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The conference focused on the non-proliferation regime at a time when proliferation challenges have reached a new level of intensity. This is not the first time that the non- proliferation regime has been at a crossroads, but it seems that we are today at a critical point. Tensions have been increasing because of severe cases of non-compliance and many difficulties have been encountered to efficiently address this issue. In addition, the continuous striving for access to nuclear technology by many states has reopened the bargain between peaceful use and the risks associated with the spread of this technology. Finally, the fierce debate over nuclear disarmament has contributed to the growing tensions within the NPT. Therefore, two years before the next Review Conference is a good time to ponder the different scenarios facing the regime. At one extreme, one can foresee a very dark future for the non-proliferation regime. The regime could become irrelevant, particularly if additional states were to follow the path of the DPRK and withdraw from the NPT. A more optimistic outcome would be to restore a form of consensus in order to build a regime more relevant to the twenty-first century. As always, the most likely scenario is a sort of muddling through: crises will recur, the regime will persist but concerns will remain, and most likely increase for all the stakeholders.

This is all the more true if we consider the inherent tensions underlying the challenges facing the NPT regime. As Emily Landau noted in her opening remarks, from its inception, the NPT has suffered from a debilitating tension between two contradictory messages. On the one hand, it conveys a very explicit message that nuclear weapons are bad and dangerous and therefore their spread must be stopped. On the other hand, states that had become nuclear prior to 1967 are deeply reluctant to renounce their nuclear status since this has considerable strategic value. With the end of the Cold War, this tension has become more apparent, as states clandestinely develop nuclear capabilities in direct violation of their commitments under the NPT not to do so. In this context, with the perceived strategic advantage of acquiring nuclear weapons so apparent to states, efforts to stop nuclear proliferation are very difficult to carry out. By the same token, one should insist on the fact that states are not identical entities, nor should they be treated as such when dealing with nuclear proliferation challenges. Therefore, the assessment of nuclear threats must take into account the nature of the state striving for nuclear weapons, as well as its behavior and expressed intentions.
 Memorandum

The Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime at a Crossroads

Memorandum No. 137, Tel Aviv: Institute for National Security Studies, May 2014
Emily B. Landau, Azriel Bermant
The articles compiled in this volume grapple with questions and dilemmas that arise from a growing sense in recent years that the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) has reached a critical juncture, and that its continued role as the centerpiece of the nuclear nonproliferation regime is at risk. This is the result of a process that has unfolded gradually since the end of the Cold War, which also spelled the end of the bipolar global structure that, in the minds of many, helped keep nuclear proliferation in check.