Table of Contents:

Key Findings

The June 2026 survey indicates widespread public criticism in Israel regarding both the outcomes of the campaign against Iran and the state of relations with the United States: 66% believe that the Memorandum of Understanding recently reached between the United States and Iran is detrimental to Israel; 37% assess that Iran won the war, and 43% believe the war ended without a decisive outcome, compared to only 15% who view Israel as the victor.

At the same time, a new low has been recorded in perceptions of U.S. President Donald Trump’s commitment to Israel’s security interests: only 12% believe he is highly committed to protecting these interests. In the northern arena, 81% assess that the current security situation does not provide safety for residents, and 57% oppose a full Israeli withdrawal from southern Lebanon, even if Hezbollah adheres to the ceasefire agreement. A majority of the public— 59% —supports military action against Hezbollah even at the cost of a confrontation with President Trump, and 52% hold the same view regarding additional military action against Iran.

Methodology

The survey was conducted between June 16–22, 2026, by the Data Center at the Institute for National Security Studies. Data were collected by an online survey completed by 805 respondents in Hebrew and 152 in Arabic, with the assistance of iPanel. After sectoral weighting, the sample constitutes a representative sample of Israel’s adult population (aged 18 and over). The maximum sampling error for the total sample is ±3.17%, at a 95% confidence level.

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Full Findings

Perceptions of Threats and Challenges

Public assessments of Israel’s national security situation have weakened compared to May, and the sense of personal security remains relatively low. At the same time, Lebanon and Iran continue to be the arenas that most concern the public from a security standpoint.

• 42% of the public rate the current national security situation as bad or very bad, 37% rate it as moderate, and only 20% rate it as good or very good. These figures reflect a deterioration compared to the May survey, when 34% rated the situation as bad or very bad, and 26% rated it as good or very good.

  • Political breakdown: 41% of coalition voters rate the national security situation as good or very good, compared to only 5% among opposition voters. In contrast, 61% of opposition voters rate the situation as bad or very bad, compared to 20% among coalition voters.
  • Sectoral breakdown: 24% of the Jewish public rate the national security situation as good or very good, compared to only 6% of the Arab public. In contrast, 57% of the Arab public rate the situation as bad or very bad, compared to 38% of the Jewish public.

• 29% of the public report a high or very high sense of personal security, 43% report a moderate sense of security, and 28% report a low or very low sense of security. Compared to May, a slight decline is evident: 32% then reported a high or very high sense of security, and 26% reported a low or very low sense.

  • Political breakdown: 51% of coalition voters report a high sense of personal security, compared to only 14% among opposition voters.
  • Sectoral breakdown: 35% of the Jewish public report a high sense of personal security, compared to only 3% of the Arab public. In contrast, 53% of the Arab public report a low or very low sense of security, compared to 21% of the Jewish public.

Security–Political Threats and Challenges

The Various Arenas

• Lebanon and Iran remain the arenas of greatest concern to the public. 80% are concerned about the security situation in Lebanon, 76% about the situation vis-à-vis Iran, 61% about the situation in Judea and Samaria, and 57% about the situation in Gaza. Concern is lower regarding Syria (32%) and Yemen (30%). Compared to the April survey, there has been a moderate decline in levels of concern across all major arenas, yet Lebanon and Iran remain at the top of public security concerns.

  • Political breakdown: In most arenas, concern is higher among opposition voters. Thus, 88% of opposition voters are concerned about the security situation in Lebanon, compared to 78% of coalition voters; 86% are concerned about the situation vis-à-vis Iran, compared to 72% among coalition voters; and 66% are concerned about the situation in Gaza, compared to 49% among coalition voters.
  • Sectoral breakdown: 84% of the Jewish public are concerned about the security situation in Lebanon, compared to 63% among the Arab public. Similarly, concern regarding Iran is higher among Jews (79%) than among Arabs (66%). Regarding Judea and Samaria, 64% of the Jewish public express concern, compared to 49% of the Arab public.

The Iranian Arena

Following the ceasefire with Iran, the Israeli public expresses considerable skepticism regarding both the outcomes of the war and the Memorandum of Understanding reached between the United States and Iran. A majority of the public assesses that Israel will be required to renew hostilities against Iran within the coming year, although opinions are divided as to whether it will be able to do so in practice.

• A majority of the public does not view Israel as the clear victor in the war against Iran: 43% believe the war ended without a decisive outcome, 37% believe Iran won, and only 15% believe Israel emerged victorious.

