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On May 17, 2010, Iran, Turkey, and Brazil signed an agreement on a swap of 1,200 kg of low enriched uranium (LEU) from Iran in return for 20% enriched uranium reactor fuel for the Tehran Research Reactor (TRR). Should the agreement materialize, it would be an important gain for Iran. Iran would receive fuel for a reactor that while today is used for the production of radioisotopes for medical uses, was previously used for weapons-related research activities: plutonium research and polonium-210 production, whose only use is in nuclear weapons. In fact, the medical radioisotopes can be commercially obtained from several sources, and would not fall under any sanctions.

Most importantly, according to the very first provision of the deal, Iran would be granted explicit legitimacy for continuing its uranium enrichment program "for peaceful purposes," and probably would not even be required to send abroad the 20% enriched uranium that it began to produce in February of this year. The legitimacy accorded to Iran's enrichment activities would be in direct contradiction to the demand, included in five UN Security Council resolutions – three of which included decisions on sanctions – that Iran cease these activities.

It is not clear that the agreement between the three will be concluded in its present form, since the real agreement has to be concluded between Iran and the Vienna Group: the US, France, Russia, and the IAEA. These four entities proposed the original fuel deal in October 2009, which Iran rejected. In any case, there are major differences between what was on the table seven months ago and the present deal. In addition, the overall atmosphere has changed, and it appears that quite a few countries have become more wary than ever of the Iranian game of playing for time. The intention of Brazil, Turkey, and Iran to quickly reach a deal in order to derail UN Security Council deliberations on a fourth round of sanctions has already failed: the day after the fuel deal was concluded, the US introduced a draft proposal on further sanctions against Iran with the long desired backing of all five permanent members of the UN Security Council.

Still, deliberations are likely to continue over the deal, and it is therefore important to focus attention on important questions that arise in light of its provisions, as well as to discuss the implications of the proposal and some of the more notable omissions.

The main question, of course, is the effect of the swap on the overall prospects for the Iranian development of a military nuclear capability. Keeping in mind that Iran would be transferring only about half of its current stock of LEU to Turkey, and that its right to continue enrichment activities would be legitimized, how long would it take Iran to attain the necessary amount of LEU that if enriched to higher levels would be sufficient for the production of one nuclear weapon? And when would it be able to replenish the entire amount of LEU transferred in the swap? The answer to the first question is a few months at most. The answer to the second question – around one year, or perhaps sooner if Iran puts more centrifuges or better ones into operation at their enrichment plant(s).

Consequently, what is the advantage of the deal at this time? For Iran there are huge benefits, including the new fuel for the TRR, a minimal disturbance of the long range aims of the Iranian nuclear program, and a message of seeming good will that could adversely affect the willingness of international actors to confront Iran's military ambitions with determination. For the world, the deal signals a delay of at most a few months in Iran’s ability to again reach the target line of the potential production of its first nuclear bomb.

The agreement speaks of the deposit of 1200 kg of Iranian LEU in Turkey. What about the 20% enriched uranium that Iran has already produced? Why is this not part of the deal? If the deal is implemented, Iran will not need its 20%, since it would receive what it needs through the agreement. Will Iran be required to cease enrichment to 20% as a result of the deal, since it will be rendered unnecessary?

There are also practical questions relating to the swap itself. Who will provide the material for the production of the reactor fuel? Although it is not made very clear by the proposal, one can only assume that the Iranian LEU to be deposited in Turkey will not be used for this purpose, because it was stipulated that this LEU remains Iran's property until the deal is closed, and will be returned immediately and unconditionally to Iran if at any point any provision of the agreement is not fulfilled. Who will do the enrichment to 20%? Who will manufacture the fuel rods? This is a difficult process, mastered only by few countries. Who will receive the deposited 1,200 kg of the Iranian LEU in the final swap? Who will pay for the enrichment and fuel production? What is the price of the operation? Is a year (the period stipulated in the agreement) a sufficient period for the process?

The achievement of this agreement, even if not applied, has already caused another rift in the Security Council membership. While Brazil and Turkey were adamant that further sanctions resolutions against Iran should no longer be discussed, since their deal created a “new situation,” the P5 have agreed to the US draft resolution on a fourth round. As such, even if the agreement does not materialize, it has emphasized the divisions in the Security Council. Moreover, with regard to the only possible benefit of the deal – namely, a several month delay in Iran's advance to military capability – the most important question is how the time gained would be used by the international community. Without any sign of an overall strategy to address this issue, a delay would be only a delay, and the gift to Iran – a fact.