Publications
Memorandum No. 70, Tel Aviv: Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies at Tel Aviv University, June 2004
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Recent years have witnessed mounting evidence of serious lapses in the nuclear non-proliferation regime. The author argues that since the actions of the international community failed to correct these violations in satisfactory fashion, it is imperative that a more effective regime be adopted. Rethinking the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Regime is the author’s proposed modification of the current regime, so that the regime becomes more practical, more comprehensive, and more successful.
Table of Contents
Preface 7
Introduction 9
CHAPTER 1
Nuclear Non-Proliferation: Past, Present, and Possible Future 13
The Treaty 13
Threats to the Regime 15
Creating a New Regime 20
Implementing the New Regime 26
CHAPTER 2
Verification: The Main Implementation Instrument 29
The Failures of Verification 29
Rethinking Verification: Moving from the Old to the New Regime 34
The New Regime and Iran: A Case Study 43
Implementing the Changes to the Verification Regime 44
CHAPTER 3
Assessing the New Regime 51
CHAPTER 4
And Then What? 55
Is an FMCT Necessary? 55
Total Nuclear Disarmament? 59
Appendices
Appendix I: Text of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty 63
Appendix II: Verification: A Potential Battle of Wits 69
Appendix III: Principles of the Revised Verification Mechanism 73
Appendix IV: Abbreviations 77
Notes 79