On the night of July 17, 2014, following its decision to advance Operation Protective Edge to a second stage, the Israeli government issued the order to launch a limited ground maneuver. The immediate goal is to neutralize the attack tunnels dug by Hamas along the border with Israel; in conjunction with this decision, the campaign is to continue until it attains the goals of “restoring calm for a long period of time and dealing a significant blow to Hamas and other terrorist organizations.” At this stage, the move involves action in...
Assuming that Hamas will ultimately accept the Egyptian proposal for a ceasefire, even if with minor adjustments and guaranteed by an external party, the question arises whether conditions for a ceasefire and new understandings are indeed sufficiently ripe. The end mechanisms of the current conflict and the ultimate arrangement are meant to promote the strategic goals of both sides. Israel chose to mark Hamas as the responsible party in the Gaza Strip, while conducting a sustained effort to weaken it but without eliminating its rule....
An end to Operation Protective Edge with resolutions and understandings similar to the above-mentioned Security Council resolutions would constitute a political and security failure for Israel. They will not weaken Hamas, which in any case will portray the situation at the end of the fighting as a success, nor will they prevent Hamas’ rearmament; furthermore, a large proportion of the rockets launched against Israel are now self-produced. Only a radical change in the behavior of the various actors in the Gaza theater is likely to...
This essay deals with the time dimension of Operation Protective Edge and contends that it is best to avoid, at least for now, a ground operation. During the first five days of the operation, all the strategic clocks have moved together slowly, but this pace is now changing. The clock hands may start moving much faster under the following circumstances: more Israeli casualties; a ground campaign; more Palestinian casualties. Attempts at mediation should be given a chance, and a short unilateral ceasefire declared for this purpose....
It is clear that Israel now faces a Hamas that sees fighting as the least problematic option. Insofar as Hamas believes that it can restore its standing through its ability to attack and inflict damage, fighting is its only chance to stop it from growing weaker and restore its absolute power in Gaza, and in the future, in the entire Palestinian Authority. This is also reflected in the organization’s demands for a ceasefire – not only the release of the Shalit prisoners, but also the opening of the border crossings with Egypt...
The strategic purpose of the operation is derived from the state’s obligation to fulfill its basic obligation to protect its citizens and enable them to pursue a normal way of life. Restoring deterrence to achieve another period of quiet was a major strategic achievement of prior operations and a primary objective of the current campaign. While deterrence addresses the motivation to fire at Israel, the current operation should also deal with the capabilities of Hamas and smaller terrorist organizations, particularly Islamic...
The abduction and murder of the three Israeli teenagers has already taken a high toll on the Palestinians in the West Bank in general and of Hamas operatives in particular, and could decide the fate of the Palestinian unity government. It has already caused a security escalation that could lead to a large scale operation in the Gaza Strip as well as an extensive outbreak of violence in the West Bank, demonstrating yet again that in the Palestinian arena, isolated tactical events can have strategic ramifications. On a political...
The abduction and murder of three Israeli teenagers has returned the issue of Palestinian terror and the military threat from the Gaza Strip to the top of the public agenda. As a result, there is a strong demand to change Israel’s strategic approach to Hamas and to terror and violence in both the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. The government of Israel has leveraged the kidnapping in order to make it clear to the Israeli public and the international community that Hamas is a terrorist organization and that there should be no tolerance...
Following the abduction of three teenagers on June 12, 2014, Israel launched a campaign against Hamas in the West Bank that involves intensive activity on the ground, including searches, arrests, interrogations, confiscation of property, and other actions. The campaign is consistent with Israel’s obligations and rights to guarantee its security and the security of its citizens. To the extent that these measures involve arrests, there is a legal framework that regulates their implementation. Legal difficulty, however, arises mainly in...
The Palestinian unity government was sworn in on June 2, 2014 in Ramallah on the basis of a presidential decree by President Mahmoud Abbas, after Fatah and Hamas came to an agreement on the makeup of the cabinet. This is a government of technocrats whose ministers are not official representatives of Fatah or Hamas. The government of Israel, which strongly opposes Palestinian reconciliation and the national unity government, has no real tools to cope with the Palestinian move, but it can adopt the policy of the US administration,...
A paradigm shift in the Israeli-Palestinian discourse, which will enable a more developed foundation for advanced negotiations toward a future agreement, is now necessary. Specifically, the discourse must shift from national rights to human rights, focusing on the humanitarian rights of the Palestinian refugees in the Palestinian Authority. Israel, with the backing of the United States and the international community, should launch a process built on the humanitarian drive to bring relief to the refugee population in the PA and...