Every day for a full week beginning August 20, as part of the Government Achievement Week festivities, the Iranian media reported the unveiling of new weapon systems. That week Iran also celebrated the insertion of fuel rods into the nuclear power plant in Bushehr. In all probability, the events were reported at the same time to impress the world with Iran’s ability to progress and grow stronger in the fields it considers important despite the sanctions against it.

The weapon systems unveiled included two new or improved tactical surface-to-surface missiles, an improved version – according to the Iranians – of the familiar Fatah 110 missile, a new missile by the name of Qiam-1, two types of fast-moving patrol ships – Serag and Zulfikar, and an armed, stealth unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) called Karrar.

The Fatah 110 has been a fixture of Iran’s weapons arsenal for some time. It is operational and many such missiles have almost certainly already made their way to Hizbollah. It is in essence a guided version of the Zelzal-3 rocket. The missile uses a solid fuel propulsion system, is launched from a launch vehicle, and (according to various reports) has a range of 150-250 km. Since the original missile was thought to have a low accuracy, it is probable that the improvement claimed for this version lies in the missile’s guidance system, though it is hard to assess its accuracy at this point.

The Qiam-1 uses a liquid fuel propulsion system and seems to be of similar (or even smaller) dimensions as the Shehab-2 / Scud-C, which Iran has had for a long time. It differs from the Shehab-2 in two ways: its nose-section is tri-conic (resembling a baby bottle) like those of the heavier Ghadr-1 and Sejil-2 missiles (and unlike that of the Shehab-2’s simple conical nose); and the tail stabilizers have been removed.

At this stage, it is hard to assess the significance of Iran's possession of the new missile. Its dimensions indicate a range of between 300 and 450 km at most. The warhead segment is smaller than that of the Shehab-3, but its shape may indicate that is it capable of separating from the body of the missile at the point of reentry into the atmosphere and it may even be equipped with a terminal guidance system. The lack of tail fins indicates that the missile has an entirely new steering system capable of overcoming the loss of aerodynamic stability given by the fins during the missile's acceleration phase. Moreover, the absence of the fins may indicate that the Iranians intend to be able to launch the missile from a canister or a permanent silo. Indeed, some assessments suggest that the Qiam-1 missile is nothing but a cheap, available means for developing such a capability, which in the future would be installed on heavier missiles such as the Sejil-2.

Among the ships displayed, the Zulfikar looks like a fast moving patrol vessel and may carry two small sea-to-sea missiles such as the C-802. The Serag is an even smaller boat. From the photographs shown on Iranian television, it appears to carry a small multiple rocket launcher for 107 mm rockets. Both are apparently meant for hit-and-run operations against large navies, e.g. the American fleet in the Gulf. If produced in large numbers, they would be capable of swarming attacks (i.e., hit-and-run operations by a swarm of small, fast moving boats), a strategy developed by the Iranians in order to fight large, well equipped ships.

The Karrar attack drone is a jet powered drone launched from a track using a rocket booster. In photographs, the drone seems to be carrying one bomb under its belly. Its range, according to Iranian reports, is 1,000 km. There is no information about its guidance or steering systems. In photographs, the drone resembles (though it is not identical to) the Soviet Tu-143 Reis drone (also known as the DR-3). It was developed during the 1970s and used for intelligence gathering operations (in our region as well). The Soviet drone had a pre-programmed track and its operators had no control over it after the launch.

The Iranian drone will likely be equipped with a GPS-based guidance system and will therefore be able to hit its target with a relatively high degree of accuracy. By contrast, it is unlikely that it is a stealth drone as the Iranians have claimed; likewise, it is unlikely that it can fly at low altitudes or avoid obstacles on the ground. Therefore, even if it does reach the stage of production and operational deployment, it will be a relatively easy target for the aerial defenses of the side being attacked.

Conclusion

Reports of innovative weapon systems in development are not a new phenomenon, and often appear in conjunction with extensive military training maneuvers or Islamic Republic holidays. This time the reports were linked both to the sanctions and to the fueling of the Bushehr nuclear reactor. As usual, however, it is difficult to conclude which if any system represents a new threat or whether it is all empty bravado.

As in previous cases, the truth apparently lies somewhere in the middle. The Iranian reports suffer from a great deal of hyperbole, but real advances have also been made. On the one hand, the declarations should not be dismissed out of hand, and increased quantity is often seen as increased quality. Years of repeated announcements about varied and versatile weapons systems – with no opportunity to date either to prove or deny their capabilities – have created the image of Iran as a menace to the world around it. At the same time, these declarations contribute to the glorification of the regime in the eyes of the Iranian people.

On the other hand, is a mistake to dismiss the announcements because there have also been real advances. As in the past, the progress that seems the most concrete and real is in the field of ballistic missiles. More accurate Fatah 110 missiles would represent an addition to the current threat, and should they be provided to Hizbollah they would certainly represent a threat close to the State of Israel.

Israel is almost certainly out of range of the Qiam-1 missile. It seems to be in its early stages of development. However, its real threat is in the fact that it is a tool for developing canister or silo launching technology, something that could significantly improve the accuracy and survivability of the Sejil-2 missiles once they become operational.

Increasing missile accuracy – both of long range missiles such as the Sejil and of short range missiles such as the Fatah 110 – means that the missiles, from being a terrorist threat against civilian populations (like the al-Hussein missiles in 1991), have turned into a more concrete threat against small strategic targets such as military bases, airfields, and civilian infrastructures. Increased survivability of missiles means greater difficulties in responding to them and in damaging them at their launching sites.