The Agreement on Syria’s Chemical Weapons: Should Israel Reassess its Arms Control and Disarmament Policies?

Even before the ink was dry on the Russian(American) proposal that called on Syria to divest itself of its chemicalweapons, a spokesman for the Israeli Foreign Ministry, in response to aquestion from Haaretz, asserted that Israel would not ratify theChemical Weapons Convention (CWC) as long as other states in the region that donot recognize Israel's existence and threaten to destroy it are in possessionof chemical weapons. He added, “Thechemical weapons threat against Israel and its civilian population is neithertheoretical nor distant. Terror organizations, acting as proxies for certainregional states, similarly pose a chemical weapons threat. These threats cannotbe ignored by Israel, in [its] assessment of possible ratification of theconvention.” It is puzzlingwhy the spokesman was in such a hurry to make such a categorical statement onIsrael's position even before it became clear how the proposal would bereceived.

Since this statement was made, the Geneva agreement,which is supposed to lead to the destruction of Syria’s chemical weapons arsenal,has been signed. The significant differences of opinion between the UnitedStates (and France and Britain) and Russia during the decision making process inthe UN Security Council on the relevant resolution that was approved indicate thatthere are still numerous obstacles to implementation of the historic decision andthat it is too early to consider the task completed. Yet even if a US recourseto military action if Syria fails to fulfill the agreement is ostensibly stillon the table, it is clear that a diplomatic process of disarmament is beginning.It is as yet difficult to assess how this process will unfold, and itsimplications depend to a large extent on the way the Syrian issue ishandled.

Crises – and wars – upset the status quoand create opportunities that did not exist previously. This is what happenedin the wake of 1991 Gulf War: American recognition of the need to takeadvantage of the results of the war to start a regional process led to thelaunching of multilateral talks as part of the Madrid process. The multilateralworking group on arms control and regional security, which was established inthat framework, was part of the American attempt to create a securityarchitecture for the Middle East. Two decades later, assuming that theagreement on Syria’s chemical weapons is implemented despite the anticipateddifficulties, will the crisis succeed in spawning a diplomatic process thatwill offer new opportunities in the regional arms control and disarmamentprocess? Will the United States under President Obama wish to promote an armscontrol agenda in the Middle East with Russia as its partner? Will a US-Russianunderstanding be sufficient to promote a diplomatic solution to the Iraniannuclear crisis and consequently lead to the continuation of the regional armscontrol process?

Against this background, the question iswhether Israel can make do with a response of the sort given by the ForeignMinistry spokesman. At the recent Valdai conference President Putin claimed thatSyria acquired its chemical weapons in response to Israel's nuclear weapons,and that Israel, because of its technological superiority, does not need tohave nuclear weapons, which only make it itself a target. This suggests thatsome will see the chemical weapons agreement as an opportunity to jumpstart aregional disarmament process in which Israel will need to do its part. Indeed,Putin added that ultimately Israel would have to dismantle its nuclear weapons,just as Syria is giving up its chemical weapons, and that Israel is not one ofthe five nations entitled to possess nuclear weapons. One Russian Middle East analyst,interpreting Putin’s remarks, noted that the Russian president prefers for theMiddle East to become a nuclear-free zone, an idea that Russia has long supported.According to this expert, the dismantling of chemical weapons is notconditional on Israel's dismantling of its nuclear weapons. As others presumablyshare his basic position, the question is whether Russia will act to jumpstartthe process. A possible platform could be the “2012 Conference,” which wassupposed to convene under the umbrella of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treatyin order to discuss measures to implement the decision to turn the Middle Eastinto a weapons of mass destruction-free zone. Russia, which has criticized the(American) decision to postpone the conference, could renew the pressure to conveneit.

What might this mean for Israel, whichcould find itself involved in a process in which it is forced to be on the defensiveand is required to address questions similar to those posed to the ForeignMinistry spokesman? Instead of focusing on the risks, perhaps attention oughtto be turned to the opportunities that the Syrian crisis and ensuing dynamic maywell create. The US actions in the wake of the 1991 Gulf War forced Israel toformulate a vision for regional security and arms control that steered itsparticipation in the working group on arms control. One outcome was the radicalchange in Israel's willingness to be involved in the process of disarmament andarms control in the 1990s, and in which – in  contrast to the prevalent approach until then– involvement created an opportunity to influence the content of the armscontrol and disarmament agreements, thereby helping to maintain nationalinterests. Two striking examples of the new approach were the involvement indrafting the CWC and the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty.In its dealings on the two treaties, Israel combined two approaches, supportingglobal disarmament processes when their implementation (that is, ratification) issubject to regional developments. For this reason, Israel decided not to ratifythe two treaties. Are the considerations that guided it at the time still validregarding ratification of the CWC? Or does the Syrian chemical weaponsdisarmament process change the situation? Does Israel's joining the conventionharm or strengthen Israeli deterrence? Does Israel’s participation help theeffort to prevent spillover of chemical weapons to terrorist organizations andthus remove a potential danger that these weapons will be used against Israel?Or is it better to maintain the status quo because the security risk and a potentialslippery diplomatic slope do not justify a risk, even if it incurs temporarysupport because for Israel given the change in its position?

These and other questions come to the fore inthe new situation. The current focus on the issue of disarmament may not beconsistent with Israel's position, which makes discussion, and certainly, implementation,of the disarmament agreements conditional on a radical change in the politicalsituation in the region. However, with the crisis in Syria, Israel can focus onthe issue of chemical weapons and propose that after the Syrian chemicalweapons disarmament process is completed, it will enter a regional discussion onestablishing a chemical weapons-free zone in the Middle East. The discussionson establishing a regional verification mechanism and reciprocal regional monitoringmechanism could start a process of confidence building as a basis forcontinuation of the process.

In conclusion, the US initiative in the1990s forced Israel to formulate a doctrine on regional security and armscontrol, which in turn changed Israel’s approach and encouraged its diplomaticinvolvement in arms control processes, in the effort to serve Israeliinterests. The crisis in Syria and potential subsequent developments requireIsrael to reexamine its positions on these topics. It is doubtful that adoptinga defensive/passive position due to the risks in the Middle East arena is the bestapproach. Instead, the opportunities that arise should be examined, and then,Israel should consult with the United States and a number of other Westerncountries and make its positions clear. It is better to set the parameters for shapingthe agenda on regional security and arms control than to be dragged into adefensive position.