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INSS Insight No. 23, June 24, 2007
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The defeat of the Palestinian Authority’s security agencies (manned by Fatah) at the hands of the military wing of Hamas has accelerated change in the domestic Palestinian balance of forces that began during the first intifada. The leadership of Hamas, which was formed from the Muslims Brotherhood’s social and educational infrastructure in Gaza, declared from the outset that it aimed to be an alternative to the traditional leadership of Palestinian national movement. Fatah still enjoys some popular support in Gaza. In the West Bank, it also enjoys a military advantage over the forces identified with the Islamist stream. However, Hamas’ takeover of Gaza after months of street battles with Fatah forces may have brought it much closer to realizing its vision.
The defeat of the Palestinian Authority’s security agencies (manned by Fatah) at the hands of the military wing of Hamas has accelerated change in the domestic Palestinian balance of forces that began during the first intifada. The leadership of Hamas, which was formed from the Muslims Brotherhood’s social and educational infrastructure in Gaza, declared from the outset that it aimed to be an alternative to the traditional leadership of Palestinian national movement. Fatah still enjoys some popular support in Gaza. In the West Bank, it also enjoys a military advantage over the forces identified with the Islamist stream. However, Hamas’ takeover of Gaza after months of street battles with Fatah forces may have brought it much closer to realizing its vision.
Israel wants to stop this possible trend by strengthening Fatah – which is, after all, formally committed to an agreement based on “two states for two peoples.” In his meeting with President Bush a few days after the Hamas victory in Gaza, Israeli Prime Minster Ehud Olmert declared that Israel will act to strengthen Fatah. On June 25, a summit will open in Sharm El-Sheikh with Egypt, Jordan, Israel and President Mahmoud Abbas. It will deal with ways of strengthening Abbas, now that the most overt obstacle to renewed dialogue with him – namely, Fatah’s political partnership with Hamas – has been removed. However, the reality is far more complex.
It is true that developments in Gaza have ended the on-again, off-again efforts since 2002 to stabilize relations between the two movements. Several rounds of discussions produced understandings on ceasefires in the struggle against Israel, the most recent of which was in November 2006. That understanding, like its predecessors, was intended to stabilize the Palestinian area by denying Israel a pretext for military actions; like its predecessors, it was also very short-lived. In March 2007, the two sides accepted principles for a national unity government which were practically forced on them by Arab governments. However, their coalition never crystallized into a functioning government. Fatah’s determination to deny Hamas what the latter saw as the rightful fruits of its victory in the 2006 Legislative Council elections – particularly control over the Palestinian Authority’s security agencies – further encouraged a frontal confrontation, which led to the military coup in Gaza.
This outcome has emptied Fatah-Hamas understandings of any meaning. Now that Gaza is in its hands, the Hamas leadership may well prefer some calm in the struggle with Israel in order to consolidate its rule. But to achieve that it will have to prevent the remnants of Fatah forces from acting to provoke an Israeli military response that could undermine Hamas plans. Moreover, the confrontation between the two movements in the West Bank will also feed ongoing clashes in Gaza. This likely dynamic indicates that the disjunction between the two regions is far from complete; the link between them will at least continue to take the form of conflict in one area feeding conflict in the other. Besides, the Fatah leadership will be unwilling and in any case unable to prevent their activists from continuing to confront Hamas, at least in part by carrying out attacks against Israel. In this, they will be joined by Islamic Jihad, which has no commitment to any relaxation of the fight against Israel or any coordination with Hamas.
Hamas’ takeover of Gaza ostensibly simplifies the challenge for Israel. The Palestinian Authority no long consists of two camps – one, an interlocutor, and the other with which there is no basis for dialogue. Nor is there any longer a situation of two regions linked by a common framework; now there is one region over which Israel has voluntarily waived any control and another whose fate remains to be determined by a political process. The unity government has been dismantled and in the West Bank, there is now an emergency government headed by Abbas loyalist Salam Fayyad. Still, although disagreements between Israel and Fatah include some security dimensions, they are primarily about political and territorial issues. In Gaza, by contrast, the reality given the political chasm separating Hamas and Israel is that the Israeli-Palestinian conflict there is reduced to purely military dimensions. That explains the assumption that Israel can now try to advance a permanent status agreement with the Palestinian Authority headed by Abbas, while bypassing the complexity resulting from Hamas’ centrality in Palestinian politics.
However, Hamas’ takeover of Gaza does not substantially change the repertoire of Israel’s policy tools in dealing with developments in the Palestinian arena. The struggle against Israel waged from Gaza, even if it escalates, will not make the military option, with its risks of getting bogged down there again, any more attractive than it was before. And other steps that Israel might take would simply be more of what it has already done in the past: the Gaza Strip is already under a full blockade imposed following Israel’s withdrawal in August 2005. The supply of electricity, water and basic goods will continue for humanitarian reasons. The economic sanctions that were imposed following the swearing-in of the Hamas government, that is, the transfer of funds except through President Abbas, will also continue. Nor do the chances of any political breakthrough look good.
The common aspiration of Israel and Fatah to prevent the fall to the Islamist camp of the West Bank, as well, does not constitute a basis for agreement on permanent status. Fatah’s main concern now is to block the rise of Hamas power in the West Bank and to regain control in Gaza. Preparing for agreement with Israel – which entails historical concessions – is not on its agenda. In any case, it could not impose any agreement it might negotiate. And Israel’s security and ideological reservations about territorial concessions in the West Bank will continue to complicate the task of reaching a compromise with Fatah – just as they did in the years preceding Hamas’ electoral gains. Moreover, the current political break between the West Bank and Gaza does not relieve Fatah leaders of their obligations to Gaza residents or signal the end of Hamas’ intention to expand its presence in the West Bank. With the revival of a political process, the West Bank and Gaza will be on the negotiating table as a single entity. And any Palestinian delegation – religious, secular, or mixed – will insist on maintaining that link. Israel will not be able to ignore demands in that spirit, however much they may complicate matters.
The opinions expressed in INSS publications are the authors’ alone.
Publication Series INSS Insight