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Home Publications INSS Insight Iran’s Global Diplomatic-Economic Campaign

Iran’s Global Diplomatic-Economic Campaign

In recent months Iran has been engaged in a campaign to improve its standing in Asia, Africa, and Latin America in various countries that are not aligned with the West. Will this help Iran mitigate its international isolation and alleviate the sanctions regime?

INSS Insight No. 1761, September 5, 2023

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Sima Shine
Yair Zukerman

Recent months have seen Iran engaged in a diplomatic campaign designed to breach its international isolation and the sanctions regime. In this framework, Iran seeks membership in international organizations that challenge Western dominance. It has already been accepted to the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation and has been invited to join Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa as a member of BRICS. In addition, Iran’s President and a number of ministers visited Asia, Africa, and Latin America in an effort to tighten political, military, and economic ties. These moves, alongside close cooperation with Russia against the backdrop of the war in Ukraine, as well as the resumption of relations with the Gulf states, help Iran improve its image as a legitimate state; they are presented by the regime – internally as well – as developments that will improve the Iranian economy and challenge the United States, and most importantly, will undermine the American sanctions regime. Thus far, however, these efforts have neither alleviated the dire economic situation in the Islamic Republic, nor lessened the alienation felt by many Iranians toward the regime.


Over the past year, Iran has made a concerted effort to advance its political and economic relations within the international community. This diplomatic effort is reflected in Iran’s joining global organizations in which the United States is not a member, and in advancing its “Good Neighbor Policy,” which President Ebrahim Raisi said was designed to improve Iran’s relations with its neighbors in the Gulf, and its “Eastern Policy,” which focuses on Russia and China.

As part of its joining international organizations that it hopes will be an alternative to the world order led by the United States and Europe – and, by extension, to the direct economic sanctions imposed on Iran – Tehran has made a major effort over the past year to join the BRICS group, comprising Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa. To this end, Iran engaged in an extensive lobbying campaign among members of the organization, primarily Russia and China. These two countries, which object in principle to a unipolar world order led by the West and to the imposition of US sanctions on Iran, supported Tehran’s application to join BRICS. The visit to South Africa by Iranian Foreign Minister Hossein Amir-Abdollahian and his meeting with his South African counterpart focused on the issue, as well as the expansion of bilateral cooperation. In July 2023, the head of the Iranian Supreme National Security Council (SNSC), Ali Akbar Ahmadian, participated in a meeting of BRICS national security advisors in Johannesburg, where he reiterated Iran’s desire to join the group. At the BRICS summit in South Africa (August 22-24), to which Iran was invited as an observer and where it was represented by President Raisi, it was decided to invite six nations to join the group in 2024: alongside Iran, Argentina, Egypt, Ethiopia, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates will also be invited to join. China and Russia eye this organization as a realistic economic alternative to the West and view the addition of countries like Iran and Saudi Arabia as a way of bolstering integration between the member states that import and export oil, as part of their principled opposition to the imposition of sanctions.

Iran joining BRICS is, therefore, an important achievement for the Islamic Republic since it will allow it to benefit at least partially from an alternative to the sanctions regime, even if it does not represent a viable way to evade them. It seems likely that the other BRICS newcomers will continue with a line that differentiates between political partnership and economic partnership. Similarly, some of the member countries and those that may join in the future have refrained from cooperating with Iran on economic issues – precisely because of the sanctions that the West has imposed on it. Either way, acceptance into BRICS will allow Iran to try to challenge Western dominance, as was already demonstrated by the meeting between President Raisi and the President of China during the recent summit. Similarly, Iran hopes that use of BRICS’ new bank – the New Development Bank – will allow it to bypass the European SWIFT bank clearing system, which under the sanctions excludes Iran.

Acceptance into BRICS follows Iran’s acceptance in July 2023 into the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), after years of participating as an observer state and after signing a Memorandum of Commitment in September 2022. The SCO, whose permanent members include China, Russia, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, India, Pakistan, and now also Iran, is an organization that seeks to promote trust and cooperation in the areas of security, economics, and culture. Membership in the SCO will mainly furnish Iran with opportunities to advance its economic interests, and it has already submitted a proposal for a joint naval defense mechanism, which it presented to defense ministers from member states at their summit in India in April 2023.

At the same time, over the past few months Iran has been engaged in a wide-ranging diplomatic campaign in Asia, Africa, and Latin America. After bolstering relations through the “Good Neighbor Policy” with the Gulf states – and especially after renewing diplomatic relations with Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates – Iran is now trying to advance possible economic cooperation that could be forged despite the ongoing US sanctions. The UAE invited Iran to the annual Middle East Rail conference, which took place in Abu Dhabi, and in May the Iranian Foreign Minister met with his Omani counterpart to discuss allowing Iranian companies access to trade zones in the Gulf.