  • Political breakdown: Among coalition voters, 30% believe Israel won and 43% believe the war ended without a decisive outcome. Among opposition voters, a majority (52%) believe Iran won, while only 3% believe Israel won.
  • Sectoral breakdown: 18% of the Jewish public believe Israel won, compared to only 4% of the Arab public. In contrast, 42% of the Arab public and 36% of the Jewish public believe Iran won.

• Only 8% of the public believe that the Memorandum of Understanding recently signed between the United States and Iran is good for Israel, while 66% believe it is detrimental to Israel. 15% believe it is neither good nor bad, and 11% responded “I don’t know.”

  • Political breakdown: 71% of coalition voters and 74% of opposition voters believe the memorandum is detrimental to Israel.
  • Sectoral breakdown: 75% of the Jewish public believe the memorandum is detrimental to Israel, compared to only 28% of the Arab public. Conversely, 25% of the Arab public believe it is good for Israel, compared to only 4% of the Jewish public.

• Only 26% believe that Israel’s security situation has improved compared to the period prior to Operation “Roaring Lion”, while 41% believe it has deteriorated, and 30% believe there has been no change.

  • Political breakdown: 51% of coalition voters believe Israel’s security situation has improved, compared to only 9% of opposition voters. In contrast, 62% of opposition voters believe the situation has deteriorated, compared to 18% of coalition voters.
  • Sectoral breakdown: 32% of the Jewish public believe Israel’s security situation has improved, compared to only 5% of the Arab public. Conversely, 55% of the Arab public believe the situation has deteriorated, compared to 38% of the Jewish public.

• 68% of the public assess that Israel will be required to renew hostilities against Iran within the coming year, compared to 16% who believe it will not be required to do so. 16% responded “I don’t know.” Compared to the May survey, there is a slight decline in the rate of those who believe Israel will need to renew fighting (73% in May compared to 68% now).

  • Political breakdown: 81% of coalition voters believe Israel will be required to renew hostilities, compared to 66% of opposition voters.
  • Sectoral breakdown: 76% of the Jewish public believe Israel will be required to renew the war, compared to 34% of the Arab public.

• 54% of the public believe that Israel will be able to renew hostilities against Iran within the coming year, compared to 29% who believe it will not be able to do so. 17% responded “I don’t know.”

  • Political breakdown: 70% of coalition voters believe Israel will be able to renew the war, compared to only 36% of opposition voters.
  • Sectoral breakdown: 55% of the Jewish public believe Israel will be able to renew the war, compared to 49% of the Arab public.

• Only 24% assess that Iran’s nuclear program was significantly damaged during the current campaign, while 69% believe it was either not damaged at all or only minimally affected. Compared to the April survey, the decline in assessments of significant damage continues (30.5% in April versus 24% now).

  • Political breakdown: 36% of coalition voters assess significant damage or full dismantling of the program, compared to only 13% of opposition voters.
  • Sectoral breakdown: 24% of the Jewish public assess significant damage or full dismantling, compared to 27% of the Arab public.

• 52% of the public support Israeli military action against Iran even at the cost of a confrontation with President Trump, compared to 35% who oppose such action. 13% percent responded “I don’t know.”

  • Political breakdown: 75% of coalition voters support such action, compared to 44% of opposition voters.
  • Sectoral breakdown: 61% of the Jewish public support military action against Iran even at the cost of a confrontation with Trump, compared to only 16% of the Arab public. Conversely, 74% of the Arab public oppose such action, compared to 25% of the Jewish public.

The Lebanese Arena

Against the backdrop of continued fighting in Lebanon, a majority of the public believes that the security situation in the north does not provide safety for residents. Moreover, most of the public supports Israeli military action in Lebanon even at the cost of a confrontation with President Trump, and opposes a full withdrawal from southern Lebanon even if Hezbollah adheres to the ceasefire agreement.

• 81% of the public believe that the current security situation in the north does not provide safety for residents, while only 15% believe that it does.

  • Political breakdown: 92% of opposition voters believe the situation does not provide security, compared to 78% of coalition voters.
  • Sectoral breakdown: 86% of the Jewish public believe the situation does not provide security, compared to 59% of the Arab public. By contrast, 34% of the Arab public believe the situation does provide security, compared to only 10% of the Jewish public.
  • Regional breakdown: 22% of residents of northern Israel believe the situation provides security, compared to 8% of residents of central Israel and only 6% of residents of Jerusalem.

