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The NPT Review Conference (RevCon) final document of May 2010 includes a clause on a conference to be convened in 2012 on a weapons-of-mass-destruction-free-zone (WMDFZ) in the Middle East. The said clause – the result of massive pressure by Egypt and threats to block a consensus on the entire final document if its demands were not accepted – reads: "The Secretary-General of the UN and the co-sponsors of the 1995 Resolution [on the Middle East], in consultation with the States of the region, will convene a conference in 2012, to be attended by all States of the Middle East, on the establishment of a Middle East [WMDFZ], on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at by the States of the region, and with the full support and engagement of the nuclear-weapon States." The clause also mandates the appointment of a facilitator to consult with the parties regarding preparations for the conference.

Whether or not the US was pressured by Egypt into accepting this idea – as reported before the RevCon – recent indications are that the US has become committed to help the idea materialize. This does not mean that the US necessarily likes the idea, or that it will accept additional Egyptian efforts to level pressure on Israel. But Israel's working assumption should be that the US is not going to actively resist the idea either.

A clear indication of the US position became evident surrounding the IAEA annual conference in September, when the Arab states – led by Egypt – pushed for a resolution calling on Israel to join the NPT. The US made tactical use of the proposed 2012 conference in order to convince some states to vote against the resolution. The American argument was that pressuring Israel with an IAEA resolution would lower the chances that Israel would agree to take part in the proposed conference. Thus while the US was signaling that pressure on Israel in the nuclear realm was not acceptable, at the same time, by using this particular argument, it lent implicit support to the conference itself.

Because at present there are only very general statements included in the 2010 NPT RevCon final document, there are many issues to clarify and details to work out regarding the format, concept, and content of the proposed conference. The lack of definition may be an opportunity for Israel to take a more active stance in the process of shaping the conference's parameters and logic.

Indeed, helping to clarify the framing and appropriate conceptual logic of a regional discussion of WMD should be a major topic in Israel's conversations with the US over the proposed conference. Moreover, if construed correctly, the conference is not necessarily a negative development.

One important issue touches upon the overall framework. Because the idea of 2012 was concretized in the NPT RevCon final document, this creates in the minds of some a necessary link between discussion of a WMDFZ and the NPT. Egypt's interest in this regard is no secret: it would like this connection to be reinforced as strongly as possible. Creating an inextricable link would better serve its argument that there is no way to discuss WMD in the Middle East without Israel adhering to the NPT. Egypt fought hard to have the idea included in the 1995 NPT RevCon final document and insisted on including it again in 2010.

But the idea of regional talks on WMD arms control is neither conceptually nor historically linked to the NPT frame, and a strong case should be made for decoupling the two in the process of framing the conference. The most obvious reason is that a WMDFZ deals with all categories of WMD and not the nuclear issue per se. Yet more importantly, discussing WMD arms control in a regional framework necessitates a different kind of arms control thinking than what is advocated by international disarmament treaties like the NPT. The international treaties focus on the weapons, whereas the regional context encourages attention to state interests, security concerns, and the nature and quality of inter-state relations. Without building up a measure of mutual acceptance and stability in the regional sphere, there is no way to address reductions in weapons.

Historically, the relevant experience to draw upon is that of the Arms Control and Regional Security (ACRS) working group that was active for four years in the early 1990s as part of the multilateral track of the Madrid peace process. It was there that a concept for regional dialogue was developed and began to be implemented. The lessons of this experience must serve as an important guide for moving forward. The idea of a WMDFZ for the Middle East has also been a longstanding item on the agenda of the various Euro-Mediterranean dialogues that have unfolded since 1995. Again, the message that has been advocated is one of building confidence and improving inter-state relations as an essential first stage.

In light of deteriorating relations in the Middle East over the past decade – and especially with Iran's developing nuclear program and blatant displays of regional hegemonic tendencies – this logic has only been strengthened. No discussion of regional arms control and security can advance without the active and meaningful participation of all states in the Middle East. Iran and Syria in particular must be willing to sit down and discuss regional issues with Israel. No less can be accepted as a baseline for a regional conference on such sensitive security concerns.

Finally, it must be recognized that what is proposed entails a very long process. Moreover, once regional processes are initiated, an entire range of additional regional issues might surface through the multilateral dynamic, as happened in all the multilateral working groups that were active in the Middle East in the first half of the 1990s. Power politics and regional rivalries are almost certain to affect the talks, sometimes in unexpected and unpredictable ways. All this must be recognized and factored in by the conveners of the talks, who will have a central and very difficult role to play. Regional dynamics – especially in an area like the Middle East – are anything but easy to navigate, and whoever assumes the external facilitating role must take into account the enormity of the challenge, and be fully up to the task.