As part of the Iranian diplomatic effort vis-à-vis African states, President Raisi visited Kenya, Uganda, and Zimbabwe in July, the first time an Iranian president had visited Africa since 2012; Raisi termed it “a mission to expand Iran’s strategic depth.” The campaign matched the interests of the countries he visited, especially in the economic sphere. Dozens of memoranda of understanding were signed in the fields of communications, fishing, agriculture, and medicine.

Prior to that, in early June, the Iranian Foreign Minister visited Sudan, where he held discussions with his Sudanese counterpart about the possibility of renewing diplomatic relations, severed in 2016 after an attack on the Saudi embassy in Tehran. Thereafter, the two Foreign Ministers met at the Non-Aligned Movement summit in Azerbaijan, where they discussed restoring diplomatic ties “as quickly as possible.” The move toward rapprochement between Iran and Sudan began with the fall of Sudanese leader Omar al-Bashir and intensified after the resumption of official relations between Saudi Arabia and Iran in March 2023. Closer relations with Sudan could provide Iran with a foothold on the Red Sea, significant for  the importance it attaches to the Horn of Africa. At the same time, there have been contacts between Iran and Egypt, mediated by Iraq and Jordan, to examine the possibility of improving their bilateral ties. So far, there has been no significant progress.

Latin America is another area where Iran has expended significant efforts to expand its influence. The Islamic Republic is trying to advance economic and military ties with countries that are in conflict with the United States, such as Venezuela. Accompanied by his Ministers of Oil, Defense, Foreign Affairs and Health, President Raisi visited Venezuela, Nicaragua, and Cuba in July. While in Caracas, Raisi spent much time bolstering the partnership with the regime of Nicolas Maduro, and as part of a 20-year cooperation agreement between the countries, 25 memoranda of understanding were signed, covering fields ranging from energy, commerce, industrial development, and culture to scientific research. Both Venezuela and Iran are contending with Western sanctions, so the South American country is fertile ground for cooperation in the fields of oil exports and replacement parts. The two nations established a joint maritime transportation company and expanded cooperation in several other fields, including innovation and telecommunications. While in Nicaragua and Cuba, Raisi signed agreements in healthcare, education, diplomacy, communications, and the legal field. Iran agreed to send Bolivia its unmanned aerial vehicles to help in the battle against drug smuggling and to safeguard its borders.

In the Far East, Iran’s diplomatic activity is likewise evident. The Japanese Foreign Ministry reported that a meeting between the two countries’ Foreign Ministers was held in August – the first such meeting in many years – and dealt with continued cooperation in medicine, the environment, and reduction of the danger of natural disasters, as well as the nuclear issue and the war in Ukraine. Raisi visited Indonesia in May, where he also signed a trade agreement with President Joko Widodo.

In conclusion, the Raisi government has had an intensive year on the diplomatic front, in accordance with its clearly formulated policy of improving relations – in Iran’s closest circle of neighboring countries, as well as with the “Global South” and the East. Unlike in the past, the Gulf states, along with nations in Africa and Latin America, are more open to the idea of “doing business” with Iran and accepting it as a legitimate diplomatic and economic partner. On the declarative level, this process has bolstered Iran’s standing on the international stage and has helped breach its international isolation. This development is part of the changes to the existing world order spearheaded by China and Russia, which are in conflict with the United States and seek to promote a world order that is not unipolar and in which Washington wields less influence. In practice, however, it is doubtful whether these moves have helped alleviate the dire economic situation in the Islamic Republic, certainly not in the short term, in part because some of the countries involved still adhere to US sanctions, and in any case, it takes a significant amount of time to finalize any deal with Iran because of the country’s bureaucracy. It also currently seems unlikely that the new international openness toward Iran will translate into better relations between the regime and the public, as long as the government continues to deny the Iranian people their civil rights and continues to enforce unpopular laws, such as the law mandating women to wear the hijab.

The opinions expressed in INSS publications are the authors’ alone.
Publication Series INSS Insight
TopicsIranIran: Internal AffairsIran: The International Arena
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      • Europe
      • Iran and the Shi'ite Axis
      • Iran
      • Lebanon and Hezbollah
      • Syria
      • Yemen and the Houthi Movement
      • Iraq and the Iraqi Shiite Militias
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