• 57% of the public believe that even if Hezbollah complies with the ceasefire agreement, Israel should not— or it is preferable not to —carry out a full withdrawal from southern Lebanon. Conversely, 33% believe that a full withdrawal is preferable or necessary. 10% responded “I don’t know.”

  • Political breakdown: 81% of coalition voters oppose a full withdrawal, compared to 48% of opposition voters. Conversely, 42% of opposition voters support a full withdrawal, compared to only 13% of coalition voters.
  • Sectoral breakdown: 67% of the Jewish public oppose a full withdrawal from southern Lebanon, compared to only 20% of the Arab public. Conversely, 68% of the Arab public believe that a full withdrawal is preferable or necessary, compared to 23% of the Jewish public.
  • Regional breakdown: 64% of residents of northern Israel oppose a full withdrawal, compared to 31% who support it. A similar pattern is found among residents of southern Israel, where 68% oppose a full withdrawal.

• 59% of the public support Israeli military action in Lebanon even at the cost of a confrontation with President Trump, compared to 30% who oppose such action. 11% responded “I don’t know.”

  • Political breakdown: 79% of coalition voters support such action, compared to 55% of opposition voters.
  • Sectoral breakdown: 69% of the Jewish public support military action in Lebanon even at the cost of a confrontation with President Trump, compared to only 17% of the Arab public. Conversely, 74% of the Arab public oppose such action.

U.S.–Israel Relations

The Israeli public tends to view U.S. President Donald Trump as a leader who supports Israel conditionally, rather than as one who is strongly committed to its security interests. At the same time, a majority of the public believes that when a gap exists between Israeli and American positions on political-security issues, Israel’s ability to act according to its own considerations is limited.

• 57% of the public believe that President Trump supports Israel only when it serves his own interests; 27% perceive him as an unpredictable leader who cannot be relied upon in security matters; and only 12% view him as highly committed to protecting Israel’s security interests.

  • Compared to the May survey, there is a further decline in the rate of respondents who view President Trump as highly committed to Israel’s defense (from 21% to 12%), alongside an increase in those who see him as unpredictable (from 21% to 27%).
  • Political breakdown: 64% of opposition voters and 61% of coalition voters believe that President Trump’s support for Israel is conditional on his own interests. Only 12% of coalition voters and 7% of opposition voters view him as highly committed to protecting Israel’s security interests.
  • Sectoral breakdown: 63% of the Jewish public believe that President Trump supports Israel only when it serves his interests, compared to 34% of the Arab public. Among the Arab public, 37% view him as unpredictable, compared to 25% of the Jewish public.

• 58% of the public believe that when there is a gap between Israel and the United States on political-security issues, Israel can act according to its own considerations only to a limited extent or not at all. By contrast, 35% believe that Israel can act to a large extent or fully in accordance with its own considerations.

  • Political breakdown: 53% of coalition voters believe that Israel can act to a large extent or fully according to its own considerations, compared to only 19% of opposition voters. Conversely, 76% of opposition voters believe that Israel’s ability to act independently is limited or entirely absent, compared to 42% of coalition voters.
  • Sectoral breakdown: 37% of the Jewish public believe that Israel can act to a large extent or fully according to its own considerations, compared to 32% of the Arab public.

The Israeli–Palestinian Conflict

• 45% of the public believe that nationalist violence by Jews constitutes Jewish terrorism and is a dangerous phenomenon that must be stopped. 20% believe these are serious incidents that require prevention but do not define them as terrorism; 13% view them primarily as marginal youth in need of treatment and support; and 15% see them as a natural response to Palestinian terrorism.

  • Political breakdown: 71% of opposition voters believe this constitutes Jewish terrorism and a dangerous phenomenon that must be stopped, compared to only 17% of coalition voters. Conversely, 31% of coalition voters view it as a natural response to Palestinian terrorism, compared to only 4% of opposition voters.
  • Sectoral breakdown: 63% of the Arab public believe this constitutes Jewish terrorism and a dangerous phenomenon that must be stopped, compared to 41% of the Jewish public.

• Regarding the preferred approach to the Israeli–Palestinian conflict, public opinion is divided: 27% believe Israel should seek separation from the Palestinians; 25% support a two-state solution; and 25% support full annexation without granting civil rights. 10% responded “I don’t know.”

  • Political breakdown: Among coalition voters, the leading position is full annexation without granting civil rights (50%), while among opposition voters the leading positions are separation from the Palestinians (40%) and a two-state solution (36%).
  • Sectoral breakdown: Among the Jewish public, the leading positions are separation from the Palestinians (32%) and full annexation without granting civil rights (31%). Among the Arab public, a majority supports a two-state solution (57%), and 21% support a one-state binational solution.

