Publications

Despite the prevailing perception that China retreated from the Middle East in 2025 amid the renewed strengthening of the United States in the region and the absence of significant Chinese involvement in the Israel-Iran war, the reality is more complex. A multi-dimensional analysis of trade, investment, technology, as well as security and diplomatic ties, shows that not only has China not retreated from the Middle East, but it has continued to consolidate and deepen its economic foothold there, maintaining a consistent pattern of conduct: avoiding security commitments while expanding economic influence. The round of confrontation between Israel, the United States, and Iran in early 2026 highlights this trend: China remains a marginal actor in the military arena, yet acts cautiously to leverage the crisis in order to accumulate long-term influence. The central question that remains open is whether and how China will be involved in Iran’s post-war reconstruction—particularly in the rehabilitation of its military capabilities and defense industry. This issue is not merely theoretical. It requires Israel to act in the international sphere alongside regional partners that have also been targeted by Iran, and influence China to refrain from such involvement, particularly with regard to rebuilding Iran’s military capabilities. Furthermore, Israel must prepare for the intensification of great power competition in the Middle East, potentially in a different and more acute form than that seen over the past decade.

What lessons can be drawn from the local elections held in Judea and Samaria and Gaza, looking toward future general elections?