Israel, the United States, and the Military Option against Iran

In a speech at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy on February 26, 2010, Defense Minister Ehud Barak made extensive reference to Iran, its attempts to obtain nuclear capabilities, and the policy ramifications for the major powers and Israel towards Iran. Despite a certain measure of opacity in his address, Barak did make some unequivocal statements of interest. These express the situation assessment prevalent in Israel regarding Iran’s nuclear goal and the gaps between Israel and the American administration and their implications from Israel’s perspective. What follows are highlights:

a. Iran is a threat challenging not only Israel but also the entire international community. It is hard to imagine a stable world order with a nuclear Iran. Iran is attempting to “defy, deceive, and deter” the entire world with its nuclear ambitions and gain time in order to attain military nuclear capabilities.

b. Iran’s objective is not merely the construction of a “Manhattan project-like crude nuclear device.” Its goal is to skip to the “second or second and a half generation” of nuclear warheads that can be mounted on surface-to-surface missiles with ranges covering not only Israel but also Moscow and Paris.

c. A nuclear Iran will lead to the elimination of the non-proliferation regime. Saudi Arabia, and perhaps another state or two in the region, will also feel obligated to acquire nuclear capabilities of their own. At a later stage this might lead to third-tier dictators acting in the same manner.

d. The model Iran looks to is that of Pakistan rather than that of North Korea. The meaning of this distinction is almost certainly that Iran strives for a solid nuclear capability based on a large number of nuclear warheads and the capacity for launching them at remote targets rather than on single launchers for purposes of show.

e. These circumstances obligate adoption of a clear policy toward Iran before it manages to realize its nuclear ambitions. Such a policy must be “intensive, concrete and conclusive.”

f. There is real activity aimed at instituting sanctions against Iran. The severity of these sanctions – from “targeted," to "hurting," "crippling," and "paralyzing" – remains unclear. Israel prefers the most severe option.

g. Israel will not deny its own responsibility or enter into a cycle of self-delusion and turn a blind eye to what is happening right before it. Therefore, it recommends not removing any option – i.e., the military option – from the table.

Barak’s statements suggest a gap between US and Israeli perspectives on Iran’s nuclear activity, in terms of its significance and severity. The United States, so it seems from Barak’s address, can live with a nuclear Iran– despite its declarations to the contrary. Israel, by contrast, cannot accept such a reality. In any event, Israel must first and foremost see to its own existential interests, even to the point of not coordinating its every move with the American administration.

Barak and other senior Israeli government figures have presumably transmitted similar messages, if not even more unequivocal ones, to senior personnel in the administration. The visible result is that Israel has succeeded in convincing the administration that its threat of a unilateral move against Iran is a credible one. If so, this constitutes an impressive Israeli strategic achievement and implies that the American administration assumes that Israel has first, sufficient military capability in order to create a real threat to Iran’s nuclear project, and second, the requisite determination to carry this option out. This means that Israel’s threats to attack Iran do not only express a tactic of “hold me back” intended to force the administration to take aggressive measures against Iran; rather, it is necessary to relate to Israel’s threats as having a high degree of credibility.

This assessment explains the sequential visits of senior American administration personnel to Israel in recent months:

a. CIA director Leon Panetta visited Israel in May 2009 and again in January 2010.

b. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Michael Mullen has visited Israel three times since assuming his post, most recently in March 2010 at the height of the extensive US ground offensive in Afghanistan.

c. President Obama’s national security advisor, Jim Jones, visited Israel in July 2009 and again in January 2010.

d. The chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Senator John Kerry, visited Israel in February 2010. He spoke explicitly about the administration’s intention of preventing an Israeli attack against Iran.

e. Similarly motivated, Vice President Joe Biden visited Israel in early March 2010.

The officials' meetings in Israel complement the many meetings held by senior Israeli personnel in the United States, including Chief of Staff Gabi Ashkenazi.

At the same time, this strategic achievement on Israel’s part creates great expectations regarding a military action against Iran. Should it emerge – as is likely – that the efforts to halt Iran’s nuclear activity have failed, Israel will find it difficult to avoid acting. Absent any unusual circumstances, an Israeli avoidance of fulfilling its threats against Iran is liable to damage the nation’s credibility and deterrent capability.