The Concept of Security and the Negotiations with the Palestinians

On Thursday, July 9, 2015, the Institute for National Security Studies hosted a conference on “The Concept of Security and the Negotiations with the Palestinians.” The conference was part of a Center for Applied Negotiations project conducted over the previous year that examined how attributing different meanings to “security” could lead to the formulation of an updated understanding of security in the context of an agreement, while expanding the negotiators’ room to maneuver in talks with the Palestinians.

The speakers stressed the fact that currently the concept of security is understood in one dominant and relatively narrow sense, which places military and national components front and center. The various rounds of past talks were, with some minor differences, all based on the same meaning of security, and hit a dead end again and again when Israel’s security demands came into conflict with Palestinian demands for sovereignty.

Israel’s security demand for control of the air and electromagnetic space, for an IDF presence in the Jordan Valley, for early warning outposts on mountain tops, and for freedom of action in emergencies, along with the demand that the Palestinian state have no military capabilities threatening Israel and the ban on third-party military treaties, are all viewed by the Palestinians as a continuation of the occupation, making a Palestinian state a second class state lacking the ability to realize fully the Palestinians’ absolute independence, sovereignty, defined borders, and full territorial control.

An expansion of the concept of security for the Israelis may hold the key not only for a change in the internal priorities of Israeli society but also provide an opportunity to avoid the dead end by assimilating meanings that place identity, social, human, and environmental issues at the core of the definition of national security. Such an assimilation has a chance to mitigate the Palestinians’ basic fears and also expand the scope of joint interests.

The first session pointed to the necessity and potential in linking “security” to the concept of identity. A positive identity emphasizes the shared aspects of living in the region – the historical and emotional connections to the location and the shared concern for its future – and the need to become free of the victimization existing on both sides. This does not mean an erasure of either the Holocaust or the Nakba. It is necessary to acknowledge the injustices of the past and learn its lessons, but it is necessary to stop planning the policy of the present as a response to the past and instead plan policy on the basis of a future both sides want.

The lack of an inclusive, embracing Israeli identity was mentioned as another social challenge. If the sense of belonging and ability to identify lie at the core of security, then in order to increase security it is necessary to shape an Israeli identity with which all segments of the population can identify.

The debate also noted that the fact that many parts of the population do not participate in the discussion about security and the determination of the most important issues in their lives is itself evidence of the lack of a sense of belonging. Thus, it is critical to involve all parts of the population in the debate on security, including Israel’s Arab citizens, women, the ultra-Orthodox, and others.

The second session placed at the core of the concept of security the ability of individuals to live full, safe lives in the word’s simplest meaning: living in an egalitarian society that affords each and every individual the opportunity to realize his/her potential, free of fear or want.

The emphasis on these components when defining security leads to a focus on finding pragmatic solutions to everyday problems: affordable housing, employment, education, preservation of natural and environmental resources, regional weapons reductions, partnerships in decisions on shaping life at the local level and through this also empowering weakened population segments, etc. Making these concerns into central aspects of security in negotiations with the Palestinians would make it possible to increase security while relying on the building of shared or overlapping interests. Several examples were presented, such as wastewater treatment, the construction of shared recycling plants, shared treatment of coal plants, and more.

The third session placed personal, economic components at the center of the definition of security, with special emphasis on the lack of fundamental security experienced by women. Referring to the Israeli context, the speakers noted that the most likely existing threats to security in the region are no longer war or the occupation of the state by foreign armies. Rather, the real threats are violence in the home, street, and workplace. It is necessary to deal with security threats stemming instead from the continued occupation of the Palestinians in the West Bank and its implications for the values of Israeli society and what it considers to be acceptable norms and practices. Economic threats become real existential threats to the individual’s ability to live in peace and security. Natural disasters are much more likely to occur. Given these threats, the notion of national, military security also changes, with terrorism becoming more dominant and strategic, operating between the public and private spheres.

