Not long ago Hizbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah was quoted as saying, ג€the Zionists will think ten thousand times before attacking Lebanon.ג€ Nasrallah’s remark appears to have been in reference to Prime Minister Ehud Olmert’s declaration, made while visiting the IDF Home Front Command, that the IDF would face fewer limitations in future confrontations. Indeed, the pressure on Nasrallah seems to be taking its toll. The Hizbollah leader is beginning to internalize what he understands as a fundamental change in...
This study analyzes the different faces of war, from the center of gravity to be attacked to the elements of decision, as expressed in familiar, symmetrical wars; asymmetrical wars against a state actor or guerilla element; and future wars.
The book includes ten analytical essays written by INSS researchers that dwell on Israel’s strategic environment in the period under review. The ongoing challenges represented by the Palestinian issue and the Iranian nuclear program are well documented, as well as developments elsewhere in the Arab and Muslim world and in Israel.
Israel’s Basic Law on the IDF correctly subordinates the military to the political leval, yet is lacking on several levels: it does not define the purpose of the IDF; does not mention the prime minister; and does not sufficiently define the relationship of authority among the political echelon, the chief of staff, and the IDF. The legislation proposed in this study suggests specific authorities for the different leaders associated with the IDF, while preserving the necessary felxibility for leadesr to meet their full...
Ground maneuver is the movement of military forces in relation to an enemy in order to gain an advantage in both time and space. Effective maneuvering deceives the enemy, throws it off balance, and eventually overpowers it, while preserving the power of the maneuvering force. Maneuvering on the ground is also designed to take advantage of success, to preserve operational freedom of action, and to contain weaknesses. Continuity of maneuvering creates new problems for the enemy, and renders its activity ineffective. In the end,...
The Second Lebanon War was waged simultaneously on two fronts: the military front in southern Lebanon, where IDF forces fought in Hizbollah strongholds, and the civilian fronts deep inside Lebanon and Israel, where civilians served as combat targets for both sides. This represented a new height in the trend that has been emerging for some time, whereby the focus of the fighting in the ongoing Arab-Israeli conflict transfers from a direct clash between armed forces to a mixed pattern, in which the role of civilians on both sides is...
The war in Lebanon exposed significant deficiencies in the IDF’s level of preparedness for a wide scale military confrontation. These were particularly noticeable in view of the IDF’s ongoing impressive ability to confront Palestinian terror. The discrepancy in the IDF’s performance regarding these two different operational challenges – combating Palestinian terror and fighting the Hizbollah organization in Lebanon – raises numerous questions with regard to the way the forces are operated and justifies an examination of all the...
Comprising sixteen analytical essays and three appendices, the book explores various dimensions to the confrontation initiated by Israel on July 12, 2006 in response to Hizbollah provocation. Studying both the Israeli dimensions of the clash and the greater regional issues, the book provides a comprehensive overview of the war and posits the strategic conclusions that can be drawn from it.
Beyond explaining where Israeli intelligence erred in the Yom Kippur War, the book probes expectations of military intelligence in general and the relationship between military and political assessments. It considers what kind of assessment an intelligence branch is capable of producing with a great degree of certainty, and conversely, what kind of assessment it should not be asked to produce. Based on the intelligence failure of the Yom Kippur War, this book also reviews possible organizational changes and methodological...
The Brodet Commission to examine the Israeli defense budget was appointed in November 2006 and presented its recommendations to the Prime Minister in May 2007. The Commission was set up against a background of ongoing arguments between the Finance and Defense Ministries over the size of the budget and the government’s difficulty, given its lack of professional tools, to decide between them. The issue was one of long standing and came to a head following the Second Lebanon War.
The intensification of the Qassam rocket attacks on the town of Sderot has once again raised the question of defense against this weapon. Interest in this subject is not new. More than a decade ago, when the town of Kiryat Shmona was being bombarded by Katyusha rockets from Lebanon, the Israeli defense establishment began to address this challenge. Its initial response took the form of the tactical laser system “Nautilus.” The system, which was developed as a joint American-Israeli venture, was supposed to destroy rockets...
At the Israeli cabinet meeting on May 13, the primary topic of discussion was the need to expand military operations in Gaza in light of the ongoing Qassam rocket fire and the increasing strength of armed groups in the Gaza Strip. The cabinet meeting ended with a decision to step up preventive actions against Qassam fire, including targeted killings and the entry of small forces into territories near the border. No decision was made to undertake wide scale land operations in the Gaza Strip, as recommended by some elements in...