It has become clear once again that Hamas feels it has nothing to lose and that it is prepared to resume the armed conflict in order to force Egypt and Israel to hand it a significant achievement: lifting the Gaza blockade, opening the border crossings, and constructing a seaport. Since the eruption of the current conflict, Hamas has been willing to negotiate under fire, because it realizes that it has no bargaining chips at the negotiating table. Its arsenal contains only the ability to cause damage to all the parties involved, and...
On June 8, 2014, the people of Egypt had their say: Fieldmarshal Abdel Fattah el-Sisi was elected Egypt’s sixth president. These elections have ended the long-running public debate whether the June 30, 2013 events resulting in the ouster of President Mohamed Morsi can be construed as a revolution or perhaps a coup? The fate of Egyptian presidents in the last 60 years was not particularly bright: Nasser died of a heart attack, Sadat was assassinated, and the last two presidents, Mubarak and Morsi, are serving time in jail
The two major options facing the Israeli government for ending the campaign in Gaza are an arrangement involving the international system and a unilateral announcement that the operation is over, followed by the withdrawal of troops. While each alternative has its respective advantages and drawbacks, overall it seems that a multilateral rather than unilateral arrangement is preferable. An agreement within an international system would force Israel to confront some of Hamas’ demands. One of the difficulties Israel will have to...
Hamas’ flagrant violation of the ceasefire on August 1, 2014 enabled Israel to change its strategic position and choose an alternative that, at least in the short term, places Hamas in a difficult strategic situation. Israel regained international legitimacy for its actions; Hamas was again cast as a terrorist organization lacking all credibility that for the sixth time violated a ceasefire that Egypt and the international community initiated and Israel accepted. Changing strategic course, Israel decided to deny Hamas veto power...
Operation Protective Edge and the talks that are supposed to end it have brought the political and ideological fault lines in the Middle East into sharp relief. The mediation attempts demonstrate the extent to which the countries involved in the ceasefire negotiations have different political agendas, as well as opposing ideologies and interests. While firmly held ideologies and weighty interests are not an obstacle per se to success in mediation, it seems that they are complicating the efforts of the regional players as they attempt...
My conversations with select leaders of public opinion in social media in Gaza and Egypt paint a complex picture, largely contradicting some Israeli working assumptions regarding Hamas and the situation in Gaza, which have been raised by leading voices in the traditional Israeli media. These opinions challenge the Israeli interpretation of Hamas’ conduct, public opinion in the Gaza Strip, and Egypt’s role as mediator between Israel and Hamas.The four questions I posed to these leaders of public opinion in Gaza and Egypt...
On the night of July 17, 2014, following its decision to advance Operation Protective Edge to a second stage, the Israeli government issued the order to launch a limited ground maneuver. The immediate goal is to neutralize the attack tunnels dug by Hamas along the border with Israel; in conjunction with this decision, the campaign is to continue until it attains the goals of “restoring calm for a long period of time and dealing a significant blow to Hamas and other terrorist organizations.” At this stage, the move involves action in...
Assuming that Hamas will ultimately accept the Egyptian proposal for a ceasefire, even if with minor adjustments and guaranteed by an external party, the question arises whether conditions for a ceasefire and new understandings are indeed sufficiently ripe. The end mechanisms of the current conflict and the ultimate arrangement are meant to promote the strategic goals of both sides. Israel chose to mark Hamas as the responsible party in the Gaza Strip, while conducting a sustained effort to weaken it but without eliminating its rule....
An end to Operation Protective Edge with resolutions and understandings similar to the above-mentioned Security Council resolutions would constitute a political and security failure for Israel. They will not weaken Hamas, which in any case will portray the situation at the end of the fighting as a success, nor will they prevent Hamas’ rearmament; furthermore, a large proportion of the rockets launched against Israel are now self-produced. Only a radical change in the behavior of the various actors in the Gaza theater is likely to...
There were no surprises in last week’s presidential election in Egypt. It was clear from the outset that Abd al-Fatah al-Sisi, the former defense minister and the most powerful man in the Egyptian leadership, would be elected. From Israel’s perspective Sisi’s election is clearly the preferred outcome. His regime is far preferable to that of the Muslim Brotherhood, with its fundamentally hostile attitude to Israel. Sabahi, Sisi’s rival in the election, was also highly critical of Israel and expressed his support for Hamas. By...
The presence of foreign fighters in Syria and the danger posed by their return to their countries of origin could create a security problem for many countries inside and outside the region, if only because of the large number of combatants and the many different countries from which they come. There is already evidence of “Syrian alumni” becoming involved in terrorist activity in their countries of origin and in various combat zones in the Middle East. Moreover, Western security agencies have warned of the danger posed by the return...
According to a number of media reports published in late April 2014, Egypt is soon to sign a large arms deal with Russia for the purchase of 24 MiG-35 fighter jets. If the arms deal is completed, it will represent a significant event in the Middle East strategic picture, another sign of reduced United States involvement in the region. For Russia, this would be a meaningful strategic achievement in its global struggle against the West. For Israel, one or two squadrons of aircraft such as the MiG-29 would not have much tactical...