Is a Military Attack on Iran Imminent?

There are increasing signs that President Bush’s administration is having serious doubts over possible American military action against Iran. Statements on a military option by senior ranking members of the administration, including the president, are heard less frequently, and there seems to be less conviction and determination behind them. There are ten primary reasons for this:

1. President Bush is nearing the end of his term. Technically he is entitled to make crucial decisions until the inauguration of the next president. Nonetheless, a president at the end of his term in office is considered a lame duck, and it is not appropriate for a president at this juncture to make far reaching strategic decisions whose consequences will unfold primarily after his tenure.
2. The meteoric rise of Democrat Barack Obama is a clear indicator that American public opinion would like to see a change in the militant policy pursued by President Bush. Military action against Iran at this stage would constitute blatant disregard of public opinion. It is doubtful whether any American president would be prepared to take such a step.
3. In the American psyche, the word “Iran” is to a large extent associated with failures and traumatic events, including the failed attempt to rescue the American Embassy hostages in Tehran, the Iran-Contra scandal, and others. These events have presumably left psychological scars that would prompt various echelons of the administration to shun a military option. It is doubtful that the president would want to add to the list of Iran-related dramas, particularly at the very end of his term.
4. The National Intelligence Assessment on Iran, which cast severe doubts on the existing assessments of Iran’s nuclear activity, and the stark findings regarding the lack of nuclear activity in Iraq, create significant obstacles to a military action against Iran. No president can now rule out the possibility that assessments of Iran’s nuclear activities and the level of their threat were exaggerated.
5. The chances of success of such an action are highly in doubt. There is no strategic surprise: action would take place with Iran well aware of a threatened operation, and possibly able to demarcate probable timeframes for its occurrence. It may be assumed that Iranian security elements have taken preventive steps to foil massive damage of its nuclear installations. They have likely spread the risk over greater areas, i.e., place their nuclear installations in various locales, far away from one another. Furthermore, it is almost certain that they would improve means of fortification and camouflage. The bottom line is that even under so called ideal circumstances it would be very difficult to foresee the actual results of a military attack on Iran.
6. American action, whether carried out independently or with Israel, would almost certainly lead to Iranian action against Israel. Should the retaliation be severe and cause Israel many casualties, it might force intense and long term American intervention in belligerent events in the Middle East. It is highly doubtful that an American president in Bush’s position would make a critical decision that would bring about another American embroilment in addition to its thorny involvement in Iraq.
7. The United States must take into consideration the possibility that military action on its part against Iran would begin a long blood feud with the entire Islamic world. Even those in the Muslim world who do not count themselves among Iran’s admirers would almost certainly view an act of aggression by a Western power against an Islamic state highly critically. The United States must anticipate a massive increase in terrorist attacks against American targets, including on American soil.
8. Action against Iran would lead to a steep increase in oil prices around the world. Oil prices have already hit highs that are negatively impacting on the world economy on a large scale. An escalation of this trend might have very serious consequences for the global economic crisis.
9. Although there is a broad consensus in the West that it is necessary to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons, many will nonetheless view military action against Iran as the Bush administration's drive to overshadow the political and strategic failures of his presidency. Even today there is talk that the State and Defense Departments oppose military action against Iran. The president could, of course, decide differently. Nonetheless, it is unlikely that the president would take a dramatic and dangerous step of this sort when such senior members of his administration and many on the outside do not share his views.
10. Finally, the UN decided on a series of economic sanctions against Iran. Information funneled to the media suggests that these sanctions are already having – or will have – consequences for Iran’s economic status and the stability of its regime. At the same time, there is also talk of indirect communication between American and Iranian elements. One may assume that the president would not make a decision on military action before knowing definitively that all non-military options to prevent Iran’s nuclear activities have been tried and have failed. Such a conclusion is highly unlikely by the end of the Bush presidency.

Should it become clear that the Bush administration is not leaning towards military action against Iran, Israel will find itself facing one of the most critical decisions in the history of the state: whether or not to initiate aggressive independent action against Iran. A great majority of the misgivings facing the American administration would also confront the Israeli prime minister. Certainly this decision will have far-reaching ramifications for Israel and for its relations with the Arab and Muslim world and the international community, as well as for its own economic situation.

It would seem that over the last few months there has been a change in the attitude of senior Israeli officials to the “Iranian problem.” In previous years, Israel stressed that the problem was a global one, and that it would tend to reject a unilateral strike against Iran. By contrast, lately the impression seems to be that the Israeli government’s freedom of (in)action regarding Iran is narrowing. Numerous declarations by very senior figures in Israel have placed Israel in the position where it would seem committed to act against Iran even unilaterally, i.e., without the cooperation of the United States.

In the coming months these circumstances will confront Israel’s leadership with a difficult dilemma: assuming that the Bush administration decides not to act militarily against Iran, Israel must decide whether to act against Iran alone. Beyond the considerations presented above, Israel also has to face the question of maintaining credibility. Lack of actions is liable to harm Israel’s credibility, to present it as a paper tiger and as a result weaken its deterrence. As it is, Israel’s credibility index is not high given, for example, not making good on threats to act decisively after the withdrawal from Lebanon and after the disengagement from Gaza. If it turns out that this time too Israel’s threats against Iran have no backing, the country’s credibility will be damaged further. The Israeli leadership is certainly aware of this dilemma, and will have to seek ways to minimize the damages, regardless of whatever decision it ultimately takes.