In accordance with the threats from its leadership and given that it considered the assassination of Hassan Mahdavi (also known as Mohammed Reza Zahedi) in Syria as being “one step too far,” Iran launched hundreds of drones, cruise missiles, and surface-to-surface missiles of various types at Israel. Additionally, the Houthis and Hezbollah “symbolically” fired toward Eilat and the Golan Heights, apparently to demonstrate the support of Iranian proxies for Tehran.
This event is unprecedented in its significance and scope and demonstrates Tehran’s understanding that not responding to Mahdavi’s assassination—a painful blow to Tehran due to both his seniority and the location of his assassination (the Iranian embassy in Damascus)—would be far more costly than an actual response. Despite the risk of escalation, Tehran was willing to take the chance to rebalance the deterrence equation with Israel.
The fact that Iranian missiles targeted distant military bases, along with the visible preparations made for this attack, indicate that Iran tried to minimize the likelihood of its attack leading to a regional conflict. It should be emphasized that Iran is wary of the US presence in the Middle East and the possibility of a confrontation with the Americans. Therefore, Iran’s actions before and during the attack suggest that it may be content with this response and may avoid further escalation, unless necessary.
The ball is now in Israel’s court, and the response to last night’s events will determine whether we are heading for a serious escalation or if we are ending the current cycle. Israel can be content with the unprecedented interception rate, the extraordinary cooperation with the United States and Britain within a coalition framework, and above all, the fact that there was minimal damage from the Iranian attack. Israel can respond in a limited way, especially when it seems that the Americans do not support an Israeli counterattack. At the same time, this is an unprecedented event that may warrant a severe response in order to prevent such events in the future and to draw a line in the sand for Iran so that it will not repeat a similar response again. Nonetheless, any attack on Iran significantly increases the likelihood of a regional conflict, extending beyond just a scenario of Israel versus Iran. Therefore, it would be advisable to coordinate any response with the US administration.
In accordance with the threats from its leadership and given that it considered the assassination of Hassan Mahdavi (also known as Mohammed Reza Zahedi) in Syria as being “one step too far,” Iran launched hundreds of drones, cruise missiles, and surface-to-surface missiles of various types at Israel. Additionally, the Houthis and Hezbollah “symbolically” fired toward Eilat and the Golan Heights, apparently to demonstrate the support of Iranian proxies for Tehran.
This event is unprecedented in its significance and scope and demonstrates Tehran’s understanding that not responding to Mahdavi’s assassination—a painful blow to Tehran due to both his seniority and the location of his assassination (the Iranian embassy in Damascus)—would be far more costly than an actual response. Despite the risk of escalation, Tehran was willing to take the chance to rebalance the deterrence equation with Israel.
The fact that Iranian missiles targeted distant military bases, along with the visible preparations made for this attack, indicate that Iran tried to minimize the likelihood of its attack leading to a regional conflict. It should be emphasized that Iran is wary of the US presence in the Middle East and the possibility of a confrontation with the Americans. Therefore, Iran’s actions before and during the attack suggest that it may be content with this response and may avoid further escalation, unless necessary.
The ball is now in Israel’s court, and the response to last night’s events will determine whether we are heading for a serious escalation or if we are ending the current cycle. Israel can be content with the unprecedented interception rate, the extraordinary cooperation with the United States and Britain within a coalition framework, and above all, the fact that there was minimal damage from the Iranian attack. Israel can respond in a limited way, especially when it seems that the Americans do not support an Israeli counterattack. At the same time, this is an unprecedented event that may warrant a severe response in order to prevent such events in the future and to draw a line in the sand for Iran so that it will not repeat a similar response again. Nonetheless, any attack on Iran significantly increases the likelihood of a regional conflict, extending beyond just a scenario of Israel versus Iran. Therefore, it would be advisable to coordinate any response with the US administration.