Publications

The prisoner exchange between Israel and Hizbollah expected to take place within the coming days has aroused a vehement public debate in Israel regarding the price of the deal versus its value. The prime minister’s declaration that the Israeli soldiers captured by Hizbollah are presumably no longer alive has only intensified the question of the price and the implications for the future security of Israel’s population. Moreover, it is clear that this debate is a forerunner of the one that is sure to occur regarding the deal with Hamas, whose price is liable to be much higher and more difficult than this one.

The State of Israel's sensitivity and feelings of responsibility for the lives of its captured soldiers and civilians are well-established in Jewish tradition and exceptional when compared to common practice in other countries. Predictably, therefore, all the deals made to date between Israel and its enemies to release those captured and kidnapped have stirred a debate about this “national characteristic.” Is it a desirable expression of moral might and the extended mutual responsibility that Jews feel for one another? Or does it reflect an uncontrolled weakness and an Achilles’ heel exploited by Israel’s enemies to attain unreasonable concessions?

The public debate over negotiated prisoner swaps inevitably focuses on questions of "profit and loss." It reflects the concern in Israel that yielding to enemy extortion will only increase enemy motivation to attempt this sort of extortion again. Therefore the supporters of an uncompromising approach have attempted to anchor stiff, rigid policies in legislation that would tie the hands of coming governments, thereby helping create a reality in which the country would be less exposed to extortion in the future. This approach clearly reflects widespread public sentiment, yet at the same time treats all extortion situations as being cut from the same cloth, ignoring distinctions involving the matter at hand, timing, and sometimes even the political and geopolitical contexts.

Far from the first of its kind, the present deal with Hizbollah – as well as all other deals – has an historical context that reflects the approach of past Israeli governments towards negotiations with terrorist organizations. This in effect has shaped policy regarding bargaining situations involving Israelis both in Israel and abroad. The Israeli government has consistently preferred a military option to rescue hostages over the release of imprisoned terrorists. This was the case in every terrorist action on Israeli soil that involved demands for the release of prisoners, and it was the case with the Air France flight hijacked to Entebbe, where the release of the Israeli and Jewish passengers was conditioned on the release of terrorists imprisoned in Israel. On the other hand, if there was no realistic option of freeing hostages and captives by force, Israel negotiated and paid different prices, depending on the circumstances. The price Israel paid was always quantitatively higher than what it received in exchange because of the disproportionate number between Israel’s civilian and military hostages/captives and those held by Israel. True, in the Rosenwasser swap, Samuel Rosenwasser, a guard in Metulla kidnapped in 1970 by Fatah, was released in exchange for a single terrorist. Nonetheless, that deal, so often cited by supporters of the uncompromising approach who would like to return to the days of old, took place at a time when Fatah was willing to settle for a merely symbolic price because, given the circumstances of the time, it was much more interested in recognition, signified by its acceptance as a legitimate partner in negotiations of any kind.

Today Israel is confronted with two exchange deals differing one from another in scope and significance, and it is important to examine each one on its own terms. The price Israel is being asked to pay Hizbollah is relatively low, and is primarily (though not entirely) of emotional significance. True, for Israel the deal pours salt on an open wound because it affords a victory to Hizbollah, and in the release of Samir Kuntar, vindicates to Nasrallah's supporters the manipulative, coercive struggle that Nasrallah has waged against Israel. Kuntar, who was personally responsible for the horrific cold-blooded murder of several Israeli civilians, including young children, is seared into Israeli consciousness as a symbol of the venom and callousness of Israel’s enemies.

However, as he has already served a long sentence – close to 30 years – Kuntar nonetheless represents a measure of the requisite deterrence. As far as is known, his continued imprisonment is not likely to yield any new information about the fate of Ron Arad, and should not impact on Israel’s commitment to solving the mystery of Arad’s disappearance. Therefore, in light of what Israel is receiving, namely, the return of the two Israeli soldiers who were kidnapped by Hizbollah and the removal of the burden of uncertainty from their families as to their fate, many see the release of Kuntar as an inevitable if painful resolution. In this context, Nasrallah’s declaration that this effectively ends the issue of Lebanon's captives bears mentioning, because the subtext is the difficulty he is liable to face in justifying the steep price Lebanon will have to pay should more Israelis be kidnapped in the future.

In contrast, the price of the reported deal with Hamas for Gilad Shalit, who is still alive, is higher and harder to digest. The main problem is twofold. First, many of those appearing on the Hamas wish list of prisoners to be released are sentenced to particularly long terms given the heinousness of their crimes, but have yet to serve a substantial portion of their sentences. Second, once released they are liable to make significant contributions to the continued struggles of their organizations against Israel.

It is abundantly clear that Israel will have to pay a high price for the release of Shalit and that the negotiations taking place with Egyptian mediation are intended to contain the damages incurred by the deal, as Israel cannot escape from it unscathed. Therefore, all those who now insist on strict legalisms that would govern this extortion situation by Hamas ought to take into consideration current Israeli reality, the history of previous prisoner exchanges, and in particular, the significance of their arguments in relation to other basic values Israel is trying to preserve. There is no doubt that this is a difficult dilemma and a struggle between opposing just values. It is necessary both to examine the question of assuming responsibility and taking risks at present in an attempt to prevent the recurrence of such dilemmas in the future, and to examine every case on its own merits.

Once the deal with Hamas is concluded, it would be appropriate to hold a serious public debate in Israel over dilemmas between principles and basic values on the one hand and security and political needs on the other, given the conduct of Israel’s enemies. It would be appropriate to examine Israel’s policy regarding release of prisoners, and the possibility of making prisoner release part of a comprehensive attempt to solve political issues that comprise the conflict between Israel and its enemies.