The Naval Arena in the Struggle against Iran

The seizure of the ship carrying weapons from Iran to Syria (intended apparently for Hizbollah via Syria) in early November revealed something of the scope of the struggle between Iran and Israel in general and on the high seas in particular, a struggle that is steadily moving upstage. However, the importance of the naval arena in the Iranian context lies not only in the foiling of attempts of weapons shipments making their way to Hizbollah and Hamas. The option of operating at sea allows Israel to refine its deterrent and offensive capabilities with regard to Iran and would allow the West to impose crippling sanctions on Iran if and when the need arises.

The efforts to foil the shipments of illegal weapons received new judicial and political legitimacy after the Second Lebanon War and Operation Cast Lead, and are related to the Security Council resolutions on Iran’s nuclear program. Three incidents were reported this year where weapons shipments from Iran to Hizbollah via Syria were intercepted at sea. The attempt to vary the smuggling methods, the high signature of sending containers by land and by air, and the ability to move large quantities of armaments by sea have all contributed to Iran’s increasing use of the maritime arena.

The seizure of the Francop – perhaps the biggest catch to date – followed a seizure the previous month by the Maltese authorities who, acting on a request from the United States, confiscated the Hansa India, a German-owned merchant vessel carrying arms from Iran to Syria. In January 2009, Cypriot authorities confiscated weapons and weapons-manufacturing equipment originating with the Iranian military industries carried by the Russian vessel Monchegorsk, after American ships of the 5^th Fleet had previously intercepted it in the Red Sea. As impressive as these successes are, they likely represent only the tip of the iceberg of Iran’s efforts. Israel is well aware of this, and therefore since early 2009 the Israeli navy has intercepted hundreds of suspicious vessels. Even if the successful interceptions do not significantly alter the next battle in Lebanon or Gaza, they serve to embarrass Iran and expose its intentions.

Hizbollah and Hamas are not the only organizations supported by Iran. At the end of October, the government in Sana’a announced it had seized an Iranian ship, the Mahan 1, carrying a wide range of ammunition intended for the Shiite rebels in the northwest of the country. This is a struggle that has recently spread and involves direct Saudi Arabian military activity, also at sea, in order to prevent additional Iranian arms shipments from reaching rebel hands.

The attack attributed to Israel in early 2009 on the convoy and vessels carrying weapons to Sudan did not occur in a vacuum. In recent years relations between Iran and the countries in the Horn of Africa have grown warmer, and Iran is trying to establish a military presence along the shipping routes in the region. There were reports of construction of an Iranian seaport on the Eritrean coast in the port city of Assab for use by the Revolutionary Guards. Iran’s growing naval presence at the Red Sea’s southern point of egress caused several Arab nations to announce last month the establishment of “an Arab naval taskforce in the Red Sea,” the first of its kind.

The Security Council’s decision on Iran provides a legal basis for increasing inspection of Iran. In addition, initiatives such as the PSI (Proliferation Security Initiative), even if limited in their ability to establish operational and intelligence gathering cooperation, are likely to serve as a platform for moves to curb Iran’s steps, especially with regard to the proliferation of non-conventional arms. The failure of the talks with Iran regarding its nuclear future may add to the West’s willingness to take these steps, especially in light of the low effectiveness of the economic sanctions imposed on Iran to date. The House of Representatives has even discussed a bill that would prevent oil distillates from entering Iran by land, air, or sea, though for now that bill has been shelved.

Presumably as part of preparations for the day after the failure of the dialogue with Iran, the 5^th Fleet is currently holding war games and discussing ways to increase the pressure on Iran, for example, by preventing its import of oil distillates Despite the fact that it is easier to enlist support (both internationally and within the United States) for a naval blockade than for attacking nuclear installations, a naval blockade is a de facto declaration of war. The blocking of distillates to Iran would be a severe blow to Iran, to the point of representing an actual threat to the stability of the regime. Therefore, even such a limited move is likely to arouse an extreme reaction on Iran’s part, whether by disrupting open shipping in the Persian Gulf and in various oil conveyance, storage, and production facilities, or by harming American interests in the region or the Gulf states themselves.

Israel’s campaign against arms smuggling from Iran has long taken place far from Iran's shores, as in the seizure of the Karine A near Sharm a-Sheikh in January 2002. However, after the Second Lebanon War, and even more so after Operation Cast Lead, the efforts to foil smuggling attempts have been stepped up and occur far from Iran with cooperation from friendly nations in the region.

Israel is especially interested in naval activity in the Red Sea, both as a way to deter Iranian activity in this arena and to serve whenever necessary as a shipping route to Iran and back in the event that a military confrontation develops. Israel’s activities are meant to demonstrate to Iran that Israel is capable of causing it severe damage from a location that is less vulnerable to attack. In June 2009, the convoy of Israeli navy missile ships and submarines making their way south towards the Red Sea was highlighted, in order to signal to Iran that the Red Sea arena is important to Israel as well as to the bloc of pragmatic nations (in this case, Egypt) cooperating with it.

The sea is also of importance with regard to a possible attack on Iran’s nuclear facilities. Reports in recent years have generally focused on aerial capability to damage the nuclear facilities, without discussing the advantages inherent in the various options open for taking action from the sea alongside the aerial possibilities. The increasing use of the Red Sea arena is likely designed to signal to Iran that Israel is capable of acting from the sea too.

Operating from the sea means operating from a space that is less vulnerable than what airpower uses, and allows the launch – without the need to go through the air space of other nations – of long range precision ammunition to damage targets in Iran. Generally speaking, naval platforms allow larger amounts of armaments, are more difficult to locate, and allow special operations in order to attack targets such as command and control positions and surface-to-surface missiles.

In the next battle Israel can expect most of its air force bases and airfields to be exposed to long range rocket and surface-to-surface missile fire over time and in ranges greater than ever before, and the importance of maritime activity will rise. As to the struggle against Iran, Israel must adhere to a policy that de facto expands its strategic borders and take naval action in order to demonstrate more clearly than ever the dangers of Iranian activity. This is also a signal that in terms of its nuclear program, time is running out and all options, including naval, are on the table.