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Following the Security Cabinet’s decision on August 7, the IDF has been preparing for the occupation of Gaza City and the remaining Hamas-controlled areas of the Strip. The prevailing assessment is that the IDF will require several weeks to prepare forces for the operation, which could take months to complete in order to secure full control over Gaza. In parallel, the IDF is planning the evacuation of the civilian population from the northern Strip. Despite the decision of Hamas’s leadership to return to the negotiating table, as its spokesmen have claimed, in order to prevent Israel’s planned offensive, it is assessed that the fundamental gaps between the positions of Israel and Hamas are unbridgeable. It is, therefore, unlikely that a final arrangement will be reached. As Prime Minister Netanyahu has declared, such an arrangement must involve the disarmament of Hamas, the release of all Israeli hostages held by the organization, and the complete demilitarization of Gaza, which would remain under increasing Israeli security oversight.

Thus, after nearly two years of fighting, Israel finds itself in a strategic dead end. Despite impressive and significant achievements in damaging Hamas and denying it the ability to operate as an organized terrorist army, Israel has not succeeded in realizing the war’s stated objectives: the complete collapse of Hamas rule, the total destruction of its military capabilities, the creation of conditions for the release of all the hostages—living and deceased—and a fundamental change in the security reality of the Gaza Strip. Moreover, as time passes, Israel’s international legitimacy continues to erode, its global standing is in decline, and the IDF is worn down. This is compounded by a deepening socio-political rift within Israel and growing tensions between those demanding the immediate release of all the hostages “here and now, at any cost” and those opposed to such an approach. The result is a lack of unity in Israel’s socio-political arena, a unity that is essential for choosing a feasible strategic alternative acceptable to the broad Zionist mainstream.

In this complex reality, escaping this deadlock requires a paradigmatic shift that moves beyond the narrow framework of only two options: either a full occupation of the Gaza Strip or a hostage-release agreement that would be seen as capitulating to Hamas. However, an additional principled alternative exists, and it should be examined and developed. This option relies on a sophisticated integration of the military and political dimensions and draws on an already broad and solid regional and international consensus: the release of all the hostages, the exclusion of Hamas from any “day after” arrangement in Gaza, the organization’s disarmament, the Strip’s demilitarization, and the basic principle that civilian control in Gaza will be Palestinian, while Israel will maintain overarching security responsibility.

Main Elements of the Proposed Alternative

1. Israel will agree to end the war and redeploy militarily along the border while maintaining control over the security perimeter and the Philadelphi Corridor in exchange for the release of all the hostages in a single stage. Hamas will no longer be a governing entity or involved in the governance of Gaza. An effective mechanism will be established to dismantle Hamas’s weapons and ensure the Strip’s long-term demilitarization.
2. Israel will assume growing security responsibility to thwart threats and prevent the rebuilding of military and terror infrastructures in Gaza. This will require preserving its freedom of operational action.
3. A Palestinian civilian administration will be established, based on technocrats—professionals who are not affiliated with Hamas—and linked to the Palestinian Authority (PA). The PA will partner with Egypt, which will lead the process of forming the technocratic administration, subject to Israel’s security approval. This administration will operate under the sponsorship and assistance of an inter-Arab task force, in line with Egypt’s plan for ending the war and stabilizing Gaza, approved and adopted by the Arab League (March 2025).
4. Israel will agree to the operation of this technocratic administration for a period of no less than one year, during which the Palestinian Authority will have the opportunity to organize itself for taking control of Gaza, subject to substantive and proven reforms that it will undergo.
5. A Palestinian police force will be established, excluding Hamas operatives. It will be trained in Egypt and Jordan under the supervision of the American security coordinator. This force will enforce law and public order in Gaza and secure the distribution of humanitarian aid, with the support of the inter-Arab task force and international backing, enabling effective control of the territory and population.
6. An international/inter-Arab mechanism led by Egypt will be activated to dismantle Hamas’s weapons, disarm other armed factions, and demilitarize the Strip—in line with the Egyptian initiative and its principles, as noted in the concluding statement of the conference that discussed the Franco–Saudi initiative (July 2025). This will mean that Hamas will be disarmed under Egyptian supervision and later under the Palestinian Authority, consistent with PA Chairman Mahmoud Abbas’s vision: “One authority, one weapon, and one law.”
7. Reconstruction of Gaza will begin only after the release of the Israeli hostages from Hamas—both the living and the deceased.
8. The progress of reconstruction will be conditional upon Hamas’s removal from power and the initiation of the weapons-disarmament mechanism.

In addition, Israel will agree to release Palestinian terrorists who were convicted in court and are imprisoned in Israel, based on an agreed-upon formula. The prisoners will be handed over to the Palestinian Authority and/or Egypt, but not to Hamas.

