Israel has some of the tools and cards it needs to be able to maneuver. Initiatives designed to divert the Turkish-Israeli talks from the level of inflammatory declarations should be encouraged (to Israel's credit, Israel has decided to remain silent and not be dragged into responding to the Turkish politicians’ statements), with the objective of leading the talks to the level of searching for areas where Turkish and Israeli interests converge.