Publications

Key Findings:

Trust in the Military Leadership

• The IDF continues to enjoy high and stable trust: Three out of four Israelis (75%) express high trust, similar to the results in August. Among Jews, the figure is very high (86%), while among Arabs it remains very low (29%).
• Trust in the Chief of Staff, Lt. Gen. Eyal Zamir, stands at 58%, stable compared with August (60%). Among Jews, 68% express high trust, compared with only 19% among Arabs.
• Trust in the IDF spokesperson’s reports also remains stable compared with August, standing at 56%. Among Jews, 64% express high trust, compared with just 21% among Arabs. A majority of Arabs (59%) express low trust in the IDF spokesperson.
• Trust in the IDF senior command has risen compared with last year: 59% of Israelis express high or very high trust, compared with 37% who express little or no trust. This is a slight increase from October 2024 (52% high trust vs. 42% low trust).
• Trust in the IDF’s investigatory and lessons-learned processes has declined: Only 37% of Israelis express high or very high trust, while a majority of the public at 60% expresses low or no trust at all. Among Jews, 41% now express high or very high trust in this area—down sharply from 66.5% in November 2023.

Trust in the Political Leadership

• Trust in the Israeli government remains stable but low: Only 26% of the public expresses high trust, unchanged since August. Among Jews the figure is 30%, compared with just 9% among Arabs (88% of Arabs express low or no trust).
• Trust in Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu remains stable but low: Only 30% of Israelis express high trust. Among Jews, the figure is 36%; among Arabs, only 5%.
• While trust in the IDF remains very high across political lines (81% of coalition voters and 80% of opposition voters express high trust), trust in the government reflects public’s division along political lines—only 7% of opposition voters express high trust in the government, compared with 55% of coalition voters. Yet, distrust within the coalition is growing, with 43% of coalition voters now expressing little or no trust in the government.

• Declining belief in an IDF victory: A majority of the public at 58% is certain or believes the IDF will win the war in Gaza—a drop of 8% since August at 66%. Another 31% of Israelis believe the IDF will not win. Among Jews, 66% believe in a victory, compared with only 24% of Arabs—down sharply from 92% on October 15, 2023.
• Declining belief that the war’s goals will be achieved: Only 44.5% of Israelis believe the goals of the war can be achieved fully or to a great extent, compared with 50% who think otherwise.
• A large majority of the public (72%) is dissatisfied with the government’s handling of the Gaza war (69% of Jews, 85% of Arabs), while 25% is satisfied. By contrast, 57% is satisfied with the IDF’s handling (66% of Jews, 19% of Arabs), compared with 40% dissatisfied.
• The public is divided over resuming the Gaza: 46% of Jews support occupying Gaza City (28% strongly, 18% somewhat), while 45% are opposed (19% somewhat oppose, 26% strongly oppose). Among Jews, support is 56%, compared with only 9% among Arabs. Among coalition voters, 85% support the operation, while only 24% of opposition voters do (68% oppose).
• Some 44% of the public believes the attack on Hamas’s leadership in Qatar did not advance any of the war’s goals. 25% believes it advanced both goals (toppling Hamas and returning the hostages), 21% believes it advanced only the goal of toppling Hamas rule, and just 2% believes it advanced only the return of the hostages.
• A growing share of the public believes it is time to end the war in Gaza: 64% of all respondents and 57% of Jews hold this view, compared with 60.5% and 49% in June and January 2025, respectively. Among opposition voters, 85% support ending the war, compared with 35% of coalition voters.

• The public expresses concern over possible international recognition of a Palestinian state: 60% is worried (29% very worried, 31% somewhat worried). 17% is not so worried, and 20% is not worried at all.

Key Findings:

• 65% of Israelis are worried about the social situation of Israel after the war (42% very worried, 23% somewhat worried). 19% are moderately worried, 6% slightly worried, and 8% not worried at all.
• 45% of the public believes solidarity has weakened (27.5% somewhat, 17.5% very much). Only 27% believes it has strengthened (22% somewhat, 5% very much)—a sharp drop compared with 48% during Operation Rising Lion against Iran three months ago.
• 58% of Israelis are more concerned about internal socio-national threats within Israel (a 10% rise since August 2024), compared with 30% who are more concerned about external security threats. 8% are not worried about either.
• Only 29% of the public reports a high or very high sense of personal security, 43% feels a medium level, and 27% reports low or very low security. These figures remain stable compared with the previous month.