The logic behind this alternative is twofold. First, it offers a reasonable chance of achieving the war’s objectives without occupying Gaza or expanding the military campaign. Second, it remains relevant even if only a partial hostage-release deal is reached, since it defines the necessary end-state for concluding the war. At the same time, this option enables Israel to uphold its core conditions: dismantling Hamas, excluding it from any “day after” arrangement in Gaza, securing the release of all the hostages, and maintaining increasing Israeli security responsibility. Should Hamas obstruct the initiative, Israel would be able to muster domestic and international legitimacy for resuming a military operation to dismantle Hamas—including the option of fully occupying Gaza.

It is assessed that effective Palestinian civilian control in Gaza is not feasible without the involvement and backing of the Palestinian Authority. Its participation is essential to enlisting active Arab partners in stabilizing and demilitarizing Gaza, as well as to securing international support for implementing the proposed alternative. However, its involvement does not mean an immediate return to Gaza or a direct pathway to establishing a Palestinian state. The PA will first be required to undertake significant reforms, while a technocratic administration governs Gaza during the transitional period. Only after the Strip is stabilized and the reforms are implemented within the PA can arrangements be made for its effective return to governing Gaza.

If Hamas obstructs the proposed framework or delays negotiations on its details, Israel will be free to dismantle the organization and pursue the stated goals of the war in whatever manner it chooses—this time with a greater chance of mobilizing regional, international, and domestic legitimacy. Such legitimacy will be possible if Israel can demonstrate that it made a sincere effort to exhaust all other possible avenues for ending the war and securing the release of the hostages.

Although it would have been preferable for the proposed alternative, with its operational and political dimensions, to be developed behind the scenes, the time pressure does not allow this. Israel should, therefore, coordinate its details and implementation closely with the United States, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the PA. Since there is broad consensus that Hamas must be dismantled and excluded from any “day after” arrangement in Gaza, negotiations should be conducted with Egypt and the PA, which will need to impose the agreement on Hamas. This will strengthen Egypt’s and the PA’s positions while weakening Hamas’s standing. Other actors—Qatar, Turkey, and the UN—whose have consistently functioned as spoilers in the context of efforts to eliminate Hamas’s rule over the Strip, should not be engaged in shaping or implementing the proposed alternative.

The proposal should be presented to Hamas as a take-it-or-leave-it offer, with a short and rigid timetable for acceptance and implementation, in order to deny the organization any opportunity to sabotage the process through delays. If Hamas refuses the framework or undermines it through evasions, Israel, together with its partners, will respond and act as it sees fit.

Advantages of the Proposed Alternative

It offers a reasonable chance of avoiding the expansion and prolongation of the war, developments that endanger the lives of the hostages and soldiers, fuel domestic controversy in Israel, escalate economic costs, and risk entangling Israel in allegations of war crimes and further political and legal deterioration in the international arena;

provides a pathway to end the war—for the sake of freeing the hostages and redirecting resources to Israel’s rehabilitation process;

removes Hamas’s rule from Gaza and establishes conditions for its disarmament;

shapes a new security reality in Gaza and southern Israel;

creates an incentive for reforms within the PA;

places primary responsibility for Gaza on regional actors who seek stability, and later on the PA. These actors will have to prove their ability to stabilize Gaza, with the goal of making it part of a new regional architecture that provides security, stability, and prosperity for regional partners;

improves conditions for advancing normalization between Israel and Sunni Arab states and expanding the Abraham Accords;

strengthens Egypt’s role as a strategic anchor in the region;

weakens Qatar’s and Turkey’s influence in the Palestinian arena;

enhances Israel’s regional and international standing while enabling it to secure legitimacy for renewed military action in Gaza if the proposed alternative is rejected or fails;

reduces tensions between Israel’s political and military leadership and improves the ability to convince the public that a genuine effort is being made to free the hostages.

Conclusion

At present, constrained by binary thinking, Israel faces two grim alternatives: either occupying the Gaza Strip—with its heavy burden and the grave risk it poses to the hostages—or accepting Hamas as the dominant force in the Strip and conceding to most of its terms in exchange for the release of the hostages, a course that would amount to surrender. This dilemma is compounded by the severe erosion of Israel’s international legitimacy and standing and by deepening social and political divides within the country. In contrast to this seemingly binary reality, an alternative path is proposed—one that integrates military and political dimensions in a more sophisticated framework. This approach, involving Israel, moderate Arab states, and the PA, would neutralize Hamas’s influence over Gaza’s future based on already existing regional and international legitimacy.

This alternative has significant potential to achieve an optimal end-state to the war in Gaza, consistent with Israel’s interests: dismantling Hamas; releasing the hostages; ensuring Israeli security responsibility to prevent future threats; and creating the conditions for renewing normalization processes as a cornerstone of a new regional architecture, in which Israel would play a central role.