Yes to Negotiations, Yes to an Agreement – an Agreement that, even if Violated, Distances Iran from the Bomb

The final weekend of September 2013 sawthe Iranian charm school at work in full force, with a campaign comprising everycomponent of a sophisticated public diplomacy strategy: moderate advancearticles in leading newspapers signed by past and present Iranian presidents;TV interviews at the leading networks with senior female journalists (with the hijaband without); background discussions with senior analysts; non-belligerentspeeches at the United Nations that said “the right things” and avoided theextreme rhetoric typical of Iran’s most recent former president; meetings offoreign ministers that were a thing of the past; and – on the way to JFKAirport – an historic telephone conversation between the Iranian and USpresidents.

Israeli Prime Minister BenjaminNetanyahu, who flew to the US for talks with President Obama and a speech atthe UN General Assembly, faces a tough mission: on the one hand, not to paint himselfinto a corner and become the obstacle to an agreement, i.e., the party that isoblivious to the changes in the international arena and is unwavering inpursuit of an aggressive alternative. On the other hand, he must present aunified, well-reasoned argument that will answer the question of “now what.”What is the proper course of action from this point onward? What is a goodagreement that can credibly neutralize the danger of an Iranian bomb, and what isa bad agreement that will allow Iran to attain a possibility to dash to anuclear bomb?

Israel pressed long and hard for harshsanctions: now that the sanctions have proven themselves as an effective toolfor a possible agreement, Israel should not regret the option of solving thecrisis by an agreement. Now the focus must be on the contents of the agreementrather than the process. It is unclear what lies behind Rouhani’s drive toreach an agreement on the nuclear problem in a few months, or Khamenei’saffirmation of the need for “heroic flexibility.” Do these signal a willingnessto forfeit a military nuclear capability, or yet another attempt to attain thisoption at the lowest possible cost? For its part, Israel must guarantee that adiplomatic deal is sound enough, and ensure that diplomacy yields more thanjust a respite for Iran as its nuclear project progresses.

What follows are ten points forconsideration by the Prime Minister in his discussion with President Obama andhis speech at the UN.

1.    A positive rather than a negative attitude:Dialogue andnegotiations are important, legitimate tools. A stance that takes a positiveview of diplomatic solutions should be adopted, as these are always preferableto military measures. Nonetheless, dialogue is not the ultimate goal, and it mustserve only as the setting for a process that neutralizes the Iranian militarynuclear threat.The Prime Minister must insist on the contents of theagreement and its details,because the devil is in the details. Israelmust be familiar with these details and relay its position regarding thesedetails in unequivocal fashion.

2.    Iran may well reject the Prime Minister’s demands (zero enrichment,removal of all the enriched material from Iran, the suspension of activity atthe underground facility in Fordow and the reactor at Arak). Nonetheless it isimportant to define an agreement that even if containing a certain risk thatIran could break out to military nuclear capability either under or inviolation of the deal, still represents a significantly smaller threat than thedangers inherent in the status quo, which is likely leading to an Iranian bombor to a military move to forestall it.

3.    Anyone examining the statements made by the US and Iranian Presidentscould justifiably assume that there was prior coordination in the terms usedabout the principles of an expected agreement: on the one hand, Iran’s right todevelop sources of nuclear energy, and on the other hand, transparency and verificationas well as “significant steps” that have not been specified by either side. ThePrime Minister must underscore that verification and transparency, while allwell and good as long as the agreement is in effect, are of themselves insufficient.It must be assumed that the agreement could be unilaterally abrogated by Iran,similar to the agreement on the freeze of the Iranian nuclear program thatHassan Rouhani, then head negotiator with Europe, concluded in 2003. In case ofa future violation of the agreement, it is incumbent upon Israel to make surethat the Iranians are years rather than months away from a nuclear bomb.Itis also important to agree with President Obama on the West’s response to afuture Iranian violation of the agreement.

4.    The United States and Israel must concentrate on the parametersthat widen the distance between Iran and the bomb should Iran unilaterallyabrogate the agreement, expel the inspectors, withdraw from theNon-Proliferation Treaty, or operate covertly yet again. This would entail astrict limit on the number of centrifuges spinning in Iran, enrichment limited to3.5 percent, removal of all enriched material from Iran, and return of enrichedmaterial to Iran only in a form that cannot be used in nuclear bombs.Itis important that the verification occur as stipulated by the Additional Protocol,including the right to search for covert sites where the Iranians are violatingthe agreement. At the same time, it is necessary to ensure that the Fordowenrichment facility and the Arak nuclear reactor cannot serve as a springboardto the bomb should Iran declare the agreement null and void.

