The Road to Geneva 2 and the Challenges to a Negotiated Political Solution in Syria

The Syrian conflict has long sincedescended into a protracted and bloody civil war, with the regime and thediverse groups that comprise the opposition locked in a painful stalemate,unable to tip the military balance of power in anyone’s favor. The irony of thesituation is that given the deep internal polarization, the ever-elusivemilitary victory that all the warring parties seek cannot easily be translatedinto a political solution. A meaningful victory that ensures a halt toviolence, preserves Syria’s territorial integrity, and reinstitutes a measureof central control requires the main parties to make a political deal. At thevery minimum, such agreement must provide mutual security guarantees while ensuring somedegree of inclusion for all the main parties in a new political arrangement.

In this context, the Geneva 2negotiations should be seen as a reflection of the reality on the ground andthe importance of ending the conflict through a political deal. Reportedlyscheduled to take place in late November 2013, the objective of the talks is toprompt the Syrian government and the opposition to move toward actualization ofthe June 2012 communique of the Action Group for Syria that urged fullimplementation of Annan’s six-point peace plan, which focused on obtaining astable ceasefire. The framework also calls for the creation of a “transitionalgoverning body” selected on the basis of “mutual consent.”

The notion of renewing the efforts launchedin Geneva in June 2012 has gained additional traction in the weeks followingthe US-Russia entente on Syria’s chemical weapons, with the UN Security Councilendorsing the implementation of the June 2012 plan in Resolution 2128 onSyria’s chemical arsenal. But even with these renewed international efforts,the challenges ahead are monumental.

First, with the parties lackingmutual trust and perceiving the conflict in zero-sum terms, finding a commondenominator will prove extremely complicated. At the moment, the most basic,minimum demand of the opposition – namely that Bashar al-Assad not takepart in the transitional government – goes beyond the realm of concessionsthe regime is willing to make. The 2012 Geneva plan was deliberately ambiguouson this crucial issue, calling for an arrangement based on “mutual consent” butlacking specific reference to replace Bashar al-Assad, either as a preconditionor as a predetermined result of the talks. This ambiguous wording was itselfthe result of a diplomatic bargain between the United States and Russia. Evenso, following the October 22, 2013 meeting between the National Coalition and the“London 11,” [1] themain international backers of the opposition openly supported the request bythe anti-Assad forces that neither Assad nor his closest allies be involved inthe interim government. Not surprisingly, this interpretation clashes with thatoffered by Syrian government. Commenting on the Geneva 2 initiative, SyrianVice-Premier Qadri Jamil provided the regime’s take on the “transitiongovernment clause” by emphasizing that "the key idea of the Geneva-2conference is to create an expanded coalition government, which represents allcircles of the society."

Second, the current self-perceivedstrength of the Syrian regime further complicates attempts to strike a deal.Assad’s position has improved in the past weeks with increased internationalacceptance, if not legitimacy, due to his cooperation with the Organisation forthe Prohibition of Chemical Weapons. Domestically, the regime is politicallystronger after averting an American military operation, and is benefitting fromboth recent military victories on the ground as well as the ongoing infightingwithin the opposition ranks. The Syrian regime can also still count on thesteadfast support of its international cheerleaders in Moscow and Tehran. Inthis context, Assad is unlikely to soften his hard bargaining strategy withrespect to the opposition. Indeed, after hearing about the upcoming peacetalks, the Syrian President was quick to declare that he does not see how theconference could succeed, while declaring that he sees “no obstacle” to runningagain for office in the May 2014 presidential elections.

Third, the opposition displays a similar level of distrust towardthe regime: George Sabra, president of the Syrian National Council (SNC), oneof the main factions in the National Coalition, has stated that the SNCdoes not want to participate in the Geneva 2 talksand has threatened to leave the Coalition. The head of Free Syrian Army,General Salim Idriss, also reportedly said, “Wesupport every political solution, but under one condition: Assad must bebrought before a court,” a precondition that is also unlikely to be met inGeneva . In turn, the general level of skepticism and hesitancy of theopposition –already deflated after the threat of international military actionsubsided and following the decline in US support – further complicates the politicalprocess.

Thisis especially the case since the National Coalition,while being the main internationally recognized political representative of theSyrian opposition, has been experiencing both internal tensions as well as adecline in its grass roots support. Indeed, within Syria, infighting betweenopposition groups has increased, while in the past few weeks prominentanti-Assad groups from the Salafi camp have openly denounced the Coalition anddenied its role as the legitimate representative of the Syrian people. Moreover,on the battlefield the Free Syrian Army has long stopped being the mainmilitary challenger of the Assad regime, with competing groups from thejihadist and Salafist camp gaining in terms of both military victories andterritorial and political control of the liberated areas.

The current divisions undermine the chances of a politicalsolution because they make the opposition even more wary about makingconcessions, while also raising doubts about whether the National Coalition hasthe power to implement a political deal and guarantee that other factions upholdit.

Fourth, in order to succeed, the Geneva 2 talks need theinternational community to coordinate policy. Specifically, a unitedinternational community would require both Iran and Saudi Arabia to accept thepolitical process and play a positive role in pushing both sides to makeconcessions. At the moment, while Russia and the United Nationsenvoy on Syria Lakhdar Barhimi have invited Tehran to Geneva, the Saudis havebeen ambivalent over the notion of having Iran sitting at the table in Geneva. Coordinationand unity of purpose is also lacking when it comes to the external playerssupporting the Syrian opposition, and this is even more the case consideringthe Saudi-American fallout over Syria.

Whentaking these challenges into consideration, it is clear that the odds are notin Geneva 2’s favor. Furthermore, the weeks preceding the negotiations may leadto an escalation in the level of violence within Syria as both parties try toimprove their military position to increase their bargaining power in Geneva.Given this grim prospect, the international community should unite and putsignificant diplomatic and political pressure on all parties to find acompromise – anoption as desirable as it is improbable.

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[1] This group includes the core “Friends of Syria”supporters: Britain, Egypt, France, Germany, Italy, Jordan, Qatar, SaudiArabia, Turkey, the United Arab Emirates, and the United States.