Ofer Guterman

Assuming that Operation Roaring Lion does not end in the complete defeat of Hezbollah, the issue of disarming Hezbollah will remain on the agenda at its conclusion—an interest shared by both Israel and the Lebanese state. This article proposes adopting the DDR model—Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration—and advancing an L(ebanon)DDR process as an orderly framework for disarming Hezbollah and integrating it into Lebanon, alongside repairing, rebuilding, and strengthening the Lebanese state. This framework offers an alternative to disarming Hezbollah through military force, which would require Israel to occupy all of Lebanon. Although it is clear that Hezbollah will not relinquish its weapons easily, the current circumstances present an opportunity to force this outcome through combined Lebanese–Israeli, regional, and international efforts. These circumstances include the willingness of Israel and Lebanon to enter into direct political negotiations; the military weakening of Hezbollah (and Iran) following the war; the IDF’s presence in southern Lebanon; and the growing support within Lebanon for disarming Hezbollah. On April 9, Israel agreed to President Aoun’s proposal to open direct negotiations with Lebanon to promote a peace arrangement and disarm Hezbollah. This objective is the central challenge on the path to an agreement between the two states, which would establish the Lebanese government’s monopoly over the use of military force. Experience from DDR processes suggests that this model can help, as it offers a long-term, supervised, and gradual process that combines disarmament with civil, social, and economic rehabilitation, alongside international support and reciprocal incentives for all parties involved.

The radicalization of Palestinian society in the Gaza Strip is not a new phenomenon, but the process has accelerated and deepened dramatically since Hamas’ takeover of the territory in 2007. Under its rule, an extremist religious-nationalist ideology has been systematically embedded across all spheres of Gaza life—from education and religious institutions to welfare and the media—producing a profound “Hamasification” of public consciousness. The war that erupted on October 7 brought unprecedented ruin to the Gaza Strip, both physically and institutionally, posing a monumental reconstruction challenge, but also a rare historic opportunity. This memorandum argues that military disarmament and physical rehabilitation alone will not ensure long-term security and stability, and that a far deeper process of “de-Hamasifcation” is required: dismantling Hamas’ ideological and institutional hegemony and replacing it with a more moderate civic and normative infrastructure. The study presents a comparative analysis of Western and Arab deradicalization models and finds that Western approaches—such as those implemented in Germany and Japan—struggle to provide an adequate response to Gaza’s cultural and political context. Instead, we propose adopting operational principles drawn from contemporary Arab models, particularly the “civic-transformative” model applied in the Gulf states, which combines a firm crackdown on extremist actors with re-education toward religious tolerance and broad-based economic rehabilitation. The paper outlines an integrative strategy encompassing sustained security demilitarization, the mobilization of an Arab coalition to provide religious and political legitimacy, and the establishment of a credible political horizon as a counterweight to the ethos of “resistance.” Only the combination of these elements can generate a viable governing and ideological alternative to Hamas and lead to a more stable long-term security environment for the State of Israel.

What options are available to Israel with regard to its conduct in the Gaza Strip in 2026—and how should it act?

The differing positions and interests of Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, and Turkey regarding the shaping of the Gaza Strip—and their implications

How can the potential inherent in the American president’s plan for the day after the war be realized in a way that aligns with Israeli interests?

How does Trump’s initiative for the Gaza Strip create new opportunities for Israel to change the security and political reality, and what challenges might stand in its way?