5.    An agreement that freezes Iran’s program at its current extent –more than 10,000 active old centrifuges, thousands of more modern centrifugeswith a higher output, and material that if enriched to a military level will beenough for seven to nine bombs – is a bad agreement and is unacceptable. Afreeze at this level and a functional Fordow are an excellent foundation for abomb at any time Iran decides to withdraw from the agreement. The agreementmust also include monitoring of Iranian activity regarding development of a warheadfor a nuclear bomb.Iran has never cleared itself of the suspicionsraised by the International Atomic Energy Agency as far back as 2002. It hasnot provided explanations for various activities over the last two decadeslinked to the weapons project, suspicious sites, and individuals. It hasblocked access to these elements, rendering a resolution of the suspicionsimpossible. Indeed, this was another reason the Iranian case was transferredfrom the IAEA to the Security Council.

6.    The risks inherent in the negotiations process itself: it is essentialthat the process have a predetermined final date. Iran is liable to resort onceagain to delay tactics to buy time to advance its nuclear projectinevery way: manufacturing and operating more centrifuges to enrich uranium,amassing enriched nuclear material, developing a plutonium-based option, andmaking progress on a nuclear warhead. The Iranians are master negotiators;their counterparts must be just as artful as they. Despite all the moderationon display, the Iranians have not conceded a thing: experts at taking withoutgiving, they have repeated their traditional positions, albeit with less incitingrhetoric. Iran’s demand that “the Iranian file” be closed must be rejected.

7.    The one-dimensional red line mistake should not be repeated. Theworst deal for the West is one in which only a single dimension, e.g., the enrichmentlevel, is dealt with.That which seems attractive to many Westernexperts – an “achievement” that would limit Iranian enrichment to 5 percent or ensurethat Prime Minister Netanyahu’s red line of 2012 is not crossed (material forone bomb enriched to 20 percent) – is a dangerous, unsatisfactory attempt todeal with a single dimension of the Iranian nuclear program. Any future dealmust also deal with equally important complementary dimensions: the number ofcentrifuges, the amount of low-level enriched material, and the plutonium track.

8.    Small confidence building measures should be avoided, and it is wiserto proceed directly to the endgame.Perhaps the only reason for theIranians’ more conciliatory posture is the heavy weight of the sanctions. TheIranians are looking for significant relief from the sanctions in exchange fora non-significant confidence building measure. However, the confidence buildingroute has failed repeatedly over the last decade of negotiations with theIranians. It can be agreed at the first stage of the negotiations that the sanctionswill be lifted, but only as a “deposit” of sorts, i.e., a promise to befulfilled once Iran has and actually executed what it has committed itself todo, namely, reduce the scope of the program.

9.    The Syrian model is a positive example: the complete dismantlementof the full production complex of all nonconventional weapons capabilities and theirremoval from Syria, extensive supervision backed by a Security Councilresolution, and a maintainedcredible threat of military force. Even inSyria, however, the test lies in the future execution of the agreement andAssad’s full cooperation. President Obama’s statements should be supported,specifically, that the case of Iran and nuclear weapons is far more serious thanthe case of Syria, and that the threat from Iran to world peace, US interests,the Gulf states, and of course Israel is far greater.

10.  Finally, even if the nuclear problem isthe central problem in the Middle East, it is not the only challenge Iran posesto regional peace and stability. The peace process, which President Obama hasdeclared to be no less an issue, has been the target of heinous terrorist actscarried out by Iranian proxy organizationsthat have been majorcontributors to obstruction of the process for the past 20 years. Iran’s highlynegative role in Syria, where it is a full partner to the widespread massacres,and its negative impact in Lebanon, the Gulf, and Iraq must also be discussedin the renewal of the dialogue between the United States and Iran.

A (good) agreement must be given achance, even if it seems that the Iranian move is an exercise in deceit.Exposing the deceit can yield strategic benefits. Negotiations between theUnited States and Iran could go in three directions, two of which could be positivefor Israel: a good agreement that would keep Iran far from the bomb, or aresounding failure that would grant legitimacy to other actions designed tostop the project.The challenge facing Prime Minister Netanyahu is toprevent a bad agreement and reach an understanding with the United States onthe questions of process and essence: what sort of negotiations process and whatsort of deal would be detrimental for America’s and Israel’s vital interests. Itis important to understand, influence, and if possible reach a conclusion onwhat America’s policy will be if the negotiations fail or the agreement isviolated in the future, and how effective levers of influence on Iran –sanctions and a credible military option – can be preserved, as only they arecapable of changing the Iranian behavior.