This session also discussed the claim that knowledge about security is compartmentalized, reserved by a restricted group, and not open to public debate or criticism. This group defines what constitutes security; it determines what and whom Iron Dome will protect in the next military confrontation, i.e., who and what are more or less important.

The lack of emergency preparedness was cited as an example of a more present and concrete security threat than war, though it is not treated as such. Preparedness requires far lower budgets, requiring the establishment of a system to coordinate among local authorities, emergency response services, hospitals, and so on.

The Knesset members who participated in the conference demanded the implementation of UN Resolution 1325, which emphasizes the importance of incorporating women into decision making positions in general and into peace negotiations in particular as a step in promoting security. The speakers pointed to the fact the very presence of women in the Knesset Committee on Security and Foreign Affairs – a presence that still has to be fought for – results in increased security, broadens perspectives, and questions what is considered self-evident.

The conference closed with an address by Minister Silvan Shalom who noted that at the moment, there are no Israeli-Palestinian talks. The regional arena is focused on Iran and the nuclear threat and on regional instability. The deal with Iran will lead to a change in the regional balance of power and the conduct of the states in the area: the more moderate ones will reconsider their strategy given the gains made by the region’s extremists in undermining regional stability. The minister said that given the signing of the agreement with Iran, he expects the Israeli-Palestinian talks once again to become the focus of regional diplomatic activity.

Neither side is currently interested in promoting the peace process. Both sides understand that any real progress in the talks will force them to make compromises and accept difficult historic decisions. The Palestinians aren’t overjoyed with the French initiative either, which implicitly forces them to concede the right of return and the dream of a “greater Palestine.”

Minister Shalom does support the resumption of talks. He is opposed to any document serving as the foundation for negotiations, claiming it will limit flexibility in the talks and the ability of the leadership to explain concessions to the public. He supports discreet talks that take place far from the public eye to allow greater flexibility in finding an agreed-upon formula. He also supports talks even if one can’t see how they will lead to a permanent settlement but only to the implementation of interim steps on the way to it.

The reconstruction of the Gaza Strip after Operation Protective Edge, a clear Israeli interest, cannot be conducted via Abu Mazen, as he has no authority there. It must therefore take place via Qatar, which has the resources required to invest in the Gaza Strip as well as access to Hamas. Operation Protective Edge achieved the desired deterrence, which must be preserved, but Israel has no quarrel with the residents of the Gaza Strip. Rather, it is at war with the Hamas leadership. It is therefore important to rebuild the Gaza Strip.

The minister made it clear that strengthening regional security takes place through cooperation and joint projects in the region. Israel is promoting development programs with Egypt and Jordan that go beyond shared military interests. With Jordan, this entails primarily water and natural gas initiatives, with the laying of the gas pipeline and the canal project being the most prominent examples. As for the Palestinians, more Palestinian laborers are currently working in Israel than was the case in the “good old days” before the first intifada. This is an important, even prerequisite step in improving regional security.

While the conference allowed only a limited number of voices from the overall project to be heard and presented the conclusions of its working teams, it still managed to demonstrate the vast potential inherent in a public debate about what constitutes security in Israel. The conference did not purport to present a single alternative understanding of security. On the contrary, it sought to present the existing possible range of meanings. Perhaps some would question the approach to security presented by the speakers, and that is a good thing.

Given that “security” is a tool with which a society sets its priorities and that anything smacking of “security” receives preferential and primary status, marginalizing other issues, questions such as what constitutes security, what are security problems, and how does one create a sense of security through other fields, are critical to our lives here. It is therefore important that anyone affected by these questions take part in formulating the answers.

The awareness of the multiple possible components of “security” and an open internal debate will also give the Israeli negotiators greater political room to maneuver in their talks with the Palestinians. The negotiators would be able to justify various moves that would change the relative weight and value of these and other issues, engage in complex “trading” among issues, and form shared interests in other issues on the basis of the flexibility that the public debate on the concept of security can provide.

It is clear that the project and conference are but small steps in support of such a public debate. We hope that the discussion continues with renewed vigor and invite others to participate.