• 42% of the public support expanding the Abraham Accords between Israel and Arab states in a framework that would include the establishment of a Palestinian state, while a similar rate (41%) oppose such a move. 17% responded “I don’t know.”

  • Political breakdown: 61% of opposition voters support such a move, compared to only 20% of coalition voters. Conversely, 66% of coalition voters oppose it, compared to 22% of opposition voters.
  • Sectoral breakdown: 66% of the Arab public support expanding the Abraham Accords in a framework that would include the establishment of a Palestinian state, compared to 36% of the Jewish public. Conversely, 48% of the Jewish public oppose it, compared to only 16% of the Arab public.

• 62% of the public are concerned about a deterioration in the security situation in Judea and Samaria, compared to 34% who are not concerned.

  • Political breakdown: 68% of opposition voters are concerned about a deterioration in the security situation, compared to 54% of coalition voters.
  • Sectoral breakdown: 73% of the Arab public are concerned about deterioration, compared to 59% of the Jewish public.

Attitudes Toward the Jewish Diaspora

• Among the Jewish public, 55% believe that Israel should take into account the risk of antisemitism faced by Diaspora Jewry as a consideration in its decision-making to a large or very large extent, compared to 38% who believe it should do so only to a limited extent or not at all.

  • Political breakdown: 61% of Jewish opposition voters believe that Israel should assign significant weight to the risk of antisemitism affecting Diaspora Jewry in its decision-making, compared to 53% of Jewish coalition voters.

Internal Social Threats and Challenges

Civil–Military Relations

• Among the Jewish public, 57% support the existence of a framework combining shortened military service with Torah study for Hesder yeshiva students from the national-religious sector, compared to 32% who oppose it. 11% responded “I don’t know.”

  • Political breakdown: 72% of Jewish coalition voters support this framework, compared to 44% of Jewish opposition voters. Conversely, 47% of Jewish opposition voters oppose it, compared to 21% of Jewish coalition voters.
  • Religious breakdown: 42% of secular respondents support the framework, compared to 67% of traditional respondents, 81% of religious respondents, and 63% of ultra-Orthodox respondents.

Trust in Individuals and Institutions

Trust in the security establishment remains relatively high, although a moderate erosion continues compared to the beginning of the campaign against Iran. At the same time, trust in the political leadership remains low and highly polarized.

• 73% of the public express high trust in the IDF (33% “to a large extent” and 40% “to a fairly large extent”), compared to 25% who report low trust. This reflects a continued erosion trend: 79% at the beginning of March, 78% in April, 74% in May, and 73% currently. Nevertheless, the level of trust remains high and similar to levels recorded prior to the campaign against Iran.

  • Political breakdown: Trust in the IDF remains high across both camps — 84% of coalition voters and 79% of opposition voters express high trust.
  • Sectoral breakdown: The gap between sectors remains pronounced — 84% of the Jewish public express high trust in the IDF, compared to only 30% of the Arab public.

• 25% of the public express high trust in the Israeli government, compared to 73% who report low trust. Here too, a downward trend continues since the beginning of the campaign — 34% at the beginning of March, 30% in April, 26% in May, and 25% currently.

  • Political breakdown: Political polarization is particularly sharp — 57% of coalition voters express high trust in the government, compared to only 5% of opposition voters.
  • Sectoral breakdown: 31% of the Jewish public express high trust in the government, compared to only 4% of the Arab public.

• 62% of the public express high trust in the IDF Chief of Staff, Lieutenant-General Eyal Zamir, compared to 31% who report low trust. Compared to the beginning of the campaign, this reflects a decline (71% at the beginning of March), but relative stability compared to May (60%).

  • Political breakdown: 66% of coalition voters and 73% of opposition voters express high trust in the Chief of Staff.
  • Sectoral breakdown: 71% of the Jewish public express high trust in the Chief of Staff, compared to only 23% of the Arab public.

• 31% of the public express high trust in Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, compared to 67% who express low trust. This represents a slight decline compared to May (33%) and remains below the level recorded at the beginning of the campaign (38%).

  • Political breakdown: 69% of coalition voters express high trust in the Prime Minister, compared to only 4% of opposition voters.
  • Sectoral breakdown: 37% of the Jewish public express high trust in the Prime Minister, compared to only 6% of the Arab public.